Management Behavior: Strategic Silence and Litigation
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Episode Description
Research by Wharton’s Matthew Cedergren finds that plaintiffs considering a lawsuit against a firm give serious weight to whether the manager went above and beyond normal reporting requirements. More: http://knlg.net/1NJEoCX 📂 Finance & Accounting 🏷️ Research
Brief Summary
Managers' disclosure behaviors affect litigation risks, with strategic silence linked to insider selling and earnings disappointments.
Key points
- Behavior Strategic Silence. Managers are less likely to warn about disappointing earnings if they sell shares first.
Transcript
so my research focuses on the interaction among firm disclosure Behavior insider trading and litigation outcomes and I examine what are the kind of settings that lead managers to uh provide forecasts with their quarterly earnings release or whether they decide to withhold those forecasts and whether incentives play a role such as inator trading or whether the desire to uh reduce the likelihood of L ation uh plays a role on that so what are the determinants of whether uh management decides to go above and beyond providing the normal required accounting disclosures every quarter and in addition provide uh more qualitative or more uh uh subjective forecasts of the
company's future prospects so in a recent study of mine my co-author and I examined a sample of firms which announced disappointing quarterly earnings and whether or not uh firm managers gave any warning about it prior to the announcement and we find that when company managers sell more of their own shares in The Firm after the prior quarters earnings announcement they're much less likely to warn about the current quarters uh earnings disappointment so as not to dampen the share price when they sell we call this Behavior strategic silence and what's more interesting is when we bring litigation into the story we find that the likelihood the firm will get sued
after the earnings disappointment is related to both strategic silence and Insider selling and that there's an interactive effect between the two meaning that silence and selling enhance the effect of each other in predicting litigation so the main takeaway for managers who are aware of an upcoming earnings disappointment is that warning ahead of time can save a lot of headaches down the road in terms of litigation and especially so if they're planning to uh divest or sell off some of their own Holdings in The Firm after the earnings announcement uh because this is a key behavior that potential plaintiffs look for when deciding whether or not to initiate class action
litigation against the firm so we're now looking at what happens to the firm's disclosure and trading Behavior after the firm gets sued we know from our prior study that silence and Insider selling both affect the like hood of the firm getting sued but what happens to that behavior after the lawsuit does the lawsuit uh instigate changes and whether or not managers are much more likely to warn of an earning short shortfall after they get sued and also are firms uh much more likely to have their managers engaging in selling uh prior to an earning shortfall does a lawsuit actually instigate changes and behavior in these dimensions
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