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our guests today are George D and Paul
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Schumacher George is an emeritus
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professor of marketing at Wharton and a
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senior fellow at the Mac Institute for
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innovation management Paul founded and
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has been the CEO and chairman of
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decision strategies International and
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he's also served on the faculty at
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Wharton and at the University of Chicago
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we are speaking with them today about
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their new book see sooner act faster how
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vigilant leaders thrive in an era of
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digital turbulence George and Paul thank
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you so much for joining us today
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acknowledged at Wharton thanks for
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having our pleasure George maybe we can
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start with you what do you mean by
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vigilance and why is it so important
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well let's start with individual
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vigilance which is a heightened sense of
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alertness and we take that and bring it
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up to the full organization and the idea
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of a leadership team which is our our
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primary focus
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that's vigilant is one that's
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characterized by candor high curiosity
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openness because they receive a lot of
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weak signals and they're open to them
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and and interestingly we have found in
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the ten years we've been working
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together on this that whenever an
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organization missed a weak signal of
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either a threat or an opportunity that
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there was someone in the organization
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that in fact knew about it but the
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leadership team didn't know about it so
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we built on that kernel to come up with
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this notion of a vigilant organization
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in in short one that is able to see
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sooner and the the the the reference
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point is the rivals both potential and
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current I could just add to that what
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what's the payoff for a vigilant
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organization in terms of
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being more vigilant tennis rivals and
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sanctioned rivals so the payoff we've
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were very fortunate to have some
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colleagues in Europe do a study based
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upon part of our survey and they
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actually ask the question what is the
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payoff but as contrasted with much
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management research which is
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cross-sectional they actually defined
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vigilant and vulnerable organizations
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those that continually are surprised and
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wrong-footed and they tracked 85 large
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European multinationals over eight years
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and the payoff was that the Vigilant
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organizations had an increase in market
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capitalization that was double the
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increase in market cap of the vulnerable
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organizations to find the way we do it
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which is you know investment in
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foresight capabilities and leadership
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commitment what is vigilance so
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important especially at a time of
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digital turbulence as you see in the
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subtitle of your book yes I think
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because you have these different
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combinations of technologies they may be
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emerging technologies and already
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developed technologies but when they
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coalesce to make something possible and
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could be a new electronic digital
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product it could be over it could be air
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B&B did they people don't see it coming
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quickly because it is not in the
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traditional mold and it may not be in
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the space that where people are looking
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so that the feature of these digital
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technologies and after they are
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disruptive but not always would be that
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they don't respect industry boundaries
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the way normally is the case they do
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allow for very fast scaling so these
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light asset kind of things and they
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become new entrants who don't want to
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compete with the old business model but
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they bring in a new one and to to
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destroy maybe did the old one or find
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a hybrid of these things but each of
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these technologies it may be five four
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six seven technologies if you think of
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autonomous cars as twenty different
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technologies now to predict when
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everything is at the right point of
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reliability cost functionality in order
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to make the car function and forget for
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a moment regulations that is very hard
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to predict so it seems that these
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happens suddenly in fact there's a long
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gestation period but this combinatorial
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complexity or well that is an express
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exponential explosion if you have twenty
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thirty technologies that make coalesce
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how do you get a fix on that so is that
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the reason why turbulence is so hard to
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predict yeah I think there's an
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unpredictable element to it and and so
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your vigilance has to respect the fact
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that it cannot all be analytically
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predicted as you you mentioned a very
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interesting term in your earlier comment
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which is vulnerable organizations I'm
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sorry vulnerable organize oh yes yeah
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and I was wondering what factors matter
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most in explaining the difference
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between vigilant organizations and
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vulnerable ones so the the vigilant
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organizations we've already talked about
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now why would you be vulnerable well we
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have discovered that in this study that
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we talked about where the market cap
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increase was so much lower for the
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vulnerable organizations that
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vulnerability starts at the top and it's
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that's a consequence of the leadership
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team being a very short term oriented
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operational stick to the knitting to use
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the old term and very comfortable in
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their familiar surveys so they don't
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step outside the bounds of their
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industry they don't challenge themselves
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they stay within their comfort space and
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as a consequence there's not a lot of
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curiosity they don't invest in foresight
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which is the second big factor
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they don't do for example discipline
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searches for
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our opportunities using techniques like
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lead user analysis they tend to be more
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inside-out thinkers that is say okay
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I've got this capability this resource
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what do I do with it now
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and so that sets them up to be always
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reacting and that's the definition of a
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vulnerable organization it's always in
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react mode it never has a chance to get
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ahead Paul do you have something to add
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about why why it is that if
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organizations need to be vigilant all
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the time that vulnerability seems to be
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the norm do you have some of your
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thoughts yeah because I think the
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day-to-day pressures really command a
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lot of attention it's almost like grass
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Ohm's law of planning where you know
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that the the less important stuff drives
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out the more important stuff which has
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to do with the longer term which always
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can wait people think but in fact of
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course you using a precious time it has
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to do where the attention goes attention
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now we focus in our book on the
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leadership team we don't think it's one
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person one CEO a board member who can
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say this is how you become vigilant we
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ask the question what master leadership
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team do at the corporate level
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divisional level functional level SBU
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level in order to be vigilant and they
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become vulnerable the moment they get
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sucked into either protecting turf or
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the politics of organizations and they
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don't really fully anticipate once you
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have a shorter term focus how much how
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the scenarios for the future may be very
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different from the status quo and those
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are discomfort level with that the
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version two ambiguity so people that
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want to go there so what they have to do
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is often counterintuitive you have to
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almost say as a leadership team so what
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are the anomalies what is happening in
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our environment that people are curious
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about they wonder why is this happening
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and most of the time that's white noise
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people people themselves who maybe
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observe that a price is increased or
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that something happens they want to
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raise it unless they have a good
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rationale for it so you need a leader
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sort of what's Andy quoted at Intel sort
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of through this paranoia that you're
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looking for the reasons why things may
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break and that you're also willing to
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challenge the current model when he
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became CEOs was well-known of course
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then he challenged the business model
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and he said if we had taken over
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this company through an acquisition
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would we really stay on the current
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course and here legitimates now
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questions about whether they have the
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right business model still but in light
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of signals that are weak
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so in signals a weak it's hard to build
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a strong case that you should make a
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bold move so George is building upon
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what Paul just said could we talk a
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little bit about some of the features
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that define a vigilant organization and
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if you have an example or two of
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companies that demonstrate that I think
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that would be great yeah there's a lot
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of nonprofit as well as for-profit but I
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will start with Adobe which is a
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masterful example of a vigilant
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organization because way back we all
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remember the shrink-wrapped image
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building photoshop capability and when I
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talk to my students about shrink-wrapped
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software they say what what they don't
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understand that concept but it was only
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15 years ago that that's the way
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software was sold and you bought your
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software and you got full rights to it
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Adobe could see over the horizon
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actually ahead of almost all their
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rivals that cloud storage was going to
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dramatically change the way images are
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stored and made available and so they
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made the decision to shift to a
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subscriber based model where all the
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content was lodged in the cloud and and
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of course their customers objected
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strenuously because they liked having a
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physical object is it
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what's this cloud up here we we don't
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feel comfortable having our images out
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of our control but they persisted
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because they were confident with what
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they had done in testing the proposition
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and what why we use the term see sooner
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then act faster acting faster is doing
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probin learn studies a lot of
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experimentation and buying real options
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it doesn't mean acting in the full sense
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of jumping into the market it's getting
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yourself ready so when the time is right
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you have all the pieces in place and
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Adobe did that superbly but in another
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domain entirely
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I think the Canadian government was very
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farsighted in realizing that the future
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digital technologies was going to be
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inextricably linked to artificial
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intelligence and they made 10 years ago
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a major commitment to investing in
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keeping the science at home as in Canada
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and making it very attractive for people
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to come from the states to Canada they
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took a lot of the risk out but this
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required some pretty farsighted
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vigilance in our term and a lot of
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initial investments to get proof of
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concept make people comfortable with it
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and now we see the payoff in fact it's
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interesting you mentioned the Canadian
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government because we some time ago
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featured the vector Institute and
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interviewed page Dickey from there who
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explains some some of these things in in
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detail Paul you referred to in your
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earlier comments the importance of
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reading weak signals and I was wondering
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you know why is it so important to for
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companies and leadership teams to pick
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up on weak signals what exactly does
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that mean and again like George could
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you give any examples of companies that
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have done it well yeah so the first
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question is what is a weak signal and I
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would say it's something that on its own
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doesn't have a lot of meaning but if it
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is combined either by understanding in
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the context of the signal
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or by combining it with other signals
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through triangulation that in fact holds
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a lot of informational value so it
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requires a culture that is curious about
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anomalies or things that are contrary to
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expectations so one pharmaceutical
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company to give an example was working
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on and dermatological drug and they ran
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and standard controlled experiments and
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the volunteers had to come in for
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medical check-ups and the person who
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registered them and noticed that some of
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these were very cheerful more so than
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others and this is a woman and she
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mentioned that the secretary to the
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people running the trial and they were
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also sufficiently curious it starts with
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this culture of curiosity that they
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wanted to look into this and as you can
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imagine it turned out that many of these
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cheerful folks happen to be in the
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treatment group not in the control group
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and even though this particular drug
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failed as a dermatological drug it
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became a very successful antidepressant
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now how often is it the case that weak
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signals from customers or from
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volunteers from inside the organization
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die at the point where it is seen it
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stays in the reception area right rather
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than make it all the way up the
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organization and so it would show you
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need champions for weak signals
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otherwise they will just die and they
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won't be noticed I do think that the
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future foreshadows itself and there's
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many warnings but it's not presented on
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a gold platter it's distributed you know
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to lay out your organization and beyond
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the organization some of the signals may
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be in other industries and if you go too
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far out it may become very complex or
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what Canada this is a great example when
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Japan tried to do something along many
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decades ago in anticipating its future
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mitii and sort of industrial policies
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they had identified artificial
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intelligence and supercomputers as the
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two big pillars and that turned out to
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be not so easy to do because they were
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very far into the future so it's a very
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fine balance between where can you still
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not only understand it but act on it in
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and responsible you know financially
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speaking waves interesting let's be be
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ready to act when the time is right yes
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and that was probably the problem with
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Japan let's go back to the the digital
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turbulence problem which it just
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increases the amount of data and
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information
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the last date I saw was our last
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information was that the amount of data
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is doubling every 18 months that means
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the signal to noise ratio is
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deteriorating rapidly
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so the important week signals the
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threats and opportunities are often
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shrouded in all of the noise and so we
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spend a lot of time in the book helping
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leadership teams think about how to
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allocate that scarce resource of
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attention and then focus on a few areas
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that will be ultimately extremely
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critical and so we have come up with the
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concept of guiding questions one of the
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six or eight questions that you've got
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to keep your eyes on and make sure the
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whole organization is aware of them and
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these questions come out of looking at
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where you missed things in the past
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diagnosing the future I mean diagnosing
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the present and anticipating the future
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and so we come up with two or three
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questions that the whole organization is
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aware of is widely communicated you have
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task forces working on them for example
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a medical device company some years ago
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was very concerned about the likelihood
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that a drug would displace the function
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of a peacemaker and it's not implausible
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and they were very concerned about it
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so they said their guiding question was
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what drug pharmaceutical drug could
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possibly displace an obsolete our our
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product and so they created a task force
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they made it highly visible all of the
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weak signals on that particular topic
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flowed into this one central node and
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interestingly just as a sidebar they
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learned an enormous amount about the
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drug industry and they found some
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amazingly effective drugs to enhance
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the capabilities of not only their their
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stents would say also sold but of the
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peacemakers that's in great that's a
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great story
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so based on everything both of you have
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said so far I wonder if I could ask each
00:17:52
of you how can companies become more
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vigilant or as you put it in your book
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how can a company increase its vigilance
00:18:01
quotient the quality won't start with
00:18:03
that yeah I think a very good starting
00:18:05
point is to and if I may just comment
00:18:07
briefly on what George was saying what
00:18:08
was in the medical example striking is
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that it was many signals having
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receptors where they can be interpreters
00:18:15
so it's seldom that it was one weak
00:18:16
signal but it is this combination and
00:18:18
the CEO of DuPont was famously in the
00:18:20
news for having identified early before
00:18:22
the you know the Great Recession three
00:18:25
different signals of a cash flow problem
00:18:27
with the customer in Japan and then the
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the hotel in Wilmington DuPont hotel not
00:18:33
being fully occupied and unusually low
00:18:36
and GM not being able to give production
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numbers to them as they normally would
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he triangulated these and they all
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happened at different times not within
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the context at all of may there be a
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recession or whatever and he said are we
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gonna hit a wall and saw that early so
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that is the hard part to do so one I
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think is to really identify cases where
00:18:53
people were prescient in some sense they
00:18:55
saw the future and as importantly look
00:18:57
at the past so we start with an audit
00:18:59
and say let's look at what you missed in
00:19:02
the past must be years what you saw
00:19:03
early was it more a threat it's an
00:19:06
opportunity and when we did that with
00:19:09
olympus for example there were things
00:19:11
that they've really excellent that they
00:19:12
saw underwater cameras at opportunity
00:19:15
before others did but there were other
00:19:17
things that there endoscopes which were
00:19:19
high-end endoscopes would be replaced by
00:19:21
the displaced by disposable endoscopes
00:19:23
they were like there was a blind spot
00:19:25
and at Shell we did this one I worked at
00:19:27
the Planning Group in shell in London
00:19:29
and we said well what is shell missed
00:19:30
and it turns out they miss of course
00:19:32
stuff in economics but they don't miss a
00:19:34
lot and systematically in in in the
00:19:36
other domains except for one in public
00:19:38
relations and media they didn't have a
00:19:40
good sense they had to Brent's Peres
00:19:42
Fiasco at one point in the North Sea
00:19:44
there in Nigeria they had made payments
00:19:46
to schools that ended up in the pockets
00:19:47
of corrupt officials and then they
00:19:50
overstated though their oil reserves
00:19:52
just have to big companies look very bad
00:19:54
and I had a vnp lost his job over that
00:19:56
issue so once you start to study the
00:19:59
profile you identify well is the
00:20:00
organization systemically weak and once
00:20:03
you understand that you can then say
00:20:04
well how can we fix that and of course
00:20:06
the past doesn't predict the future in
00:20:07
that sense unless you have a starting
00:20:09
point and then the other way maybe
00:20:11
George can talk about that we have tests
00:20:13
lots of surveys to measure the requisite
00:20:16
conditions for being vigilant in place
00:20:18
and we have survey that has you know 30
00:20:20
questions that and we have benchmarks
00:20:22
tokens which that can be compared so
00:20:24
those are Diagnostics that can help so
00:20:26
we offer at the the end of the book a an
00:20:31
action agenda that is consistent with
00:20:34
all the examples we talked about there's
00:20:36
a lot of research but especially our
00:20:39
research says there's two big factors
00:20:42
and that is leadership commitment to
00:20:45
vigilance it's highly visible signal to
00:20:48
the organization and then significant
00:20:52
investments in foresight activities so
00:20:55
leadership commitment is signaled by the
00:21:00
amount of time you spend for example
00:21:03
thinking about the future and an a
00:21:06
vulnerable organization will spend less
00:21:09
than 20% vigilant organisations spend up
00:21:13
to 50 percent of the leadership time
00:21:15
thinking about the future
00:21:18
they also Network very widely they're
00:21:22
open they signal that they're ready and
00:21:27
open to weak signals Andy Grove was a
00:21:31
magician at that he gave permission to
00:21:36
people at the way out on their periphery
00:21:39
to come to him directly with a concern
00:21:43
and and that kind of openness
00:21:47
curiosity and candor is is critical
00:21:53
because it vigilance is a team sport and
00:21:58
then you follow that with very visible
00:22:01
investments in foresight activities
00:22:05
including what we find is the 3m and
00:22:11
companies of that sort invest an
00:22:13
enormous amount in looking for
00:22:15
opportunities they don't wait for them
00:22:17
to come but they use lead user analysis
00:22:20
to pursue interesting needs of their
00:22:25
lead customers they do a lot of
00:22:30
experiments and they have a lot of
00:22:34
investments in small startups for
00:22:38
example that might have a but go back to
00:22:42
the medical device company they invested
00:22:44
a lot in small stakes in many many
00:22:48
companies to get visibility into what
00:22:52
was the next generation rather than
00:22:55
having it appear as a product they knew
00:22:58
the basic science and then they
00:23:02
communicated that widely through the
00:23:04
organization and finally just one of the
00:23:09
things that is so consistent through all
00:23:11
of our studies and examples is that when
00:23:15
information is not shared you're
00:23:18
vulnerable yeah now we've talked a lot
00:23:23
about for-profit companies and I wonder
00:23:25
if vigilance and vulnerability are also
00:23:29
applicable to other kinds of
00:23:30
organizations like nonprofits
00:23:32
foundations and so on yeah yes sir we
00:23:35
also samples in particular foundations
00:23:37
American foundations with the help of
00:23:39
the Council on Foundations and also
00:23:42
Credit Union's American credit unions
00:23:43
the corporate study was actually global
00:23:46
in this world a lot of time of global
00:23:48
companies but we do can see a comparison
00:23:50
and indeed the weight that some of these
00:23:53
factors that we mentioned in terms of
00:23:55
vigilance differ but and it differs as a
00:23:57
function of size and the difference of a
00:23:59
function of how the degrees of freedom
00:24:01
if you're highly regulated as credit
00:24:03
unions are there is of course less scope
00:24:04
for really farsighted leadership
00:24:06
foundations likewise for some small
00:24:08
Community Foundation's some other
00:24:10
MacArthur Foundation's very big and so
00:24:12
there is a lot of
00:24:14
you need you need to understand the
00:24:15
contingent factors why when is a certain
00:24:18
foresight capability a certain
00:24:21
attitudinal shift critical in that
00:24:23
sector so it's hard to sort of have
00:24:25
here's the recipe the five things they
00:24:27
always work they work but two different
00:24:29
degrees and so I think you cannot I
00:24:31
think it says still a research topic
00:24:33
about why vigilance varies and what are
00:24:36
the determinants of it because it
00:24:38
depends on time place culture all these
00:24:41
kinds of things George would you like to
00:24:43
add but one interesting finding was that
00:24:49
the large foundations had the same
00:24:53
attributes and and the the vulnerable
00:24:57
foundations and the vigilant foundations
00:25:00
were very similar to our sample of
00:25:04
global organizations but only for the
00:25:07
large foundations the small community
00:25:10
foundations with the restricted mandate
00:25:13
may be only in a region say southeastern
00:25:19
Pennsylvania with a very limited
00:25:24
periphery the that they had a totally
00:25:28
different as Paul said those very
00:25:32
restricted entities didn't have much
00:25:38
need for vigilance because they they
00:25:40
knew what they had to do they had very
00:25:42
few resources and so we we only really
00:25:48
began to appreciate how applicable the
00:25:50
model was when we started looking at the
00:25:52
big foundations I'd like to end with one
00:25:56
question for each of you that is that
00:25:58
let's imagine there is a CEO who comes
00:26:01
to you and says what's your one piece of
00:26:04
advice to make my company's leadership
00:26:08
team more vigilant what would be your
00:26:10
top recommendations Paul I would say
00:26:13
reward it if you see it and share the
00:26:16
best practices and and instill a culture
00:26:20
of curiosity and hypothesis testing
00:26:23
George the
00:26:26
litmus test is openness and and so
00:26:30
that's almost the other side of the
00:26:33
curiosity coin but you also have to be
00:26:36
open and make it clear to the
00:26:39
organization that you're open to weak
00:26:41
signals nagging concerns anomalies that
00:26:45
you can't explain
00:26:47
rather than having them bottled up in
00:26:50
the at the point of contact with the
00:26:54
marketplace for example or the
00:26:57
technologists people feel comfortable
00:27:00
forwarding that up and that openness is
00:27:04
is in a critical part of the curiosity
00:27:09
well George Paul thank you so much for
00:27:11
speaking with knowledge it working about
00:27:13
your book it's been a pleasure talking
00:27:14
with you likewise thanks as always for
00:27:18
more insight from knowledge at Wharton
00:27:20
please visit knowledge Wharton UPenn edu
00:27:27
[Music]
00:27:32
you
