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Baseball, Bias and Decision-Making

October 13, 2016 / 09:46

This episode features Wharton professor discussing expert decision-making, specifically umpire calls in baseball, and how biases affect accuracy.

The conversation begins with an overview of the professor's research on how umpires make calls based on pitch location and the influence of the count. He explains how umpires often deviate from strict rules, favoring pitchers or batters based on the count.

Key points include the systematic bias in calls, where the strike zone expands or contracts depending on whether the count favors the batter or the pitcher. This trade-off between bias and accuracy is highlighted as a rational decision-making process.

The professor draws parallels between umpire decision-making and hiring practices in business, emphasizing the prevalence of statistical discrimination in various fields.

Lastly, he shares his interest in future research, including predictions about elections and how different models can influence decision-making.

TLDR

Wharton professor discusses umpire decision-making biases in baseball and their implications for accuracy and hiring practices.

Episode

9:46
00:00:01
today we're speaking with Wharton professor 8 on green about his research on expert decision-making and
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specifically umpire calls in baseball so it sound happy with us thanks for joining us yeah my pleasure so can you
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give us an overview of your research yeah so generally what I'm interested in
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is decision-making by experts expertise particularly in realms for which there are predictions available from machines
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and machine based models algorithms or in the case of umpires in baseball data from stereoscopic cameras behind home
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plate of every major league ballpark that we use to benchmark the calls that umpires make and so this is a great
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setting for studying decision-making by experts because we have experts who are supposed to abide by a very specific
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decision rule so the pitcher throws a pitch if the pitch is in this imaginary box the official strike zone defined by
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the width of home plate on the floor and the batter stance then the umpires supposed to call a strike otherwise he's
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supposed to call a ball and so what we do is we use these data from the stereoscopic cameras that take a
00:01:00
sequence of images of every pitch from its release from the pitchers hand until it crosses the region above home plate
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to basically observe to what extent the umpire abides by this decision rule to make his calls based solely on the
00:01:13
location of the pitch and so I think the most interesting thing that comes out of
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the data is basically this deviation from that benchmark and very systematic way and so there's something in baseball
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called the count the count is keeps track of the sequence of pitches between a pitcher and a batter over the course
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of an at-bat if the count reaches for balls that's good for the batter he walks if it reaches three strikes that's
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good for the pitch or the batter strikes out and so what you see is that instead
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of the umpire just using the location of the pitch to make as calls pitches at the same location are sometimes called
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balls or sometimes called strikes depending on the count and in particular the strike zone expands dramatically
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when the count favor is the batter and so when account favors the batter the umpire responds by favoring the pitcher
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and vice versa when account favors the pitcher the Empire responds by favoring the batter and it's particularly extreme
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so basically you can think about a pitch that crosses say the top boundary of the
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official strike zone so this pitch and what I'll call baseline count the count
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at the beginning of the advance euro strikes this an umpire calls a strike fifty percent
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of the time it calls a ball fifty percent of the time you can think of as being a different between a ball and a
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strike but when the counts say has three balls and 0 strikes when it's strongly
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favored is the batter well then this pitch is almost always called a strike and the reverse is true in the opposite
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countless your balls and two strikes the same pitch at the same location is almost always called a ball so so why
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does this happen so they're potentially a number of stories that I can explain
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this result let me tell you about a particularly interesting and counterintuitive one and the argument
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here is that what the pitcher is do or what the umpire is doing is he's trading
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off accuracy for bias or rather he's trading off bias for accuracy he's being
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purposefully biased consciously or unconsciously so he's varying the strike zone that he enforces with the count
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he's not making his decisions based solely on the location of the pitch but the argument is this actually helps them
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make more accurate calls and why is this the case well imagine yourself as an umpire you're squatted behind the
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catcher you're looking out over his head towards the pitcher the pitcher winds up
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he throws a 90 plus mile an hour pitch it's there in an instant it has some lateral movements and vertical movement
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you have to decide whether this pitch is inside or outside some imaginary box it's an incredibly difficult problem and
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if you relied only on your observation of the location of the pitch you'd probably make mistakes on a regular
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basis frequently when the pitch is closed it'd be hard to say whether it was just inside the strike center just
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outside the strike zone but fortunately for you you have other information at your disposal you have expectations that
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you've built up over many years of being a professional umpire expectations about
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where the pitcher is going to throw in a certain count and whether the batter is
00:04:02
going to swing and so for instance you might reasonably expect that when the count has three balls and 0 strikes that
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is when favor is the batter that the pitcher is going to try to throw a strike and so if the pitch is close and
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you're unsure whether it was just inside the strike zone or just outside the
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strike zone you may err on the side of calling a strike the pitch that you expect now think about what happens in
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an 02 count so in this count you expect that the batter is going to swing it anything close
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because if he doesn't he runs the chance of striking out whereas he can prolong
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liat bad if he fails the pitching off for instance and so imagine you see a pitch that appears close to you but the
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batter chooses not to swing how can you rationalize that decision well you can rationalize it by saying that he
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observes something that you didn't that his vantage point was such that he believed the pitch to be a ball and so
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you might err on the side of calling a ball and so this Bayesian updating this basically rational way of processing
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other information that you have creates this trade-off between bias and accuracy
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it helps the umpires become more accurate at the cost of having them systematically change the strike zone
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that they enforce with this variable the count that has nothing to do with their
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directive so what would you say a business practitioner should take away from your research yeah so I think what
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umpires are doing is they're statistically discriminating so they have a directive to make their calls
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based solely on the location of the pitch but that's very difficult to do it's very hard to observe the exact
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location every time and so what they do instead is they say well this other informations other information is
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correlated with the location in the pitch it could help me on average make more accurate calls and so as I said
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before they basically trade-off bias for accuracy it's a statistical discrimination at least opportunities
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for statistical discrimination are just they're everywhere and they're everywhere in the workplace in
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particularly in you know the hiring process so for instance you know when we hire we have a benchmark that sounds
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very similar to the umpires directive we want to hire the best person person is going to do the best of the job there's
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going to be the best fit but it's hard in the interview process looking at a CV
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or even interview i'm a person often to decide who is the best or how good is
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this person how good is this person going to be in the job and so we may rely on other factors factors that are
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either implicitly or explicitly banned that we shouldn't be using perhaps but
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factors that we believe perhaps rightly as in the case of the umpires or even erroneously to give us information about
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this person's fit and so if we're right we're going to get a little more
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accuracy but it's going to come look at the cost of bias it's going to come at
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the cost of systematic being able to systematically predict who we hire based on factors
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that have nothing to do at least directly with the dimension that we're trying to hire along so what are you
00:06:50
going to look at next going to stay stay in baseball or look elsewhere for research yeah so I mean it's a baseball
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is an opportunity to use machine based models these cameras to say how good of a job umpires are doing but I think
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there are a lot of interesting cases in which the decisions that individuals make that experts make can be informed
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by algorithms by machine based predictions and so one of the things that I'm interested in particular now is
00:07:23
making predictions about the election so it's particularly timely I think a lot
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of us are interested in the probability that Hillary Clinton is going to wait on
00:07:29
the probability that Donald Trump will be our next president and so one place you may go to get information about this
00:07:35
you may go to 538 nate silver's website and one thing that nate silver is doing
00:07:39
this election season that he hasn't done in previous election seasons is he's
00:07:42
providing multiple models so in the past he told you the probability that Hillary
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Clinton would win is seventy-seven percent now he's telling you if you believe this model it's seventy two
00:07:52
percent if you believe this model it's eighty-four percent and sometimes there's really quite a deviation between
00:07:57
these two models well what are these two models well basically they're making
00:08:03
different assumptions about the world and your decision as to which model you listen to is really a decision about
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what what you believe the data generating process to be what do you believe the world to look like and in
00:08:14
particular there's one model that says we should only listen to the pulse we
00:08:18
should only listen to what people are saying right now and there's another model that says actually there are lots
00:08:23
of predictors economic indicators for instance like that historically have been very predictive of election
00:08:30
outcomes and so we should listen to those as well as your decision about which model to listen to her how to
00:08:35
balance these two pieces of information basically comes down to your belief about whether this election season is
00:08:41
totally different from the past in which case you should only listen to the polls
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or if you believe that this is just another draw and some stable distribution that is similar to
00:08:51
everything else that's come before and so generally what I'm interested in
00:08:56
is how can we frame questions what types of information can give people to make them think that this moment the present
00:09:04
is just like the past and the past is a good predictor of the present and what types of information how can we frame
00:09:10
questions to get people to think actually know the process is not stationary at all this moment is unique
00:09:16
in time great that's fascinating thanks very much for joining us a time yeah my
00:09:21
pleasure thank you you

Episode Highlights

  • The Impact of the Count
    How the count influences umpire decisions, affecting the strike zone.
    “The count dramatically expands the strike zone.”
    @ 01m 50s
    October 13, 2016
  • Decision-Making in Baseball
    Exploring how umpires make calls based on pitch location and game context.
    “Umpires trade off accuracy for bias.”
    @ 02m 57s
    October 13, 2016
  • Predicting Elections with Models
    Using machine-based models to forecast election outcomes and their implications.
    “This moment is unique in time.”
    @ 09m 16s
    October 13, 2016

Episode Quotes

  • The count dramatically expands the strike zone.
    Baseball, Bias and Decision-Making
  • Umpires trade off accuracy for bias.
    Baseball, Bias and Decision-Making
  • This moment is unique in time.
    Baseball, Bias and Decision-Making

Key Moments

  • Umpire Calls00:07
  • Expert Decision-Making00:17
  • Strike Zone Dynamics01:50
  • Bias vs. Accuracy02:57
  • Election Predictions07:20

Tension Over Time

Words per Minute Over Time

Vibes Breakdown