The Insider Trading Risk in Prediction Markets
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Episode Description
ABOUT THE EPISODE Prediction markets are booming, but can their security systems keep up with their rapid growth?
Daniel Taylor, Wharton Finance Professor and Director of the Forensic Analytics Lab, explains why monitoring prediction markets is uniquely challenging as trading expands into sports, geopolitics and other events.
The conversation explores insider trading, market manipulation, sports betting, geopolitical information and whether regulators need to take a stronger role.
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Brief Summary
Dan Taylor discusses the growth and security needs of prediction markets, emphasizing the importance of surveillance systems and regulatory oversight.
Key points
- The Rise of Prediction Markets. Dan Taylor explains the rapid growth of prediction markets and their implications.
- Regulatory Challenges Ahead. Taylor emphasizes the need for robust surveillance systems in prediction markets.
Episode highlights
- The Rise of Prediction MarketsDan Taylor explains the rapid growth of prediction markets and their implications.“You're seeing an explosion in prediction markets.”0:42Sep 30, 2026
- Regulatory Challenges AheadTaylor emphasizes the need for robust surveillance systems in prediction markets.“I think we need the government and regulators to step in.”12:29Sep 30, 2026
Transcript
Well, it is no secret how much prediction markets are growing within our culture these days. Well, what isn't known as this point is the level of security that is going to be needed around these platforms and the type of market surveillance systems to be put in place to make sure that they have longer term success. Wharton Finance Professor Dan Taylor has taken a deeper dive into this. He is also Director of the Forensic Analytics Lab at the Wharton School and he joins us to discuss this. Dan, great to catch up with you. How are you, sir? I'm doing well, how are you?
I'm doing well. All right, so take us into this research and why it's so important. Well, I think that what you're seeing is you're seeing an explosion in prediction markets. Prediction markets have been around for a while, but they've typically operated either offshore or they've operated as like an academic experiment with an exemption from regulators. So the quintessential, I would say, market or analogy example, really, that people use to define prediction markets is betting on election outcomes. So in the U.S., you never used to be able to bet on election outcomes. You'd have to go offshore to a site
called either InTrade or TradesForce or you'd bet with a UK bookie. And there was, in the U.S., if you were a U.S. customer, in the U.S. there were two exchanges that you could use. One was Iowa Electronic Markets. They had a $500 max. And then another exchange called PredictIt that had a 700, I wanna say a $750 max. So relatively small, like play markets and mainly experiments for academics in terms of like, hey, how these things work. And the CFTC just wasn't into letting institutions or large swaths of Americans bet large positions. There were two students out of MIT who
went to Wall Street, did some trading. And they, like, why, why not? And so they were, I would say, persistent and kept asking the CFTC to approve a prediction market exchange in the U.S. And the CFTC and everybody kept telling them that's never gonna happen, you know, like abandon all hope. And then it was interesting, you know, like this fellow Donald Trump, you might have heard of him, became president and replaced the CFTC. And the new CFTC under Donald Trump gave them approval to begin operating a U.S. prediction market exchange. So the last election, the Trump v.
Harris election was, I don't know if it was the first, but it was certainly one of the largest where people could bet in the U.S. on who was gonna win. If I recall, you could also bet it was a partial exemption for Trump v. Clinton and Trump v. Biden. But now it's exploded beyond elections into geopolitics. It's exploded into, like, Iran peace deals, you know, what leaders are gonna be deposed. They've just grown massively. And really, I would say to note, and this is what gets controversial, what shifted is the type of clientele. So what started happening was they started pushing into sports.
So, like, is University of Delaware gonna beat Coastal Carolina? And getting a market on that. And now sports accounts for, I would say, more than 80% of trading volume on these prediction markets. Have those, has that, like, was that the intention when the prediction market was founded, was to be another avenue for sports betting or sports gambling? I'm not really sure. But now the popular prediction markets, Cal-She is U.S. regulated, and then Polly Market is international. The volume is predominantly sports. And that's created some controversy from traditional sports
books, draft kings, the casinos, saying that, like, hey, this is our type of, our stuff. It's not prediction market anymore. So that's what's created a lot of controversy. Well, and part of this is looking at the type of surveillance, I guess comparing it with the equity markets as to what we're going to need to see and be put into place in order to have some security and belief that these prediction markets are running properly, or as properly as we would expect them to run. Yeah, so I think that's a great, I think that's a great point. They're new, right?
So imagine all of a sudden we just set up, we never had a stock exchange before and we set up a stock exchange. We think that surveillance in the first one or two years is gonna be as good as surveillance five years out. I don't think so. I just don't think that's realistic. One of the challenges, so I should mention that I'm on Cal-She's Market Integrity Committee, and obviously I'm offering my own views, not those of Cal-She. One of the challenges of surveillance prediction markets is you have different types of instruments. So you have a customer who's going to be betting or trading the outcome of the University of Delaware versus Coastal Carolina game.
You've got another customer that's gonna be trading based on whether there's gonna be a US -Iran peace deal. You have another customer that's gonna be trading based on whether Donald Trump is gonna run for a third term. The types of market manipulation and insider trading vary across those markets. So for example, are you really gonna get inside information about who's gonna win the Delaware -Coastal Carolina game? No. Maybe you learn that a particular, the starting quarterback isn't gonna be playing. So that might give Coastal Carolina an edge. But that's not gonna determine the outcome of
the game. That might shift the probability a little bit, but it's not like you know for certain, even with a starting quarterback out, that Delaware's gonna win. Whereas for some of the geopolitical events, you could know with certain. For example, that Trump was going to reject the Iran seven-day ceasefire offer that's now come out that he rejected it. You could know for certain if you were in the military that the US was gonna strike Iran. You could know for certain if you're in the administration that Pam Bondi was gonna resign. So there, it's not like you have some sort of probabilistic edge. It's that you know the outcome with certain.
So surveilling for insider trading and market manipulation in sports is more about detecting someone who's in league with a player. So that would be like prop bets. What's the pitch speed gonna be? You know, I'm thinking in baseball, how many strikes or balls are gonna get thrown? Not necessarily game outcomes. Whereas, and you have to do that over multiple games. So you have to look at Taylor's betting. Always bets when the Phillies are playing a home game. Always bets when the Phillies are playing a home game. And so and so's the sort of pitcher.
And always bets on the first pitch of the seventh, you know, like the seventh inning or something like that. Whereas for the geopolitical stuff, it's much more like Dan Taylor knows that, you know, that Trump is gonna reject the peace deal. So Dan Taylor gets a second mortgage on his home, you know, takes all of his money and throws it all in on the Trump to reject Iran peace deal contract. Right. And then I never trade again. Because I don't have any other, I don't know anything else. So those are two different topologies and those require different surveillance systems.
The latter is more of an equity surveillance system that you'd see in like NYSE and NASDAQ where somebody would trade shortly before the earnings announcement and then never trade again. Whereas the former is much more sports book like casino, like how many times has this person bet on roulette? They played roulette 50 times. They won 40 out of 50 times on roulette. You know, like something's wrong. They're cheating somehow. How important is it then as we move forward here that we have these types of surveillance systems in place because of these concerns
around insider trading? Yeah, I mean, I think that there is a lot, obviously there's, because the markets are new, you know, and people care. Interestingly, I would say the average American seems to care more about prediction markets and equity markets. I'm not really sure that's a good thing. I mean, my 15 year old daughter is talking to me about insider trading and prediction markets because she thought the bad bunny was gonna sing at the Superbowl. She heard about it on Reddit and she was like, hey, I could have put money on whether bad bunny, you know, somebody knew.
And so they traded it in advance. But, and I have to tell you, that's great. I'm glad that you wanna learn about insider trading and all of this, but like the scope of market manipulation and insider trading is far greater in equity markets. You know, hundreds of millions of dollars traded in a single stock on a single day. On a Cal sheet, you know, these contracts for like whether Trump cabinet secretary's gonna resign, maybe they get half a million dollars total volume, right? Obviously the popular media, like Superbowl contracts, things that are like Oscars, these get much more than that, but it still pales in comparison
to, you know, as someone who studied insider trading and equity markets, as you know, it pales in comparison to the scope of the profits that one can make from insider trading and equity markets. But what's different is that prediction markets are more novel, they're more pop culture, so they've captured the imagination and the attention of the American public. But I'll tell you, you know, Cal sheet's trading volumes, it's not that difficult to spot large trades on Cal sheet because if the whole market's half a million dollars and somebody puts $100,000 trade, like it's gonna throw
a red flag all about it. But it's still important to have these systems in place as we move forward. I mean, you can talk about what the penalties would be if you were doing insider trading, but it's still important to have these systems in place, correct? I mean, yes, it's certainly important to have the systems in place. I would like to actually see the regulators take a harder line on the exchanges. So right now we are, I don't think anyone would challenge the statement, we are in deregulatory mode. The SEC's enforcement statistics for enforcement stock market
is at an all time low. They've lost 20% of their enforcement staff. The CFTC either fired or caused to be terminated their entire enforcement division in Chicago. So I don't think that, I mean, you're in this interesting, there's a shift. This administration wants to put the burden of surveillance and enforcement on the private sector, on the exchanges themselves. Frankly, I don't think that's a good model because these, you know, the exchanges, like how she's taking a lead with enforcement, Calcu's gonna invest, got to invest its own money into
its compliance, which it is doing. But at the end of the day, like we need to see people go to jail over this. And if the government isn't going to prosecute, then I think people are gonna see that and that filters down. People don't see anybody going to jail, they don't see any prosecutions. So at the margin, people will think that, you know, there's very little, they just have to pay a monetary penalty. So I do think that we need surveillance. I think we need the government and regulators to step in and, you know, demand rigorous surveillance and demand rigorous punishment when individuals are
caught. Dan, thanks very much for your time today. I greatly appreciate it. We look forward to chatting with you again about this down the road. All the best. All right. Great to be here, Dan. Thank you. Thank you. Wharton Finance Professor, Dan Taylor, joining us.





