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Management Behavior: Strategic Silence and Litigation

November 03, 2015 / 03:19

This episode covers firm disclosure behavior, insider trading, litigation outcomes, and strategic silence in earnings announcements. It features a discussion on how managers decide to provide forecasts during quarterly earnings releases and the incentives influencing these decisions.

The guest discusses a recent study examining firms that announced disappointing quarterly earnings. The findings indicate that managers who sell more of their shares after a previous earnings announcement are less likely to warn about current earnings disappointments, a behavior termed "strategic silence." This silence is linked to the likelihood of litigation.

Furthermore, the episode highlights the interaction between strategic silence and insider selling, suggesting that these behaviors can increase the risk of lawsuits. The guest emphasizes the importance of warning about earnings disappointments to mitigate potential legal issues.

Future research directions are mentioned, focusing on how firms' disclosure and trading behaviors change after being sued. The episode concludes with questions about whether lawsuits influence managers to provide more warnings about earnings shortfalls.

TLDR

Managers' disclosure behaviors affect litigation risks, with strategic silence linked to insider selling and earnings disappointments.

Episode

3:19
00:00:05
so my research focuses on the interaction among firm disclosure Behavior insider trading and litigation
00:00:12
outcomes and I examine what are the kind of settings that lead managers to uh provide forecasts with their quarterly
00:00:20
earnings release or whether they decide to withhold those forecasts and whether incentives play a role such as inator
00:00:26
trading or whether the desire to uh reduce the likelihood of L ation uh plays a role on that so what are the
00:00:33
determinants of whether uh management decides to go above and beyond providing the normal required accounting
00:00:39
disclosures every quarter and in addition provide uh more qualitative or more uh uh subjective forecasts of the
00:00:47
company's future prospects so in a recent study of mine my co-author and I examined a sample of
00:00:56
firms which announced disappointing quarterly earnings and whether or not uh firm managers gave any warning about it
00:01:03
prior to the announcement and we find that when company managers sell more of their own shares in The Firm after the
00:01:11
prior quarters earnings announcement they're much less likely to warn about the current quarters uh earnings
00:01:18
disappointment so as not to dampen the share price when they sell we call this Behavior strategic silence and what's
00:01:25
more interesting is when we bring litigation into the story we find that the likelihood the firm will get sued
00:01:30
after the earnings disappointment is related to both strategic silence and Insider selling and that there's an
00:01:37
interactive effect between the two meaning that silence and selling enhance the effect of each other in predicting
00:01:47
litigation so the main takeaway for managers who are aware of an upcoming earnings disappointment is that warning
00:01:54
ahead of time can save a lot of headaches down the road in terms of litigation and especially so if they're
00:02:00
planning to uh divest or sell off some of their own Holdings in The Firm after the earnings announcement uh because
00:02:06
this is a key behavior that potential plaintiffs look for when deciding whether or not to initiate class action
00:02:12
litigation against the firm so we're now looking at what happens to the firm's disclosure and
00:02:21
trading Behavior after the firm gets sued we know from our prior study that silence and Insider selling both affect
00:02:29
the like hood of the firm getting sued but what happens to that behavior after the lawsuit does the lawsuit uh
00:02:36
instigate changes and whether or not managers are much more likely to warn of an earning short shortfall after they
00:02:42
get sued and also are firms uh much more likely to have their managers engaging in selling uh prior to an earning
00:02:50
shortfall does a lawsuit actually instigate changes and behavior in these dimensions
00:03:07
[Music]

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Episode Highlights

  • Behavior Strategic Silence
    Managers are less likely to warn about disappointing earnings if they sell shares first.
    “We call this Behavior strategic silence.”
    @ 01m 22s
    November 03, 2015

Episode Quotes

  • Warning ahead of time can save a lot of headaches down the road.
    Management Behavior: Strategic Silence and Litigation

Key Moments

  • Earnings Disappointment00:58
  • Strategic Silence01:22
  • Litigation Risks01:29
  • Post-Lawsuit Behavior02:36

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