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Itay Goldstein: Hello, everyone. We are
doing a miniseries of podcasts
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here at the Wharton School on
the Future of Finance. And today
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we are going to explore a new
phenomenon, behavioral and
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social investing. Of course,
behavioral investing is not a
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new phenomenon. We have known
about it and talked about it for
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a long time. The new element
that has come into it more
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recently, is social investing,
how behavioral investing is
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assisted by social media and the
desire of people to participate
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in a social phenomenon, kind of
like a cultural phenomenon. And
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we saw different episodes of
this with meme stocks, starting
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from GameStop and AMC and
others. And we have the best
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guest to dive into all this.
This is Matt Levine, who is a
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columnist at Bloomberg and the
author of the very famous "Money
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Stuff" newsletter. Hi, Matt.
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Hi, thanks for having me.
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- It's great to have you. And I'm here,
Itay Goldstein. I'm a
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Professor of Finance at the
Wharton School, and currently
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the Chair of the Finance
Department, and I will conduct
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this conversation with you,
Matt. Looking forward to hearing
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from you. So in your May 13
issue of "Money Stuff", in which,
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by the way, you generously link
to the Wharton MBA curriculum,
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you ask the audience, is this
just how life is now? So I will
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turn it over to you. Is this the
case? Are we going to expect
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more of these Gamestop sagas, or
is this just a unique
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phenomenon?
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My gut is that it is more the
former, that this is kind of the
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way life is now. I think that
Gamestop was sort of a proof of
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concept. But really ultimately,
Bitcoin and crypto were a bigger
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proof of it. That something like
social investing can work.
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I mean, sometimes the way I think
of it is that for most of the
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history of financial markets,
people thought of, like, the stock
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market as this sort of social
gambling game, where you were
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trying to out-guess the other
person. And then there was a—
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almost a brief blip of, like,
scientific finance, where people
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thought, "Oh, stocks are worth
the present value of their
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future cash flows." And we've now
kind of gone back to the old
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system where stocks are worth
what you can get someone else to
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pay for them. And people realized
that you could harness social
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media technologies to
collectively influence the
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prices of stocks. And I think
that that just kind of remains
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true. I don't think you'll see
Gamestop again. Like, the real
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insanity of that was kind of
because it was the first time
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and because it was such a
novelty. But the basic idea of,
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like, memes can drive the prices
of financial instruments seems
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pretty, like, well established in
crypto by this point, to the
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point that it's like, not even
newsworthy. And it's, you know—
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it continues to reverberate
through the stock market.
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So this is very interesting. So
basically, what you're saying is
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that our models of finance where
the value of a stock is going to
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be determined by the present
value of future cash flows—you
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say this is a blip on the
timeline of financial markets?
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And people used to think
about it in less scientific
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terms, and this is what we're
going to see going forward?
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You know, I'm probably
exaggerating when I say that. I
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mean, I think that one thing
that the Gamestop episode taught
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you is that, you know, there's
good reason to think that the
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present value of future cash
flows of an asset sets some sort
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of like floor under the price of
the asset, because if it goes to
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zero, then someone can go buy it
and extract the cash flows
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themselves. But I think people
sort of developed this, like,
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rational system, where they
assumed that the present value
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of the cash flows was also a cap
on the value of the asset. And,
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like, that's just— there's no
real reason for that. And if, you
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know, a lot of retail investors
want to bid up a thing for years
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at a time, then I think
what you learned in Gamestop was
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that there's not really a clear
corrective mechanism, right?
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It's not like short sellers can
come in and force the price down
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to a rational level. And, I don't
know. That's like the— that, to
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me, is the lesson. Like, there's—
that there's not a corrective
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mechanism in the short or medium
term for just a meme-driven price.
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Right. And it's very interesting
that you draw the parallel to
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Bitcoin and crypto assets.
Because, you know, when we talk
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about Bitcoin in the classroom,
we say that there is really no
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clear way to price them. So
there is really no way to tell
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what is the right price for
Bitcoin. So you think basically
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that Bitcoin and other
cryptocurrencies are maybe the
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central phenomenon,
and Gamestop was
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maybe one other example of that?
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I kind of think that, yeah. I
kind of think that, like,
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GameStop being a stock that
moved, like a coordinated social
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movement for a few months was
really interesting. And, like,
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sort of brought it to— closer to
the financial mainstream. But
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that's also true in a less silly
but more important way of
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Bitcoin, right? I mean, like,
you know, when you talk about,
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like, how you value Bitcoin, it
is, like— any, any— any sort of
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legitimate— any real effort to
value it is going to be based on
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its social adoption, right? If
people buy it, then it's worth a
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lot of money, and if no one
believes in it, then it's not
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worth a lot of money. And that
is the sort of core of what
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happened in GameStop, right?
Where, like, GameStop was also a
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company. But like, the sort of
real meme-driven stuff was— was
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about just, like, the— its
popularity in the— in the— in a
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social investing universe.
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I think that Bitcoin
is the
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clearer illustration of how
strange this is,
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and how, like, enduring it is,
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right? I mean, Bitcoin has— has
had a five-figure valuation for
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years now. Its— its social
adoption is enough to drive the
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value in a way that it wasn't
really for the— for the long
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term, for GameStop.
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Yeah. So, you know, when we talk
about it as economists, we would
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think about it as kind of a
coordination problem, where if
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everyone thinks it's valuable,
it will be valuable. If no one
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thinks it's valuable, it will
not be valuable, and then it can
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kind of end up anywhere in terms
of price. And you're right, we—
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And Bitcoin is sort of like, self
consciously that, right? It's
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like, it's meant to be a
currency, right? So it's like,
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sort of everyone understands
that it's a coordination
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problem, whereas there's no
reason for Gamestop to work that
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way. It just did for a while.
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Right. Yeah, exactly. And this
is, I think, where the deviation
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is. That with GameStop, there is
a way to price it that is not
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based on coordination. With
Bitcoin, there isn't. But the
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fact that this migrated into
Gamestop and AMC was really the
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new thing, and maybe the very
interesting element here.
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So, you know,
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diving a bit deeper into that,
what do you think are the sort
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of psychological and social
triggers that were behind the
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AMC and Gamestop saga? How would
you characterize them?
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I do think that there is— there
is a cultural moment that is
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somewhat pandemic-driven, right?
I mean, people were— a lot of
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people were stuck at home. They
had a lot fewer entertainment
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options. They were sort of
turning to the internet for
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entertainment because, you know,
sporting events and television
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shows were canceled, and, like,
live events were canceled. And
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so it was easier. You know,
there's like, a lower bar for
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entertainment. So like, going to
a message board and talking
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about trading Gamestop options
was relatively more entertaining
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than— than it would have been at
any other time.
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And it was just, like, a real— you
know, it fed on itself in the
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sense that, like,
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people were having fun trading
GameStop. Gamestop went up. This
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got attention. Gamestop went up
more, and then it became like a
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truly insane event where people
were making, you know, 10,000%
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returns in a couple of days. And
so that attracted a lot of
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people, right? It was a
combination of, like, people
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were making a lot of money very
quickly, and also they were just
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very evidently having a lot of
fun doing it. That attracted a
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lot of people. So, like, one
thing that happened in Gamestop
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is that the stock went up a lot.
But another thing that happened
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is that the number of users of
the Wall Street Bets message
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board went— went from like,
you know, under a million to
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like, 8 million people in a
couple of days. And that just,
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you know— it was a— in a time
where people were starved for
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entertainment and starved for,
like, social interaction. That
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was a very fun place to be
socializing. And like, the coin
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of socializing there was you
buying and holding GameStop.
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Right. So this is all sort of
pandemic era driven, as you say.
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But then when you saw this
coming back in May of this year,
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what were you thinking?
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One thing I was thinking is, this
can't work as well again, just
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for, like, entertainment
reasons, right? It's just not as
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fun the second time. And it
wasn't, right? I mean, like,
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people were interested in it.
And, you know, what happened is
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that— that Keith Gil, the sort of
like "influencer" who was the main
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driving force behind the first
Gamestop rally— I'm not sure
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that's true. He was the mascot
of the first Gamestop rally. He
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came back to Twitter to sort of
tweet inscrutable things, and to
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sort of try to get the band back
together. And people were
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interested, and the stock shot up,
and Gamestop was able to do an
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at-the-market stock offering.
But it was never— it
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didn't have anything like either
the financial or the cultural
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impact that it had the previous
time, right? I mean, it just— the
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stock did not go up that much.
And it got attention in, like,
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the financial press. But it was,
you know— the sort of original
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Gamestop rally was, you know—
it was on <i>Good Morning</i>
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<i>America</i>. It was, like, the biggest
news story in the world. Keith
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Gill coming back was like a
financial niche news story.
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Right. So, you know,
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when we analyze
financial markets, we tend to
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think about retail investors and
institutional investors. And the
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usual thinking is that
institutional investors are
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going to be more sophisticated.
They are the experts. They have
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time, they have money to do the
research, and at the end of the
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day, they will know how to pick
the stocks. And then the retail
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investors, those who are maybe
more naive, they don't have the
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financial resources to make the
right investment. At the end of
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the day, they might be taken
advantage of. This was not
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exactly how things played out in
these episodes. So, did these
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episodes lead you to reconsider
the way you're thinking about
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institutional versus retail
investors?
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I think that it suggests that
retail investors have more power
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than you would have expected,
right? It— like, I have read for
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years, people saying— you know,
on Reddit or whatever— people
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talking about gamma squeezes,
right? Like saying, if we all
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buy call options, then that will
force the price of the stock up,
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and dealers will have to hedge
their call options by buying
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more stock, and then the stock
will keep going up, and the
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dealers will have to buy more to
keep hedging, and the stock will
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sort of spiral up infinitely.
And I would read that and say,
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okay, like, there's no, you
know, perpetual motion machine.
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But also, like, how big of an
impact on a big liquid stock,
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can retail call option buying
have? And the answer is, like,
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much more than I expected,
right? It's just that you think
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of, like, retail investors as
being, like, dispersed and kind of
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random, right? Because they're—
they're— you know,
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traditionally, don't have access
to a lot of information. But
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they're also just, like,
individuals with small accounts.
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And one thing that you learned
in the Gamestop saga is that
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retail investors can kind of
coordinate around one thing,
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where they're all buying the
same call options at the same
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company at the same time. And
then the stock really does go
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up. And the stuff about gamma
screws is— that sort of like
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looks like an urban legend—
turns out to be kind of true
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some of the time. So I think
that has been an interesting
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shift where retail investors,
like, just have the power to
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move markets in a way that
nobody really expected. And you
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see that in, like, institutional
investors being much more
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cautious about short selling.
And particularly, like, you know,
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vocal activist short selling,
because they worry that if they
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go after a company, they short a
company, some— you know, some
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retail investors on a message
board will say, you know, "Let's
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go after that hedge fund." And
like, it turns out that if they
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all do that, then, like, it can
have a material effect on the
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hedge fund.
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You know, your question—
you talk about, like,
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you know, retail investors being
less sophisticated and having
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less access to information. I
don't know that, like, the retail
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investors, like, in the long run,
look particularly smart from the
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Gamestop episode, right? It's
not like Gamestop is killing it
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in their business.
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I think
there's like, interesting
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effects where, like, GameStop
and AMC were able to raise so
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much money and sort of, like,
get some runway from their
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retail involvement. And like,
that has interestingly shifted
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the dynamics of the underlying
businesses. But, like,
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ultimately, I don't know. Like—
like, you know, the hedge funds
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who were shorting GameStop— I
don't know. The hedge funds shorting
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Gamestop at, like, $14 maybe
they were wrong. But the hedge funds
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short in Gamestop at, you know,
$80 seem right, but they also
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got blown up. And I don't think
that, like, this is a story of
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retail investors being better
analysts of companies than
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professional investors. But I do
think it's a story of, like,
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retail investors coordinating in
a way that is much more
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impactful on the market than
anyone really thought.
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Yeah, I completely agree. I
mean, it's not that they did the
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underlying analysis, but it is
that when they come together,
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they managed to move markets in a
way that puts institutional
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investors in a bind, in a way
that they didn't really expect.
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So I think in that sense, it's a
little more subtle than the
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traditional story we had about
retail versus institutions.
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Yeah. You know, I read a lot about,
like, market structure and
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about, you know, like— like
like, high frequency trading
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firms, market making to retail
traders. And like, everyone's
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model there is that retail
traders are— I'm sorry, I shouldn't
00:15:03
say everyone's model. The
popular perception is that
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retail traders are sort of
random noise traders, where,
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like, they'll buy a stock or
sell a stock, but there's no,
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overarching coordination
among retail traders. And so you
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can, like, make a lot of money
market making to retail traders,
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because, like, they are, like,
you know, buying at the— at the—
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at the offer and selling at the
bid, and not— not like,
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predictive of prices. And you
see in— like, I don't really know
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how market makers did in this. I
think they did very well for the
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most part. But like, you see in
this that retail trades are,
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like, much more predictive than
people would have thought,
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right? Like that they are— that
there is a— like, a
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directionality to retail trades,
where, like, if one retail
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trader— like, sometimes, if one
retail trader buys a stock, that
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is a sign the stock is going to
keep going up, because a lot of
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other retail traders are going
to buy it. And that's just like
00:15:54
an interesting shift where, you
know, like, a retail trader is
00:15:59
not an atomized individual
buying stock, sort of like
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independent of all other retail
traders. There is, like, this
00:16:05
ability for retail traders to
coordinate.
00:16:08
Right. So you mentioned the fact
00:16:11
that AMC and Gamestop
were able to
00:16:13
raise capital out of this
increase in stock price. And at
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the end of the day, you know,
for example, in the case of AMC,
00:16:21
this led them to avoid
bankruptcy, which I think was a
00:16:27
real concern at that point. And
I think this raises a very
00:16:31
interesting question. Because at
the end of the day, if this just
00:16:34
stays in the financial market,
some people make money, some
00:16:37
people lose money,
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you know, you can say
it's okay. People go to the
00:16:40
financial market at their own
risk, and they should be
00:16:43
prepared to lose money. But when
this kind of spills over to the
00:16:46
real economy in the way that it
did here, because you have a
00:16:49
firm that is able to raise more
capital and stay in business,
00:16:52
even though maybe shouldn't
have, then I think this raises
00:16:56
deeper questions. Are you
worried about that? That firms
00:16:59
are using this phenomenon?
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I sort of put myself in the shoes
of the CFOs, and think, well,
00:17:05
how could you not, right? I mean,
how could you not try to raise
00:17:08
money here? I also think that,
you know, it's an interesting— I
00:17:13
mentioned earlier the idea that
there's no mechanism to cap the
00:17:20
price of a company at its, like,
cash flows, right? Like, there's
00:17:23
no mechanism for, if retail
investors all want to buy a
00:17:26
stock, there's no mechanism to
prevent the price from going to,
00:17:29
you know, as high as they want.
But of course, there is, which
00:17:32
is, the company can sell the
stock, right? And you see a
00:17:34
little bit of that in some of
the meme stock episodes, where,
00:17:37
like, if the price gets too
high, the company is going to
00:17:40
hit the bid, and then the price
will come down to a more
00:17:44
reasonable level. In part
because, like, there'll be more
00:17:47
supply. But also, in part
because, like, it sort of
00:17:50
deflates the social phenomenon.
If, like, if everyone's like,
00:17:54
"Oh, we're buying and holding," and
then the company's like, "We're a
00:17:56
seller at this price." It's like,
sort of bad for the meme. But,
00:18:04
you know, I think it's probably
bad if financial markets are
00:18:08
allocating capital on retail
wins. So it's not that bad,
00:18:12
right? Like, there— there are
other like, forms of gambling
00:18:15
and— and— that are probably, you
know, equally expensive. And you—
00:18:21
like, there's something
interesting about AMC, right?
00:18:23
Because, like, on the one hand,
their business was struggling,
00:18:27
and they got a lifeline from
meme stock investors. On the
00:18:31
other hand, like, those meme stock
investors were not driven by,
00:18:34
like, pure irrationality. They
were driven by, like, nostalgia
00:18:37
for movie theaters, right? And
their business was struggling,
00:18:39
in part, like— there were other
problems, but in part because
00:18:42
they were in a pandemic where
they couldn't show movies,
00:18:44
right? So the idea that, like,
these retail investors, driven by
00:18:47
nostalgia, were sort of bridging
them through a difficult
00:18:50
business period— like— like, it
doesn't seem that bad, right? It
00:18:53
seems like, in some ways, like—
the retail investors, like, made
00:18:57
a sort of, like, rational
allocation of capital there.
00:19:02
I do think that you can look at
some of these— there is, like, a
00:19:11
real cynicism to some of the
capital raising off of meme
00:19:14
stocks. But at the same time,
like, you know, the most cynical
00:19:20
looking of— well, I shouldn't
say that. One very cynical
00:19:23
looking trade was when Hertz
raised money from meme stock
00:19:26
investors while it was in
bankruptcy, which is just a
00:19:29
crazy thing to do. But also,
like, it emerged from bankruptcy
00:19:33
with equity value, and those
meme stock investors made money.
00:19:35
Which is, again, like— it's a
pandemic-driven thing where,
00:19:38
like, the business crashed and
then recovered, and the meme
00:19:40
stock investors sort of bridged
them through the pandemic. There
00:19:44
are other cases. I mean, Bed
Bath and Beyond is a case where
00:19:47
they raised money from meme
stock investors all the way to
00:19:49
zero in a way that looks really
cynical and looked really like a
00:19:53
transfer of money from retail
investors to, essentially, bond
00:19:57
holders. But I don't know how
big of a misallocation of
00:20:04
capital it was, because they did go
back to pretty short order.
00:20:07
No, you're making good points
here. I mean, I think it is
00:20:11
clear that this meme stock
phenomenon can help firms go
00:20:16
through a bad time. Whether this
is good or bad, it's not— it's
00:20:21
not clear. It depends on whether
the underlying stress was
00:20:24
efficient or not. And yeah,
certainly there was some
00:20:27
business proposition behind AMC
staying alive. So in that sense,
00:20:32
maybe— maybe the investors did
them a favor.
00:20:35
If your model is that, like, the
retail investors doing this are
00:20:38
are just always, like,
systematically less rational
00:20:42
than institutional investors
who'd normally fund companies,
00:20:46
then, yeah, this is bad. I think
that model is like, you know,
00:20:50
largely correct, but it's not
like— it's not like, so
00:20:52
obviously correct, right? I
mean, institutional investors
00:20:54
make mistakes too.
00:20:55
Yes, absolutely. I would be
the first one to agree with
00:20:58
that. So if you are a regulator
sitting and watching all this,
00:21:03
what are your main takeaways?
What do you think should be done
00:21:06
to make financial markets more
orderly?
00:21:10
I'm sympathetic to the actual
response of regulators, which
00:21:12
was kind of that this is all
fine. Embarrassing, but fine.
00:21:17
Like— like, when the Gamestop
thing originally happened, there
00:21:23
was a lot of interest in whether
there was some sort of, like,
00:21:26
secret coordination pump and
dump, where the people on Reddit
00:21:32
touting Gamestop were like,
secretly, you know, doing
00:21:36
something nefarious. And it
doesn't ever look like that was
00:21:41
true, right? It just looked like
they liked the stock. There was
00:21:45
maybe an awkward amount of
coordination, an awkward amount
00:21:47
of cheerleading. But, like no one
was lying, really. And that's
00:21:51
like, the main thing that the SEC
is concerned about, is, like,
00:21:56
people misrepresent—
misrepresent things, or lying.
00:21:59
This strikes me as like, kind of
an emergent phenomenon of retail
00:22:02
traders, and one that, like,
kind of can't be regulated away,
00:22:07
because it's like— you know, if
people want to put their money
00:22:11
on this thing, then— then
they're allowed to. Now, you
00:22:14
see, like— you know, there's
tinkering at the edges, right? I
00:22:16
mean, the— like, one thing that
came out of this was— was the
00:22:19
move to T+1 settlement,
which is a really arcane
00:22:23
response to the Gamestop saga.
But like, you know, basically
00:22:28
the Gamestop, like, phenomenon led
to increased credit risk of
00:22:36
clearing, because everyone was
buying the stock at, like, you
00:22:38
know— this incredibly volatile
stock at, like, increasing
00:22:41
prices. And so that led to, like,
hiccups in the system of, like,
00:22:47
stock settlement, where, like,
Robin Hood was getting giant
00:22:49
margin calls from the clearing
house. And so the— the SEC
00:22:52
subsequently moved to T+1
settlement to kind of like tamp
00:22:55
that down. Another response you
saw is that the SEC sort of
00:23:00
expressed very clear skepticism
about companies raising capital
00:23:04
off meme stock things, and they
sort of demanded that companies
00:23:07
put a lot of, like, dire warnings
in their prospectuses when they
00:23:13
did these offerings. But of
course, when you do a retail at-
00:23:16
the-market offering, zero of
your investors read the
00:23:19
prospectus. So it doesn't really
matter. I don't know that
00:23:23
there's much that they can do.
And I do think that, like,
00:23:26
again, this was, like a thing
that happened during the
00:23:28
pandemic as a sort of, like,
entertainment substitute. And
00:23:31
you look at what entertainment
options are available to people
00:23:36
these days, like, it's a lot of
gambling. And so, like, I'm not
00:23:40
sure that, like, investing in
Gamestop options is— is that
00:23:45
much different or that much
worse than, you know, betting on
00:23:50
sports. And so, like, the
regulators are in a bit of a
00:23:52
bind. I think it's very
embarrassing for the SEC to have
00:23:57
this occur, because they would
love for financial markets to
00:24:01
just look more orderly and
rational and less like an insane
00:24:05
entertainment product. But
people are coming to the stock
00:24:10
market for a lot of reasons, and
one of them is clearly entertainment.
00:24:13
Right. Yeah, and
I think they will have a problem
00:24:15
thinking about the stock market
as a casino. They would like it
00:24:19
to be a place where allocation
of capital is being done, and I
00:24:23
think this is why they look at
it,
00:24:25
and are a little worried by that.
00:24:27
I think that's right. But I also think,
like— the SEC has such a bias and
00:24:33
mission in favor of retail
investors. And that includes
00:24:35
letting retail investors do what
they want, right? I mean, like,
00:24:38
if your goal is efficient
allocation of capital, you might
00:24:42
be sort of skeptical of a lot of retail
investor decision making, right?
00:24:48
You might be like, "Everyone's
got to put everything into index
00:24:50
fund, and only professionals can
trade stocks." But that's, like,
00:24:54
not the American way. And— and I
think that there is a bias
00:24:58
towards letting retail investors
do what they want, even if the
00:25:01
SEC is sure it's bad for them.
I also think that, like— I talked
00:25:05
about Hertz. The SEC stopped the
Hertz equity offering, and that
00:25:10
offering, like, turned out to be
a good idea for the people who
00:25:13
were buying it, right? I mean,
like, the stock— in the sense that
00:25:15
the stock went up, right? So the
SEC, like, doesn't always know
00:25:19
what is irrational for retail
investors.
00:25:21
Yeah. So, you know, to close our
conversation, I want to ask you
00:25:26
more broadly where else do you
think we are going to see
00:25:30
episodes like this? And I want
to bring up something that is
00:25:32
related, but also different in
many ways. And this is the
00:25:36
Silicon Valley Bank that, you
know, had the biggest bank run
00:25:41
in history, and it was also
driven by social media. Of
00:25:45
course, you know, this is not
the stock market. It's a bank,
00:25:47
people pulling out deposits. But
at the end of the day, there
00:25:51
were some similarities because
of the contagion that happens
00:25:54
through social media. So do you
see some connection? Where do
00:25:59
you think we are going to see
more action along these lines?
00:26:04
Yeah. I mean, SVB— I think SVB
is interesting because, like,
00:26:11
SVB collapsed because of a bank
run. And the people doing that
00:26:15
bank run were largely, like,
very sophisticated, well
00:26:18
connected, you know, sort of VCs
and tech startups who are like,
00:26:23
you know, largely the depositors
there. And people talk about it
00:26:26
being a social-media-driven bank
run. But I think a lot of, like,
00:26:30
my gut sense is that a lot of
what happened there was not
00:26:33
happening on, like Twitter, but
on, you know, private text
00:26:37
messages or just like, phone
calls between VCs, right? So
00:26:40
it's not exactly social-media-
driven. It's like, a fast, tech-
00:26:44
intermediated sort of
traditional rumor mill. The
00:26:47
interesting bank run, from a
social media perspective, was
00:26:52
like— Credit Suisse, before it
collapsed— like, not the day
00:26:56
before it collapsed, but in the
months leading up to its
00:26:58
collapse, there were a lot of
like, you know, Redditors trying
00:27:03
to take down Credit Suisse. And
I do think that, like, the
00:27:06
possibility of coordinating a
bank run on social media is
00:27:12
interesting. It is, as you say,
like, the inverse of the— of the
00:27:15
of the, you know, meme stock
phenomenon. Where, you know, if—
00:27:19
if people on social media can
get together to drive a stock
00:27:23
up, they can get together
to drive it down. And
00:27:27
in general, you know, as I said
at the beginning, like, the— you
00:27:30
know, cash flows are a floor on a
stock price, right? And like,
00:27:33
you can't really come together
to drive the stock price of,
00:27:36
like, Tesla to zero. But you kind
of can with a bank, because
00:27:40
banks are so like, perception-
dependent. And if you have a
00:27:42
bank run, then, like, the bank
really can go to zero. So I do
00:27:46
think that, like, the
possibility of using social
00:27:48
media to coordinate a run on a
bank is like, you know,
00:27:51
something that occurred to
people after GameStop. And
00:27:53
something that, like, kind of
sort of tentatively played out a
00:27:57
little bit in Credit Suisse,
although I think ultimately it was
00:28:00
not, like, the causal problem with
Credit Suisse.
00:28:04
In terms of more
00:28:05
generally, like, where does this
go in the long term? I mean, I
00:28:08
think that— the two things I'd
point to are, again, crypto is
00:28:12
just like— people have developed
a better understanding of the
00:28:18
social dynamics of investing. And
like, that's going to get— just
00:28:21
keep being reused in crypto. And
then the other thing I'd point
00:28:24
to is Donald Trump's SPAC,
right? Which is— you know,
00:28:30
GameStop is a real company.
Like, you know, like, you could
00:28:33
have a range of opinions on how
much money Gamestop will make
00:28:37
selling video games in ten years,
right? Donald Trump's, you know,
00:28:42
Trump Media Technology Group is
like a real, like, teeny nub of
00:28:47
a company, right? It's got a
social media site that doesn't
00:28:49
seem to bring in very much
revenue. It talks a big game
00:28:52
about, like, getting into
streaming video and other
00:28:54
things, but it's like, not clear
what they're doing. And on its
00:28:57
very, very small revenue and
sort of, like, minor, like
00:29:02
small, negative net income, it
has, like, a multibillion
00:29:04
dollar valuation. And it's just
very clear that the people
00:29:07
buying it are not buying it
because they're, like, doing
00:29:09
financial analysis, but because
they are trying to get behind
00:29:12
Donald Trump in some way. And I
think that, like— I don't think
00:29:19
he'll be the last person to make
use of this phenomenon, right?
00:29:23
And I do think that, like
Gamestop kind of proved out the
00:29:26
possibility here. And then Trump
Media Group capitalized on it.
00:29:31
Okay, lots to think about. Thank
you very much, Matt, it was a
00:29:35
pleasure talking to you about
all these issues, and I think we
00:29:38
should all stay tuned to see
what's next.
00:29:40
All right. Thank
you very much.
00:29:42
Thank you.
