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Welcome. Welcome everyone to this week's
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edition of Wharton Moneyball. My
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favorite time of the week where two of
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my favorite subjects, sports and data
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science collide. This is Eric Bradlo,
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professor of marketing statistics and
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data science here at the Wharton School.
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I'm joined today by my longtime friend,
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collaborator, co-author, and co-host,
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professor of statistics and data
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science, Audi Winer. some combination of
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the two of us, Kade Massie and Shane
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Jensen are here every week on the
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Wharton podcast network version of
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Wharton Moneyball. Well, Audi, you and I
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have been at this for almost 12 years
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together. Been friends for 30 years.
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Today's a very special week. Um, I
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always say one of the greatest things we
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get to do here on Wharton Moneyball is
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we get to talk to people that are living
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statistics and data science and its
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application to sports in the real world.
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I would say today is no exception. But
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today really, you and I were talking
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about this off the air. I would think
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you and I would both consider this a
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pinnacle of everything we've been trying
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to achieve with Wharton Moneyball is uh
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interviewing our guest today, Theo
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Epstein. Um, for those of you that don't
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know, I don't know how you could not
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possibly know who this is, but what the
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hell? I'm going to read a bio anyway.
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And by the way, Theo, just so you know,
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this was generated by a large language
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model to show you the whole world knows
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this. We'll see how accurate it is.
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>> Yeah, we worry about that.
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>> Yeah, we'll see. Exactly. Theo Epstein
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is one of the most influential baseball
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executives of the modern era. Best known
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for helping end two of the sport's
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longest championship droughts. After
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rising quickly through the Boston Red
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Sox front office, he became MLB's
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youngest general manager and hate build
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helped build the roster that won the
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2004 World Series for the Red Sox, the
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franchise's first title in 86 years. and
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later another championship in 2007. He
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then took over baseball operations for
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the Chicago Cubs and helped the
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organization to a historic 2016 World
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Series victory ending a 108-year title
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drought. Widely respected for blending
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scouting, player development, and
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analytics. Epstein has also been a
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prominent voice on the future of the
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game, including pace of play and
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competitive balance. So, Theo, please,
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on behalf of Audi and myself and all of
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our listeners, welcome to Wharton
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Moneyball. Thanks for having me. I
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appreciate uh I'm not sure I'm the
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pinnacle of anything, but I I appreciate
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that kind intro.
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>> Now, I should warn you, by the way, you
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know, I don't know if you've ever
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listened to our show. Um you broke our
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hearts cuz just so you Oh, listen.
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>> Yeah, he's going to get it out there
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right early.
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>> I might as well let you know there's no
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two more diehard Yankee fans than Eric
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Bradlow and Audi Winer. But withstanding
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that, we do have respect for everything
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that went on in 2004, 2007, 2016, and
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beyond.
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>> Yeah. I'm I'm breaking my rule of being
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outnumbered by Yankee fans.
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>> Yeah, I'll roll with it.
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>> Well, Audi, let me turn things over to
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you, please.
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>> Sure. Okay. So, um there's a I thought
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it was a pretty accurate bio. Um, but in
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the in the process of doing a little bit
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of research, I remember that when you
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first started at the Red Sox, um, Billy
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Bean was in hot pursuit by the Red Sox
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and he and he obviously turned them down
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to stay at at the Oakland A's and he and
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at least the the story is is that he
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actually recommended they just hire you.
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Um, so you can confirm or deny that
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that's up to you, but I wanted to ask
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you specifically, how influenced were
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you by what Bean was doing at Oakland
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A's? And just to be more specific, um,
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how what we would call saber, meaning
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sports analytics oriented or baseball
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analytics, were the Red Sox back in back
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in the day when you first took over
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because it's a different time now than
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it was then.
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>> Yeah. Well, first off, it's it's true
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that Billy recommended me, but not
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before I recommended him. So, I was I
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was actually running the search process
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uh for the GM. I was the assistant GM.
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I'd been there a year. um my boss, the
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interim general manager, Mike Port, had
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been let go at the end of the or removed
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from that role at the end of the O2
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season. So, we had a search process that
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I led and uh Billy was the top guy, the
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guy that we all wanted and it was sort
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of a long very public pursuit and he
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ended up accepting the job, got a record
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contract and then, you know, the
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Moneyball the movie sort of has it a
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little bit right and and there's more to
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it. But
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>> he uh he called me 24 hours after taking
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the job and asked if I was sitting down
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and and and then after I sat down, he
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told me that he had decided he couldn't
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take the job. And so I had to go back
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with my tail between my legs to um John
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Henry and Tom Warner and Larry Lucino
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and told them we had to start the
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process over again. They met and yeah, a
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day or two later they they called me and
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said, "Well, we just want you to do it.
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that's what Billy said we should do and
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we've gotten to know you over the last
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year and we think you're the right
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person for the job. So, um, as to how
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influenced I was by Billy and what
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Oakland was doing, I'm definitely
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absolutely took note of it. I mean, they
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were doing remarkable things on a small
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budget. I think it's probably accurate
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to say both Billy and I and Billy's
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um mentor Sandy Alderson were all sort
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of influenced by Bill James and by men
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and by you know the school of sabertric
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thought that had always existed sort of
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outside uh the walls at MLB up to that
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point. You know, I grew up in the 80s
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watching baseball, playing baseball, but
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then also reading Bill James baseball
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abstracts. And I know Sandy, he he's
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talked about this that when he got the
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job, he saw it as an opportunity to
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apply a lot of Bill's concepts. And
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frankly, a lot of that dates back to
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like George Weiss and the and the
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Yankees. you know, he had his own
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>> personal statistician and he made a lot
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of decisions based on
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>> um you know, the hidden value of numbers
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in baseball. Branch Ricky the same the
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same way and a lot of so a lot of it
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dates way back. But Bill Bill's
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masterful mind um sort of just made it
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crystal clear that there's this whole
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other world, other way to evaluate
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players, other way to understand the
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game. Sandy, I think understood that,
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weaponized it. Billy took it to another
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level. And then and then when I took
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over the Red Sox, um it was at a time,
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it was before Moneyball had come out,
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there were only a handful of teams
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really using statistical analysis in a
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meaningful way uh to make decisions. And
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so that made it uh that left a lot of
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lowhanging fruit. And then my personal
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philosophy having come up with the
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Padres's under Kevin Towers, I had I had
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the benefit of, you know, my my cubicle
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was literally situated between the
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scouting director, uh, Brad Sloan, and
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the statistical director, Eddie Epste,
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no relation. And those two had
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completely opposite views of the world.
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Brad Sloan
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>> didn't want to know a player stats. He
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just wanted wanted us to evaluate them
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by watching them play. He thought it
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would it would uh bias his opinion or
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scouts opinion if he knew what the
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player's performance was. And Eddie was
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the opposite. He didn't want to see him
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play. He just wanted to to take a
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sophisticated look at the players track
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record, run it through his models, and
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make a projection. So those two guys had
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opposed views of the world. But I I
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ended up soaking up a lot from both of
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them and and sort of came to the
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conclusion that the right answer is not
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just looking through the traditional
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scouting lens and not just looking
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through the the uh object objective
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analysis lens but whenever possible
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using both to try to get to the clearest
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picture of the player. And so watching
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what Billy was doing successfully in
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Oakland and taking over in Boston,
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knowing that we had a lot more resources
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than they did, and I I had uh this
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personal approach trying to blend uh
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analytics and scouting, I just saw it as
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sort of a great opportunity to learn
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from a lot of great people and and go
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off and try to apply it the best we
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could with a new approach.
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>> Just to say just to jump in here and
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then I know Audi's going to continue on
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with some other questions. Couple
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things. One is um I I'm a strong
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believer like you are Theo. Apparently
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we you know in statistics we might call
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that an ensemble estimator. We get two
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we get a scouting approach. We get a
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more analytics approach. Any I mean
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every theorem of statistics says you get
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optimal solutions when you blend both.
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Neither is 100% correct and you do
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better. The second thing you'll be proud
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of this. Last week our guest was Josh
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Rawitz uh the president of the National
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Baseball Hall of Fame. Um we of course
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recommended you for the Hall of Fame. We
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hope that you know seriously we hope it
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happens someday. And the other person we
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talked about was Bill James and we said
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but unfortunately for Bill there isn't
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like the same path there is for you as
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an executive. And we just told Josh we
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did this on the air we just said
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something has to be fixed like how Theo
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Epstein's not in the Hall of Fame and
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how Bill James is not in the Hall of
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Fame. Like to us there is no Hall of
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Fame. And he gave a very good answer. He
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said, "Well, I don't know if there'll be
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a day where a plaque of Bill James will
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be in the Hall of Fame, but Bill James
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is in the Hall of Fame. It's the Hall of
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Fame and Museum. You can't talk about
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the history of baseball without talking
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about Bill James." And I thought that
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was a very thoughtful answer, but we
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wanted I just want to know on the
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record, we want you both in the Hall of
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Fame.
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>> Appreciate the the support there. But
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yeah, Bill Bill's had a had a
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transformational impact on the game and
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on a lot of others who went on to make
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their own impact as well. So my that
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actually leads me to my second question
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because Bill James um obviously his his
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role is incredible but as you pointed
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out a lot of these ideas particularly
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the ones that most people will talk
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about the the the value of the OBP the
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home run and the the poverty of the
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batting average as a metric um shifts
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and things like this. These were known
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for a long time. And in fact, when I
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teach um students at all levels, I
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emphasize that Moneyball the book and
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the movie especially is actually a it's
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people think it's a baseball book. It
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sort of is. Um people often think it's a
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statistics book. It sort of is that, but
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it's really a management book. It's
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really about getting an organization
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that didn't value certain things to
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change and become and value them. And we
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know like in and we always ask the
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question, how did it take basketball so
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long to figure out that three is bigger
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than two? It's just how do you miss
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that? Um and and the answer is actually
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complicated. And and so I guess my
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question for you is
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>> how did you transition a team from doing
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things historically into what I mean
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everybody does now to varying degrees
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understands completely that that you
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have to use the numbers the way they are
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done now. How did that transition
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actually how did how did that take
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place? Um, well, we had the benefit of
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having an owner and John Henry who
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really set the tone for that. I mean, he
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the
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>> my first meeting with John after I um
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got the job, you know, he said, "Oh, we
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need to arm you, you know, with some
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some experienced adviserss because
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you're young and it'll help you. It'll
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also make it look better." and and so
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Bill Lejoy who was um you know a great
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general manager we we brought in uh put
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the 84 Tigers together um and then John
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suggested Bill James and I said great so
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let's call him never forget sitting in
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John Henry's office we just cold called
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Bill James and uh Bill Bill's answer he
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goes well he goes I have I have a a rule
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I I try to live by which is never say no
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to if a billionaire wants to meet with
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you never say no so he agreed to fly to
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Austin and we ended up hiring him as an
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adviser. But um so we had we had great
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alignment throughout the organization
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because John set the tone. He had made
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his fortune um in the in the markets
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using models and algorithms and um
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understanding trends and trend following
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in the markets. And so he was he was a
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Bill James reader. he was um very driven
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by data and and so um I guess I guess
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the way I approached it initially was
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was um you know to to to make make it
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clear that we were going to take some
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risks that um you know the Red Sox had
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at the time what 84 years or or so of of
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of of not having success and we were
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going to try things a different way that
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we weren't afraid to be wrong. Um, but
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that but that just because we were going
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to build an infrastructure that allowed
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us to work successfully with data didn't
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mean that we didn't place tremendous
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value on scouting. It didn't mean that
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we didn't place tremendous value on
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player development and that there that
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there was room for everything. We tried
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to um be transparent and open with the
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organization that you'll remember back
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then at the time there was a lot of
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animosity really for you know from the
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old guard to the new guard scouts
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computers were going to come and take
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their jobs and
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>> um so we just tried to um
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>> cross-pollinate as best we could share
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information. And we'd send our analysts
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out on the road with the scouts to get
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them to understand how hard their job
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was and to understand what they bring to
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the table and share ideas. We'd bring
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our scouts into the draft room and and
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and in preparation for the draft and
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show them the models that that we were
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going to use. And we had some some early
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wins um that uh helped create some some
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momentum behind some of the ideas we
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were using. And you tried to just create
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a culture of thoroughess using all the
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information possible,
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creativity, trying to innovate, you
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know, that there were sort of no bad
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ideas. And you know, when you're when
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you're trying to find a competitive
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advantage, um, in baseball, you do a lot
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of R&D, probably 99
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projects can lead nowhere. And the
00:13:51
hundth one might help you getting a
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little bit of insight, something
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actionable, help you position the
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fielder a little bit better, help you
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evaluate a player in the draft a little
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bit better. and just tried to foster
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that culture of there are no bad ideas
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and that it was, you know, but but good
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ideas would be rewarded and brought down
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to the clubhouse or or or or you know,
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show up on the GM's desk. So, it was,
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you know, sort of a culture change uh
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project as as as much as anything else.
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>> I'm loving this format, Audi, where you
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ask questions, Theo answers. Now, I get
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to chirp in here. So, let me just chirp
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in. Yeah. Um, one is Theo, you said
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something that makes me think of today,
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which is, you know, you people were
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worried back then that computers were
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going to take their jobs. Wow. If we
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just replace that with the word AI,
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we're in we're in 2026. And so that's
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one thing. Uh, the second is our
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listeners on Morton Moneyball knows
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this. I started the data science team at
00:14:41
the Philadelphia Eagles, our home
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football team. Jeffrey Lur has a PhD in
00:14:46
sociology. He's a quant guy. He
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contacted me and it starts from the top.
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when you know it was him and Howie
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Roseman that I reported to. how he's a
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very quantoriented guy that would you
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know I hate to say it but you know the
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rest of the organization fell in line
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when the owner says we will be data
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oriented and we'll use it as a you
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didn't use these exact words but it's
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what you bent it's a decision support
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tool by no it's no one's looking to
00:15:09
automate draft decisions to Eric
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Bradlo's statistical model but it's
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another input into the decisionm so I I
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really everything you said really
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resonated a lot with me
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>> and there was it was a time when there
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was so much lowhanging fruit that we
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would have been negligent in in not
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>> and not not picking them up. I give you
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an example. You know, I'd been in the
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draft room um with the Padres's in the
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in the mid 90s and late 90s and there
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were there were no stats in the room
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whatsoever. And I remember one year we
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had these extra picks and I was up high
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and I was the night before the draft I
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was in a panic because I could tell from
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the way we were setting up our board and
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the way we were talking about certain
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players that we were going to end up
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with a handful of players who who had
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subpar performance at small colleges and
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we were going to draft them just based
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on some scouting looks and expect them
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to go out and you know perform their way
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through the minor leagues and perform in
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the big league against better
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competition. And so like in a panic, I
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remember calling the night before the
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draft, calling sports information
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directors at the respective colleges and
00:16:16
and and asking them to fax me their team
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stat sheet. So I'd at least have, you
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know, the ability to stand up on a soap
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box and say, "Why are we about to draft
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a kid from Texas Pan-American with a
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five and a half erra, you know, at the
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bottom of the first round?" And
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>> and and we did and he didn't get that
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aball. But so when I got to the Red Sox,
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literally the first project we did, we
00:16:39
sent a team of interns to NCA
00:16:41
headquarters um and had them look
00:16:44
through file cabinets and photocopied 30
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years worth of college baseball stats
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just trying to answer the simple
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question um what do great big leaguers
00:16:53
look like when they're in college? And
00:16:55
so just, you know, simple process,
00:16:56
building a database, run some regression
00:16:58
analyses, came up with a very simple
00:17:02
set of formulas. one was ISS iso ISO
00:17:06
power over strikeouts, ISOP over K. And
00:17:08
it just basically showed that if if you
00:17:10
if you slug, it doesn't have to be
00:17:12
homers, but if you have isolated power,
00:17:14
if you slug in in college ball and and
00:17:17
you make a lot of contact and don't
00:17:19
strike out, you tend to project really
00:17:21
well. So, we took that into the draft in
00:17:24
2004.
00:17:26
And Dustin Pedroya was, you know, not a
00:17:30
not a prototypical
00:17:33
high pick because he didn't hit for a
00:17:35
ton of power. Although he hit a a lot of
00:17:37
doubles and some triples, he only had a
00:17:39
handful of homers, but he never struck
00:17:40
out. And so he did extremely well in the
00:17:43
ISOP over K. We moved him up to the
00:17:46
point where he became our first pick.
00:17:48
And uh you know, you know,
00:17:50
good scouting reports, great makeup, but
00:17:52
also you know, we moved him where we
00:17:54
needed to because he lit up this metric
00:17:56
that we had just devised. And then you
00:17:58
know, obviously the rest is history.
00:18:00
Rookie of the year. Yeah, we know all
00:18:02
about it. Yeah, we don't want to.
00:18:04
>> So, it's just but it's just an example
00:18:06
of, you know, there was so much low
00:18:07
hanging fruit. You could you go from one
00:18:09
year this you're with an organization
00:18:11
you're not using any stats in the draft
00:18:13
and they're not allowed to a couple
00:18:15
years later now you have some formulas
00:18:17
where you think you can identify what
00:18:19
good big leaguers look like in college.
00:18:21
You can weaponize that. And we had we
00:18:23
ended up being the best drafting team of
00:18:24
the decade.
00:18:26
mainly through great scouts and great
00:18:28
process but also because we were one of
00:18:30
the first teams to to really incorporate
00:18:32
that kind of data and that kind of
00:18:34
innovation into the draft room. So I
00:18:36
think it's fair uh to say that I want to
00:18:38
I want to scroll us in time to today to
00:18:40
2026 teams all over are using these
00:18:43
these are now fan graphs it's every you
00:18:45
get all this information so so I don't
00:18:48
even want to entertain that but let's
00:18:49
ask a question I'll start with an
00:18:50
example uh some of the one of the most
00:18:52
recent papers I wrote in baseball
00:18:54
surprisingly I write more papers now um
00:18:56
baseball's still my favorite sport in
00:18:58
football and other things because
00:18:59
there's so much widespread interest and
00:19:01
in some level more to do but I did write
00:19:03
a paper on on something which every time
00:19:04
you watch a baseball game and it's late
00:19:06
in the game. The announcers keep yapping
00:19:09
away about what they call a third time
00:19:10
through the order effect. So if you
00:19:13
actually see how it's implemented in the
00:19:15
game, the way they implement it is what
00:19:17
we would call statistically based on
00:19:19
what uh the idea of a discontinuity. So
00:19:21
that the pitcher once he turn the line
00:19:23
lineup turns over, you're now dealing
00:19:25
with batters who have seen the pitcher
00:19:27
twice and they have now an advantage.
00:19:29
That's a discontinuity. So and therefore
00:19:32
you should react accordingly. the
00:19:34
pitcher is going to be hit, more likely
00:19:36
to be hit. So, what I did was look at
00:19:37
the data. I did this with my my former
00:19:39
PhD student Ryan Bril, and we discovered
00:19:42
that while it's very obvious that the
00:19:44
pitcher starts to break down in the
00:19:47
third time through the order, it's not
00:19:49
because of a discontinuity. It's because
00:19:51
of a combination of getting exhausted
00:19:53
and that the everyone's watching the
00:19:55
pitcher. So, at some level, it is batter
00:19:57
learning. They are watching the pitcher,
00:19:59
but it's not a discontinuity. And the
00:20:01
reason why that's distinction is because
00:20:03
there's no real reason to pull the
00:20:05
pitcher just because they're heading
00:20:06
into the third time through the order if
00:20:08
they're having a good game and that it's
00:20:10
not a it's not a discontinuity. So I
00:20:13
take that as something that that is it
00:20:15
is a widespread practice that I believe
00:20:16
as an academic status is wrong. So my
00:20:19
question to you is uh what are the
00:20:21
analytics that are either using being
00:20:23
used too much uh and maybe ineffectively
00:20:26
and and is there another analytics thing
00:20:28
uh or an avenue an area of baseball
00:20:29
where analytics isn't being applied
00:20:31
enough? So where is it over the top and
00:20:33
where is it um not being underused and
00:20:35
this is in today's game? Do you have
00:20:36
anything you could
00:20:38
>> Yeah. Where is it being used too much?
00:20:40
Um
00:20:41
>> so I I I my example was the third time
00:20:43
there trying to do it too much with the
00:20:45
relievers and not looking almost in the
00:20:47
oldfashioned way. How is that pitcher
00:20:48
doing on that day?
00:20:50
>> Well, I think it's a process, right,
00:20:51
where we're like when when you can first
00:20:53
quantify something, it becomes over
00:20:56
relied upon. So, right, you know, team I
00:20:59
think people have always known, yeah,
00:21:00
you have to be careful with pitchers as
00:21:02
they get later in games. Then it was, oh
00:21:03
wow, look what happens third time
00:21:05
through the order. Oh, we can quantify
00:21:07
it. Here's a third time through the
00:21:08
order penalty. Let's make sure we don't
00:21:10
fall victim to that. And then, um, you
00:21:13
know, overreact and start pulling
00:21:16
pitchers too early. I think then there's
00:21:18
more sophisticated thought. Oh, let's
00:21:20
separate fatigue from the exposure
00:21:24
element. Um, we can and and then you
00:21:28
have to take into account, you know,
00:21:29
what the alternative is just because you
00:21:32
may not be as effective the third time
00:21:33
of the order, you have to then look at,
00:21:35
you know, well, what's what are my
00:21:36
probabilities of getting outs, you know,
00:21:38
with with the alternatives. And so I
00:21:40
think most teams by this point have now
00:21:42
gotten to a point where they'll have
00:21:45
their manager prepared with a card that
00:21:48
shows sort of the appropriate third time
00:21:50
through the order penalty, but then also
00:21:51
what the what the matchup is for a fresh
00:21:55
each available reliever facing for the
00:21:57
first time. I mean, he can make a
00:21:59
comparison so that you're, you know, if
00:22:01
you look at the information in context
00:22:03
and better understand it visa the
00:22:05
alternatives, you're you're more likely
00:22:07
to make a decision than just
00:22:08
overreacting to some sort of newly
00:22:10
discovered phenomenon. I I feel like a
00:22:12
lot of baseball
00:22:13
um new new data streams or new insights
00:22:16
fall into that pattern. like when you
00:22:18
know we first started to be able to
00:22:19
quantify defense um there were a lot of
00:22:23
overreactions and sort of like
00:22:25
misattribution of of skill in certain
00:22:28
ways we didn't have we had some data but
00:22:31
it wasn't perfect data and we wasn't
00:22:33
taking all the factors into
00:22:34
consideration. Um so back to your
00:22:37
original question which is um where is
00:22:39
it being underutilized where is it being
00:22:42
under um uh where is it being
00:22:45
underutilized? sort of being
00:22:46
overutilized. Um I don't know. I think
00:22:50
um
00:22:53
I mean think about that. I think I think
00:22:55
you know personally I think there's sort
00:22:57
of too much data being used in in-game
00:23:01
decision making right where
00:23:03
>> you
00:23:05
where like the manager Yeah. He needs
00:23:09
some basic information which he probably
00:23:12
>> understands because managers prepare
00:23:14
really well for games to begin with. But
00:23:16
there is something to the flow of a game
00:23:19
to understanding your personnel to being
00:23:21
in the dugout. Um to feel is a real
00:23:25
thing just because it's not like
00:23:27
quantifiable and driven by numbers.
00:23:29
Managers have a pretty good
00:23:30
understanding of of of of how to run a
00:23:32
game. I think you lose a little bit of
00:23:35
that when there's too heavy a hand, too
00:23:38
much information being forced upon on on
00:23:41
the manager. I wouldn't want a manager
00:23:42
who's underprepared, who doesn't
00:23:44
understand their percentages. And but at
00:23:46
the same time, I wouldn't want to put a
00:23:49
manager in a position where he doesn't
00:23:50
have the ability to take in all the
00:23:53
factors, including those that are harder
00:23:54
to quantify and and and make decisions
00:23:57
where there's probably not enough data
00:24:00
in the game and where there's a race to
00:24:02
properly incorporate data is like injury
00:24:04
prevention, right? We're just um that's
00:24:07
I think the next big breakthrough. It
00:24:10
it's already started in player
00:24:11
development using obviously data and
00:24:14
tech to improve player development and
00:24:16
to sort of engineer training for certain
00:24:18
outcomes that are that are really
00:24:20
important to
00:24:21
>> let's hope AI and motion data also helps
00:24:23
with that video analysis now that can be
00:24:25
done at large scale with motion data as
00:24:27
well.
00:24:28
>> Absolutely. And all and what all all
00:24:29
that will do is is um you know increase
00:24:33
the data set and give you enough
00:24:36
information where then now
00:24:38
>> your analyst or AI or a combination
00:24:40
thereof um can can go about analyzing a
00:24:43
big enough data set where
00:24:45
>> we will hopefully find some leading
00:24:47
indicators of injury that we can sort of
00:24:50
uh develop and and and and uh around and
00:24:54
and put players in a better position to
00:24:56
stay healthy. It's a billion dollar
00:24:57
question. It's it's also an arms race
00:24:59
because right
00:25:00
>> you know they they get very advanced
00:25:02
training methods which is giving you
00:25:03
more ability to train harder and longer
00:25:06
but now you get more injury and you get
00:25:08
methods to prevent that and so it's
00:25:09
almost like it's still I don't think the
00:25:11
injury rates have
00:25:12
>> really have they gone up they've gone
00:25:14
down and they where are they they
00:25:14
constant I mean
00:25:15
>> yeah they're they're really constant and
00:25:18
what's amazing and Bill James used to
00:25:19
make this point too um and this gets to
00:25:22
your point about third time through the
00:25:23
order and fatigue but you know the the
00:25:26
>> the pit pitch limits
00:25:27
and pitch counts and innings limits. You
00:25:30
know, we've we've changed pitcher usage
00:25:32
so dramatically over the year. It really
00:25:34
started like with remember when Billy
00:25:36
Martin had the four aces in Oakland
00:25:39
>> and they were on the cover of Sports
00:25:41
Illustrated and everyone thought, "Oh,
00:25:42
they have this dominant pitching staff
00:25:45
that's young. They're going to be
00:25:46
together forever." And then all four of
00:25:48
those guys got hurt and and blew out in
00:25:50
the course of a year. And what happened?
00:25:52
Billy Martin lost his job
00:25:54
>> because that in and Bill's theory is
00:25:56
that all because if you look at the data
00:25:58
that's when the most dramatic change in
00:26:01
pitch pitcher usage occurred where we
00:26:04
started going from you know 275 innings
00:26:07
to you know 250 225 200 now you know 180
00:26:11
170 pitchers used to throw you know
00:26:13
upwards of 200 pitches a game and then
00:26:16
there was a huge drop off obviously now
00:26:18
we're like below 100 but
00:26:19
>> that was that was sort of this
00:26:21
inflection point in Bill's series that
00:26:23
the the ma managers notice that if you
00:26:25
blow out your very talented, very
00:26:27
valuable pitchers, you're more likely to
00:26:29
lose your job. So, usage dramatic a bit.
00:26:32
Look, look how far we are from where
00:26:35
pitchers were a couple generations ago
00:26:36
throwing so much less. It's such less
00:26:39
lowered volume and injury rates are
00:26:41
exactly the same. And
00:26:43
>> the main reason for that is because
00:26:44
obviously when you throw less, you throw
00:26:46
with more max.
00:26:48
>> Yeah. This the entire modern game. We've
00:26:50
had lots of biomechanics people on our
00:26:52
show that have talked to us about what
00:26:55
really matters in their view, love your
00:26:57
view on this, is not so much the number
00:26:59
of pitches, but how much how many max
00:27:01
effort pitches?
00:27:02
>> Yeah, exactly. And so people ask all the
00:27:04
time um you know, well, a how do you um
00:27:11
how do you keep pitchers healthier? And
00:27:13
then B is also sort of how do you how do
00:27:16
you rein pitching in a little bit so
00:27:18
that the strikeout rate gets back under
00:27:20
control, balls are in play a little bit
00:27:22
more, pitchers can go deeper in games,
00:27:24
restore the value of the starting
00:27:26
pitcher. And I think, you know, it's
00:27:28
it's obviously not a new concept, but
00:27:30
this idea of if if you could get to a
00:27:32
point where you have real limits on the
00:27:36
number of pitchers on a pitching staff,
00:27:37
you know, when when I was growing up,
00:27:39
there were 10 pitchers on a staff, then
00:27:40
it went to 11 and 12 and 13 and 14 and
00:27:43
15. We've obviously ran it back in with
00:27:45
the 13 pitcher limit. But if you could
00:27:47
ever gradually work it down, so say,
00:27:49
"Hey, we're going to we're going to move
00:27:51
that limit to 12 pitchers two years from
00:27:53
now. So train your pitchers
00:27:55
accordingly." And then if we don't get
00:27:57
the strikeout rate um under control, but
00:28:00
you know, if we don't hit a certain
00:28:01
metric, two years after that, we're
00:28:03
going to 11 pitchers. And if we don't
00:28:04
get the strikeout rate, you know, under
00:28:07
22% or by then we're going to go to 10
00:28:10
pitchers. You would just have to draft
00:28:12
and develop pitchers differently and
00:28:15
bring back the art of pitching. you
00:28:16
know, the and the number of pit the
00:28:18
percentage of pitches thrown at max
00:28:20
effort would go down because that, you
00:28:22
know, the job of the starting pitcher
00:28:24
used to be go as deep in the game as you
00:28:26
possibly can, if not pitch the whole
00:28:28
thing. And so pitchers would modulate
00:28:29
their effort. They'd come out throwing
00:28:31
90 miles an hour and if they really
00:28:33
needed it in a big spot, they'd reach
00:28:35
back and throw a max effort fast and get
00:28:37
more. But now the the whole job
00:28:39
description has changed because of
00:28:41
optimization. and we understand how hard
00:28:44
it is to hit a, you know, maximum stuff,
00:28:48
throw them with max effort. And so now
00:28:50
the job description of the pitcher is
00:28:51
get me as many outs as you can, but miss
00:28:54
as many bass as you can along the way.
00:28:55
And don't worry if you have to come out
00:28:57
after four and two/3 because I've got,
00:29:00
you know, eight guys and you are
00:29:02
throwing 99. One of my Theo, just so you
00:29:04
know, one of Audi and my favorite
00:29:06
moments on our show was when we
00:29:07
interviewed John Smoltz and we asked
00:29:10
him, you know, you know, who wouldn't
00:29:12
even make the major leagues? And he
00:29:13
said, "Oh, there's no way Greg Maddox
00:29:15
would make the major leagues today with
00:29:17
the stuff he had." Like, who would have
00:29:18
seen that a guy, you know, who can
00:29:20
barely throw 90 that hits all his spots
00:29:23
would win whatever 300?
00:29:24
>> That's actually not true. That's
00:29:25
actually not true because when Greg
00:29:27
Maddox was drafted out of high school
00:29:28
and then his his early years in the
00:29:30
minor leagues, he was actually throwing
00:29:31
he threw quite hard. He was throwing
00:29:34
five miles an hour. But what Maddox
00:29:36
>> learned is that he he could be just as
00:29:39
effective, toning it back, hitting his
00:29:41
spots and using movement and changing
00:29:43
speeds to be effective. I think if Greg
00:29:45
Maddox were drafted today, they would
00:29:47
said, "Hey, you throw 95.
00:29:49
>> Now throw 98.
00:29:50
>> Let's put let's put you on a velocity
00:29:51
program to make sure you throw 98." and
00:29:54
he would have thrown a fraction of the
00:29:55
the amount of innings and probably never
00:29:57
would have developed.
00:29:58
>> So that actually leads me to my next
00:29:59
kind of question and topic is you were
00:30:01
really influential in changing a bunch
00:30:04
of the rules that that were really I
00:30:06
think it had a tremendously positive
00:30:08
impact on MLB the pitch clock uh the
00:30:10
bases the the the pickoff uh limitation
00:30:13
and the size of the bases. Um I guess I
00:30:16
want to confirm that that that this was
00:30:17
you were studying this with the MLB. Um
00:30:20
and I love the changes. Um, I want you
00:30:22
to comment that, but but um but
00:30:24
particularly the the um the time between
00:30:26
pitches, what has that done to the
00:30:29
pitcher? Does that force them to not
00:30:31
throw as hard because they don't have a
00:30:33
35 minute, 45 seconds to a minute to
00:30:35
catch their breath and rare back another
00:30:37
100 mph fast or is it just making their
00:30:40
time through the game shorter? What is
00:30:42
what is the impact of that? And and how
00:30:43
do you reflect on on that change in
00:30:45
particular? You proud of it? I mean, I
00:30:46
love it.
00:30:47
>> Yeah, know it's true. I had been on the
00:30:49
when I was serving as general manager, I
00:30:50
had been on the competition committee
00:30:52
for, you know, over a decade and um so I
00:30:56
had given those issues a lot of thought
00:30:58
and frankly it was kind of frustrating
00:30:59
because we just couldn't we couldn't get
00:31:01
much done on the competition committees
00:31:03
and so when I was getting reaching the
00:31:05
end of my time with the Cubs, I reached
00:31:07
out to Commissioner Manfred and and
00:31:10
asked if I could have a role at Major
00:31:12
League Baseball just help helping out
00:31:13
with um the rule change projects. and he
00:31:16
was great and and brought me in. So with
00:31:19
Morgan Sword and his staff of at
00:31:22
baseball operations at Central Baseball,
00:31:24
I was allowed to be one of the leaders
00:31:25
of um uh those projects and it was a lot
00:31:29
of fun. There were a lot of different
00:31:30
components to it. There was a sort of
00:31:31
like research component. We we relied on
00:31:34
a lot of club analysts and a lot of very
00:31:36
smart people try to model all the
00:31:38
changes. There was a a sort of
00:31:40
scientific method experimentation
00:31:42
process where we we were able to we had
00:31:45
this great petri dish of the Myer
00:31:46
Leagues where we could experiment a
00:31:48
little bit, make sure we
00:31:50
>> um uh sort of planned and and and
00:31:53
determined any unintended consequences
00:31:55
and sort of understood what worked about
00:31:57
the proposed changes, what didn't in in
00:31:59
in not just in theory but in practice.
00:32:02
and we were able to test over the course
00:32:04
of 8,000 minor league games to so that
00:32:07
by the time we were ready to implement
00:32:09
at the major league level, we were
00:32:11
really confident, we understood that the
00:32:13
rules worked, what the outcome would be,
00:32:14
and that they were fair to players. And
00:32:17
then there was a sort of like political
00:32:19
campaign element of the rule change
00:32:21
process too where we were trying to win
00:32:24
hearts and minds and um you know sort of
00:32:27
plate traditionalists as well as as as
00:32:30
as sort of younger fans and get the
00:32:33
players and the managers and the media
00:32:36
on on board. And then the execution
00:32:38
element where you know you had to make
00:32:40
sure the adjustment period was as as
00:32:42
small as possible and that that went
00:32:43
pretty well. I think by
00:32:45
>> pretty much by like the end of April
00:32:46
that first year, people just didn't
00:32:48
notice the pitch timer and all they all
00:32:50
they noticed was this really crisp,
00:32:52
beautiful pace uh to the game and that
00:32:55
they were getting home at a at a more
00:32:56
reasonable hour. But as far as the pitch
00:32:58
timer's impact on on pitchers, I mean
00:33:00
the pitch pitch timer um
00:33:04
was going to have a lot of effects um
00:33:07
ultimately I think like on on pitchers
00:33:09
on hitters um on on on the pace of play
00:33:13
on fans and ultimately they were like
00:33:14
all going to be really positive right
00:33:16
with with with pitchers. One of the
00:33:19
secondary impacts on pitchers was going
00:33:21
to be um that this trend of pitchers
00:33:26
taking a lot of extra time between
00:33:28
pitches in order to be able to recover
00:33:31
and throw max effort was going to be
00:33:33
mitigated a little bit. So, I think
00:33:35
pitchers figured out and and and and a
00:33:38
lot of people at the clubs figured out
00:33:40
that, you know, to to throw more pitches
00:33:44
at max effort, you could you could
00:33:46
accomplish that by pacing yourself. And
00:33:48
conversely, if you have to work at a
00:33:50
more rapid pace, you have to modulate a
00:33:52
little bit. Now, the strikeout rate
00:33:54
didn't go down directly because of that
00:33:56
because it's a it's a multiffactorial
00:33:58
issue and a complicated um equation. Um,
00:34:02
but I think it helps a little bit. And
00:34:04
then obviously you have to balance that
00:34:06
with the concern that um, recovery is a
00:34:09
good thing and that if you ask pitchers
00:34:11
to do too much, you could potentially
00:34:13
run the risk of hurting them. But I
00:34:15
think the data has backed up that what
00:34:17
we saw in the minor leagues, I think
00:34:18
what's held true in the in the major
00:34:20
leagues is that the pitch timer is not a
00:34:21
contributing factor to the increased
00:34:24
injury rate. It's simply um the desire
00:34:27
to throw max effort um as as as
00:34:31
frequently as possible that's really
00:34:32
leading to these injuries.
00:34:34
>> I think they probably have to pull it
00:34:35
back just because they just don't have
00:34:37
the the uh the the energy. But I'm I'm
00:34:39
surprised that the strikeout rate didn't
00:34:41
go down. Um and that probably was in It
00:34:44
didn't go up though, did it either?
00:34:45
>> Yeah, it went it stabilized a it
00:34:47
stabilized a a little bit
00:34:49
>> because we don't have the
00:34:50
counterfactual. I would imagine it would
00:34:51
have gone it would have gone up a little
00:34:52
bit and probably kept it from rising and
00:34:54
just sort of stopped stopped that trend.
00:34:56
>> Again, I think it's just going to be um
00:34:59
there are sort of other interventions
00:35:01
that ultimately will be necessary to
00:35:04
lower the strikeout rate and we tested
00:35:06
all kinds of things even we even tested
00:35:09
mound distance where
00:35:11
>> in one of the independent leagues.
00:35:12
>> Yeah, we heard that that ran this joint
00:35:14
venture. we moved it back from 60 ft 6
00:35:16
in by
00:35:18
>> I think it was a foot and um again it's
00:35:21
sort of like a dynamic environment. So
00:35:24
that alone doesn't lower the strikeout
00:35:26
rate because then you breaking balls
00:35:28
actually break a little bit more from
00:35:29
that distance and it
00:35:31
>> there's a huge adjustment period for
00:35:33
hitters to to who have trained their
00:35:34
whole lives seeing pitches at 60 feet
00:35:36
six inches. How long is do they have to
00:35:38
be exposed to this new input before they
00:35:41
can adjust as well? So, I still think
00:35:43
there's something there uh to toy with,
00:35:45
but you know, lot lot of different
00:35:47
things you can a lot of different levers
00:35:48
you can pull to try to get the strikeout
00:35:50
rate um back under control. I think
00:35:53
ultimately the most important thing is
00:35:55
we have to ask a little bit more from
00:35:57
our pitchers in terms of volume whether
00:36:00
through it it's its pitcher roster
00:36:02
limits or through like mandating the
00:36:05
length of starts be certain innings
00:36:07
unless you know you have to go you lose
00:36:09
your DH if you know or you can't come
00:36:12
out of the game unless you've gone five
00:36:13
innings or give up five runs or um
00:36:16
unless there's an injury concern. Um,
00:36:19
but just change the job job description
00:36:21
for more volume. So that so that pitch
00:36:25
pitching is not about power and missing
00:36:28
bats exclusively. It's also an art where
00:36:31
you're where you need to be efficient.
00:36:33
So that you know there's a reason to
00:36:35
throw under certain game situations
00:36:37
throw a one-1 sinker down the middle.
00:36:40
Know that
00:36:40
>> there's only aso as the famous quote I
00:36:42
think it was Sandy Kofax said right? I
00:36:44
became a good pitcher when I stopped
00:36:45
trying to guy make guys miss the ball.
00:36:48
Yeah. And and under the current
00:36:50
environment, teams are asking pitchers,
00:36:52
hey, if you want to be a good pitcher,
00:36:54
miss as many bats as you can, right?
00:36:56
>> And because that's an optimization under
00:36:58
the current system. So, putting in
00:37:00
constraints that change the equation,
00:37:02
change the incentives,
00:37:05
soon you'll start rewarding pitchers
00:37:06
that can go deep in games and that throw
00:37:08
volume even at reduced strikeout rates.
00:37:12
But under the current system, teams
00:37:13
would be crazy to pay for anything other
00:37:15
than bat missing. That's the that's the
00:37:16
one way to know you're you're going to
00:37:18
get guys out.
00:37:19
>> So, I want to ask about the the I guess
00:37:21
the fan experience, which is one of the
00:37:23
things that the pitch clock really
00:37:26
helped. It moved the game along. Now,
00:37:27
I'm a traditionalist and my view is you
00:37:29
brought it back to where it was.
00:37:31
>> Yeah, exactly.
00:37:31
>> The game pace was back to where it was
00:37:33
and why it would be very against
00:37:34
changing the distance because one of the
00:37:36
beauty things, beautiful things about
00:37:37
baseball is you can say, "Yeah, Sandy
00:37:38
Kovac was playing the same game as
00:37:40
they're playing today." And they really
00:37:42
are. Um, so I'll add two things. because
00:37:44
I actually went to a Phillies game um
00:37:46
this past season and there weren't any
00:37:47
strikeouts and there was a lots of lots
00:37:50
of ground balls, lots of terrific
00:37:51
fielding and one of the things that's
00:37:52
great about a game in person is you
00:37:54
really feel what a spectacular fielding
00:37:58
play. You don't catch that on TV that's
00:38:00
missing but you really feel that in
00:38:02
person. There was there were stolen
00:38:04
bases. So I I'll just an anecdote. You
00:38:07
know back in the day stealing bases was
00:38:09
considered something you needed to do.
00:38:10
And one of the things the analyst showed
00:38:12
that if you're not doing that on average
00:38:14
twothirds of the time, although there's
00:38:16
some variance in that depending on
00:38:18
context, you're not getting any value
00:38:20
out of that. And
00:38:22
>> even so Babe Ruth used to steal tons of
00:38:24
bases when he was young and he was
00:38:26
actually somewhat quick, but he was not
00:38:27
successful at it very much half the
00:38:30
time. He was actually costing his team a
00:38:31
lot of value. We know that now. But from
00:38:33
a fan experience, all those balls in
00:38:35
play, all that action makes the game fun
00:38:37
to watch. Yeah.
00:38:39
>> And so the the new rules about stolen
00:38:40
bases have have made the game more
00:38:43
exciting. I think you you would concur.
00:38:45
Um so my question is two things. Um
00:38:49
>> how do we get the I mean as you know and
00:38:51
and Eric and you were all roughly the
00:38:54
same age. You're a little younger than
00:38:55
we are but not too much. Um baseball was
00:38:58
once the the national game. Um and
00:39:00
football has overtaken and I I think
00:39:02
that's largely to do with the TV the
00:39:04
beauty and elegance it has on
00:39:05
television. Um, but what we have is what
00:39:08
we I say we we uh baseball has the
00:39:10
advantage of having a great experience
00:39:12
in the ballpark and 162 games and I
00:39:16
think all of us I don't know I know Eric
00:39:17
and I we got to be baseball fans from
00:39:20
our childhood from the experience of
00:39:21
going to games and maybe you did in
00:39:23
something similar are playing. How do we
00:39:25
get baseball to bring back fans and be
00:39:27
attracted to it? How do we make the fan
00:39:29
experience better? Is that something
00:39:30
that's that you're thinking about? I
00:39:32
know that some people are trying to get
00:39:34
engagement that really um connects with
00:39:36
fans through computers, through their
00:39:37
phones, through through like
00:39:39
forecasting. Um but the how do we how do
00:39:41
you think about the fan experience? And
00:39:43
you can think about stolen bases an
00:39:44
example and maybe jumping on from that.
00:39:47
>> Yeah. Um so the entire rule change
00:39:50
project that led to the pitch timer
00:39:52
bigger bases and and um the shift
00:39:55
changes was was um intended to give fans
00:40:01
more of what they like and less of what
00:40:03
they don't like. And the reason I I I
00:40:05
love that project is you I'd worked 29
00:40:08
years for for teams where you're really
00:40:10
only focused on winning, right? So, I'm
00:40:13
a huge baseball fan, but you have to
00:40:15
almost stop thinking like a fan in order
00:40:17
to be a GM and your your currency is
00:40:20
wins. And so, you're you're trying to
00:40:22
optimize your player selection, your
00:40:24
player deployment, your player
00:40:26
development just simply to win. So, um,
00:40:30
you know, for instance, if if you know
00:40:31
that, uh, the stolen base attempt is
00:40:34
only a good play if you're going to be
00:40:36
successful 70% of the time, then you ask
00:40:39
your your base runners not to go unless
00:40:42
unless, you know, everything adds up,
00:40:44
all the math adds up that they're going
00:40:45
to be successful more than 70% of the
00:40:47
time, even though it's a very
00:40:48
entertaining game. So, we started that
00:40:50
project with with a ton of fan outreach,
00:40:52
trying to determine what is it that fans
00:40:54
really like about baseball? What is it
00:40:56
that they don't like? We're trying to
00:40:58
create the most joyful, most
00:41:00
entertaining version of baseball.
00:41:03
Figuring that if you do that, that's the
00:41:04
single best thing you can do to to bring
00:41:06
fans back. Turns out, you're right, fans
00:41:09
like action. They like the ball and
00:41:12
play. They like athleticism on display.
00:41:14
Their favorite uh three events at a
00:41:16
baseball game are triples, doubles, and
00:41:19
stolen bases. Their least favorite
00:41:21
events are anything that has to do with
00:41:23
uh inaction or inactivity. So, they
00:41:26
don't like uh pitching changes. Um they
00:41:29
don't like intentional walks. They don't
00:41:31
they don't like things where there's
00:41:32
dead any dead time whatsoever. So, we
00:41:35
knew we wanted to try to incorporate
00:41:37
some rules that would change the math on
00:41:39
stolen bases to make it a little bit
00:41:41
better percentage play so that there'd
00:41:43
be more attempts and more stolen bases
00:41:45
and more athleticism on display on the
00:41:47
bases. So, you know, you mentioned being
00:41:50
a traditionalist as well and you could
00:41:51
you never want to change 60' 6 in. Well,
00:41:54
the same is sort of true of the base
00:41:55
paths. You know, they're they've been
00:41:57
set out um 90 ft um
00:41:59
>> in shorter now.
00:42:02
>> Well, no, but it's not it's See, this is
00:42:05
what's interesting. I'll tell you this
00:42:06
anecdote. Um it's not 90 ft between
00:42:09
bases. It's a 90 90 foot square at which
00:42:12
the bases are set out with first base is
00:42:15
is uh on one end of that square. Second
00:42:18
base is the midpoint of the base.
00:42:20
>> Uhhuh. on on the 90 degree uh corner.
00:42:23
Second base, third base is within there.
00:42:25
So, it's actually le it's always been
00:42:26
less than 90 feet between bases,
00:42:29
>> right?
00:42:29
>> So, we were sitting around, we said,
00:42:30
well, one way we can encourage soul and
00:42:32
base activity is to shorten the distance
00:42:34
between bases, but we could never get
00:42:36
away with that because everyone thinks
00:42:37
it's 90 ft between bases. It was
00:42:39
actually an analyst at the Cubs, Chris
00:42:41
Jones, who we were having a meeting
00:42:44
about this and he just he he came up he
00:42:46
just said bigger bases. I said, "What do
00:42:48
you mean bigger bases?" He said, "Well,
00:42:50
that's that's that's another way to
00:42:52
shorten the distance between bases
00:42:53
without having to change the geometry of
00:42:55
the game." So, fast forward a year
00:42:57
later,
00:42:58
>> I'm leading this project at MLB and I'm
00:43:00
on a Zoom with all 30 major league
00:43:02
managers.
00:43:03
>> And I asked them, okay, uh, how wide is
00:43:06
home plate? And they all knew 17 inches.
00:43:08
And I said, well, how what's the
00:43:10
distance between home plate and the
00:43:11
pitchers mount? They all knew 60 feet 6
00:43:13
in. And I said, well, let me ask you
00:43:15
this. What are the dimensions of a major
00:43:17
league base? No idea.
00:43:20
>> Guess how many of the 30 you knew.
00:43:22
>> None.
00:43:23
>> Correct.
00:43:25
>> Beautiful.
00:43:27
>> No one knew that it was
00:43:28
>> I don't know. And I'm a numbers fan.
00:43:29
>> Yeah. So, it was 15 in by 15 in, right?
00:43:32
15 in squared.
00:43:33
>> And so, I said, "Well, look, if you guys
00:43:36
don't even know how big a base is, then
00:43:38
I don't want I don't want to hear that
00:43:40
we're ruining the game by going by
00:43:42
adding 3 in on the base." And so when
00:43:44
you add three, you make the base uh 18
00:43:47
in by 18 in, which is what we did. Now
00:43:50
all of a sudden, the distance between
00:43:51
first base and second base is shorter by
00:43:53
4 1/2 in because you gain 3 ft at first
00:43:56
base and you gain an inch and a half at
00:43:58
second base. So 4 and 12 in is like the
00:44:00
length of your finger. So all those all
00:44:02
those bang bang plays where you're just
00:44:05
out at second base by less now all of a
00:44:08
sudden you're safe. So the stolen base
00:44:11
became a better percentage play by
00:44:14
shortening the distance between bases
00:44:16
doing it in a way that didn't offend the
00:44:18
traditionalist because you weren't
00:44:19
messing with 90 ft. You were just
00:44:20
messing with the size of the base which
00:44:22
not even the major league managers knew
00:44:24
about. And it ended up being a very
00:44:26
successful rule change because the math
00:44:28
worked. We tested it in the minor
00:44:29
leagues. There were once you shorten the
00:44:32
distance, more stolen base attempts,
00:44:33
higher percent higher success rate. And
00:44:36
that's exactly what happened in the
00:44:37
minor le in the major leagues. And so,
00:44:39
you know, we were we we had gotten down
00:44:40
to a point where guys were leading the
00:44:42
big leagues in stolen bases with like 40
00:44:45
bags. And we just realized it's a better
00:44:47
game when guys can steal 70 80 bags. And
00:44:50
so now there's a lot more guys running,
00:44:53
a lot more guys getting, you know, 30
00:44:55
bags and it's a better pickups, right?
00:44:58
How much how would you distribute the
00:45:00
increase to the pickoff limitation
00:45:02
versus the
00:45:03
>> Yeah, I think you that was definitely
00:45:05
part of it. You know, as part of the
00:45:07
pitch timer rule, you had to put in the
00:45:09
the the pickoff throw limitation. It's
00:45:11
really a disengagement. It's really a
00:45:13
limit on how many times you can
00:45:14
disengage from the rubber as a pitcher.
00:45:17
um the the the data shows that um it's
00:45:21
it's not that's not as significant as as
00:45:24
as you would you would think, but
00:45:26
certainly helps and certainly moves the
00:45:28
needle the right direction. Everyone
00:45:30
everyone was saying, "Oh, once you get
00:45:31
to, you know, once you've disengaged
00:45:34
once, you only have one left or once
00:45:35
you've disengaged twice and you have to
00:45:37
put the runner out or else it's an
00:45:39
automatic 90. It's going to be an
00:45:40
automatic bag." And that that fear did
00:45:43
not play out. If you look if you look
00:45:45
behind the data, it hasn't ruined the
00:45:46
game. You don't hear too many people
00:45:47
talk about it. Now it's just another
00:45:49
another part of the batter the pitcher
00:45:52
runner dynamic.
00:45:54
>> So go ahead. Go ahead.
00:45:55
>> Yeah. Let me let me ask you a few last
00:45:57
questions for us here.
00:45:59
>> Um first
00:46:00
>> without giving out any secret sauce
00:46:02
about what you're specifically working
00:46:03
on now, which I'll ask you in a second.
00:46:05
Um, how do all of us, how do all the
00:46:07
teams, whether it's our Yankees, your
00:46:10
Red Sox, whether formerly the Cubs, how
00:46:12
do we compete with the Dodgers today?
00:46:14
Like, if you know, one way to think
00:46:17
about it is we need to go in an entirely
00:46:20
different direction. Like, they're good
00:46:21
on these dimensions and so we can't
00:46:23
compete. We can't be better than them on
00:46:25
the dimensions in which they're really
00:46:27
strong. Another option would be, you
00:46:29
know, we have to invest in, I don't
00:46:32
know, purely, you know, we're going to
00:46:34
be the best defensive team and so we'll
00:46:36
try to create as many outs that way. How
00:46:38
do you think about competing with a team
00:46:40
that's now the two-time champion and,
00:46:43
you know, team spender?
00:46:45
>> Yeah, they're they're they've gotten
00:46:47
better. They're the biggest spender.
00:46:48
like how how do teams even think about
00:46:51
compet like for example you know you've
00:46:54
been a general manager long enough you
00:46:55
know you remember when our Yankees were
00:46:57
the three-time repeat champions and were
00:46:59
an out or two away from fourtime repeat
00:47:01
champions in 2001 h how did you think
00:47:04
about it then and how do you think about
00:47:05
it now
00:47:06
>> yeah
00:47:08
look I think obviously the Dodgers have
00:47:10
tremendous resources and have done a
00:47:11
remarkable job of of using them and
00:47:14
growing them and creating this cycle
00:47:16
where um they've had so success that
00:47:19
their revenues have grown. They're up
00:47:20
over like a billion dollars in revenue,
00:47:22
I think, now, and it's just this
00:47:24
perpetuating cycles. They've done a
00:47:25
phenomenal job. But look, it's it's it's
00:47:29
baseball. So, the you know, Billy
00:47:32
famously said the playoffs are a
00:47:33
crapshoot, and I don't I don't fully
00:47:35
agree that it's not a crapshoot, but
00:47:37
there's there's no team that's actually
00:47:39
um you know, can get anywhere close to a
00:47:41
50%
00:47:43
chance of winning the World Series
00:47:45
there. So, the Dodgers still are still
00:47:46
underdogs. compared to the field. And so
00:47:50
the answer is is you you try to build a
00:47:53
team that has sustained success and gets
00:47:54
into the playoffs as often as possible
00:47:57
and then lean into the ingredients that
00:48:00
make for a successful October baseball
00:48:03
team and chance plays a huge part in
00:48:06
what happens in October. The Dodgers
00:48:08
themselves were an inch away from not
00:48:10
being champions last year and then they
00:48:11
became. But um there are certain
00:48:13
elements of of the game and elements of
00:48:17
the roster that that take on added
00:48:18
emphasis in October. So our goal when I
00:48:22
was with the Red Sox was always, you
00:48:24
know, build a team that wins, you know,
00:48:26
a foolproof team to win 95 games a year.
00:48:30
You know, anything that could get in the
00:48:31
way of us winning 95 games a year, uh we
00:48:34
needed to attack and create redundancies
00:48:36
and depth because you couldn't look up
00:48:38
and say injuries are excuse or this is
00:48:39
an excuse. So win 95 and get in and then
00:48:43
make sure your roster is is built for
00:48:46
for October as well. And that worked
00:48:47
then with the Cubs different landscape.
00:48:49
Now there's wild card teams lowers the
00:48:52
bar a little bit. 93.
00:48:53
>> You don't need 95
00:48:55
to be 95 anymore. But you know now that
00:48:58
bar has never been lower. You know say
00:49:00
you could either be a fan or a critic of
00:49:02
the modern uh playoff structure but the
00:49:05
reality is the bar has never been lower
00:49:07
to get into the postseason. And so, um,
00:49:10
if I were with a team and said, "How am
00:49:12
I going to compete with the Dodgers?" I
00:49:14
would start with build a team that's get
00:49:15
into the playoffs every single year and
00:49:17
then lean into the elements that make a
00:49:19
team successful in October. Be prepared
00:49:22
and and attack it that way.
00:49:24
>> So, maybe two more questions. I lied.
00:49:25
Um,
00:49:25
>> oh, I got to do a follow-up though to
00:49:27
just jump in. Go ahead. You go ahead.
00:49:28
>> What is that? So, we love to argue about
00:49:30
what that actual element is. Some people
00:49:33
have said it's starting pitching. Others
00:49:34
said it would be middle relief pitching.
00:49:36
Others said, "Is it contact? Is it
00:49:37
homers?" If you had to pick one thing
00:49:39
that's that that that that ingredient
00:49:42
for October that's different from the 90
00:49:44
95 games in the in in the in the regular
00:49:46
season, what would it be?
00:49:47
>> Well, one of my roles now is with Fenway
00:49:49
Sports Group, which owns the Red Sox,
00:49:51
and I'm right so I'm an adviser there.
00:49:53
So, I'm not going to share
00:49:55
>> You're not going to talk about a an
00:49:57
element that's that's kind of obvious
00:49:59
and has been publicly discussed. So,
00:50:01
it's not showing anything, but you know,
00:50:04
>> uh you're, you know, having like an ace
00:50:06
reliever or two or three just absolute
00:50:08
shutdown relievers has added import in
00:50:11
in October because they're pitching
00:50:14
>> a much greater percentage of the innings
00:50:17
and and and where the the sort of most
00:50:20
important innings where the game turns
00:50:21
in October. So, you know, so takes
00:50:23
that's why we traded for Raldis Chapman.
00:50:25
One of the reasons we traded for old as
00:50:27
Japan with the Cubs is we we were not,
00:50:30
you know, doing that to maximize our
00:50:32
chances of winning the division and we
00:50:34
were pretty sure we were going in the
00:50:35
division. Our calculation was literally
00:50:37
based on World Series odds,
00:50:39
>> right?
00:50:39
>> And a pitcher like that can change your
00:50:41
World Series odds. I think I think
00:50:43
adding him changed our World Series odds
00:50:45
from something like um World Series
00:50:48
championship odds from something like,
00:50:50
you know, 18% to 22%. I would guess
00:50:53
three to 5% which is
00:50:56
>> right. And so you got back with one
00:50:59
player. It's it's that and and you know
00:51:01
what we don't win game five of the World
00:51:04
Series at Wrigley Field without him. He
00:51:06
comes in and
00:51:08
>> one out in the seventh and that gets
00:51:09
eight huge outs in a one-run game. So
00:51:12
that one that one turned out well. But
00:51:14
um so so ace reliever and then you know
00:51:17
it's obvious like you need a really you
00:51:20
need you need good fourth fifth starters
00:51:22
sixth seventh eighth starters to get
00:51:24
through a season and win enough games to
00:51:26
get in the postseason but your fourth
00:51:28
and fifth starters probably don't see
00:51:30
the light of day you know in in the
00:51:31
postseason and your your ace pitches you
00:51:36
know out of the 1400 innings these days
00:51:38
he might be lucky to pitch 200 in the
00:51:40
regular season. So, one oneth,
00:51:44
you know, 13 14% whatever that is. Um,
00:51:47
but in the postseason, you know,
00:51:50
especially if if he can start games 1,
00:51:52
four, and seven, he's pitching a much
00:51:54
higher percentage. So, like your your
00:51:56
top two or three starters, your top one
00:51:58
or two relievers, obviously those are
00:52:01
more important positions in the
00:52:02
postseason even than in the regular
00:52:04
season.
00:52:05
>> Can you just maybe just last question,
00:52:07
you mentioned about the work you're
00:52:08
doing now with the Fenway Sports Group.
00:52:10
What is your actual role and title
00:52:12
today? And um you know, are we going to
00:52:16
see you back in a general manager? Are
00:52:18
you interested in a full-time general
00:52:19
manager role again? Or you know, I don't
00:52:21
know if the baseball Josh Raw told the
00:52:24
story where you know, the baseball hall
00:52:26
of fame called him and he took over the
00:52:28
job. Is there some dream job you'd like
00:52:30
to have? Like you know, I don't know
00:52:31
when Rob Manfred called you tomorrow and
00:52:33
said, "Theo Epstein, you know, the
00:52:34
owners of you know, we need you to take
00:52:37
over Major League Baseball." I mean, no.
00:52:39
No. Oh, I mean it's not imp you're
00:52:41
laughing but I mean none of us would no
00:52:43
there's no baseball fan that would would
00:52:44
have a problem with that at all. So what
00:52:47
are you doing now for the Penway Sports
00:52:49
Group and what do you see your to me you
00:52:50
look like an extremely young man. What
00:52:52
do you forecast for the next 30 years of
00:52:54
your career in baseball?
00:52:56
>> Um well I appreciate that compliment. I
00:52:58
am 52 so it's all age is age is all
00:53:01
relative but um yeah I have two
00:53:03
part-time jobs now and and also have the
00:53:06
benefit you know after those 29 years in
00:53:09
front offices of of spending more time
00:53:10
with my kids I have two boys 18 and 11
00:53:13
so making up for lost time with them but
00:53:15
with Femway Sports Group I guess
00:53:17
technically my title is senior adviser
00:53:19
and part owner um so I kind of advise
00:53:23
all the different uh uh organizations
00:53:26
and companies that we have across the
00:53:28
portfolio. So different role with each
00:53:30
organization. So with the Red Sox, I get
00:53:32
to play that Bill the Joy role for for
00:53:35
Craig Brezlo where I had the benefit of
00:53:37
Bill's wisdom, someone who had done the
00:53:39
job and done it successfully. Now I get
00:53:41
to be there for Craig whenever he has
00:53:43
questions, help him see around corners,
00:53:45
help him with his development in in that
00:53:47
role. And then um we also own the
00:53:50
Pittsburgh Penguins, uh Liverpool
00:53:52
Football Club and the Premier League. We
00:53:54
have a a NASCAR team, Rous Femway, uh,
00:53:58
Racing. We're, uh, I, you know, I can't
00:54:00
drive stick, so I'm not sure I'm I'm I'm
00:54:02
a great help there, but we're also the,
00:54:05
uh, lead investor in this consortium,
00:54:07
um, that that is invested in the PGA
00:54:09
Tour. So, I'm actually doing a lot of
00:54:11
work. I'm on this uh competition this uh
00:54:14
future competition committee at the PGA
00:54:17
Tour where we're putting in a lot of
00:54:18
thought under the leadership of um Brian
00:54:21
Rolap who's the new CEO of the PGA Tour
00:54:23
and Tiger Woods who's chairing the
00:54:25
committee trying to reimagine the
00:54:27
competitive and commercial model uh for
00:54:29
the for the tour.
00:54:30
>> Oh, you got to be eating that up. That's
00:54:32
got to be right up your You must be
00:54:33
loving that.
00:54:34
>> No, it's real. It's really interesting
00:54:35
stuff. And my oldest is a big golfer, so
00:54:37
I've got the golf bug myself the last
00:54:39
couple years. So, it's good work. And
00:54:41
then I'm also an operating partner for
00:54:43
Artos Partners.
00:54:45
>> Oh,
00:54:45
>> Artos Partners was the first mover in in
00:54:48
in the space of institutional capital
00:54:51
coming into the sports world. So they're
00:54:53
sports only private equity company
00:54:55
started.
00:54:55
>> We know them well here at the Wharton
00:54:57
School. We have a partnership with
00:54:58
Artos. So
00:54:59
>> that's right. So uh they were the first
00:55:01
mover in that space. actually got got
00:55:03
the rules changed at Major League
00:55:05
Baseball and subsequently
00:55:08
um NHL and NBA and now just uh the last
00:55:11
year or two the NFL. So they have um you
00:55:14
know close to 30 investments in in in in
00:55:17
different teams across the the four
00:55:19
major sports here in global soccer. So,
00:55:21
it's been fun. You know, after sort of
00:55:23
working for for owners um for 30 years,
00:55:26
I recognized what a sea change this was
00:55:28
going to be with institutional capital
00:55:30
coming in and creating liquidity and
00:55:32
some growth capital. And so, it's been
00:55:34
fun to advise. I definitely do not ever
00:55:36
want to consider myself a finance guy
00:55:38
and I and I do not. Um but getting
00:55:41
exposure to that world and they're doing
00:55:43
some real exciting work on the phone
00:55:45
with commissioners and sports owners
00:55:46
every day. It's been been a lot of fun.
00:55:48
So, as far as the future, yeah, as my
00:55:51
kids get older and can see myself
00:55:53
jumping back in full-time, if it's with
00:55:55
a team, you know, I definitely want to I
00:55:57
I've seen the the power of great
00:55:59
ownership in sports, like what you can
00:56:01
do to make an impact in your city. Um,
00:56:05
how you can um align the team around
00:56:08
certain values on and off the field. So,
00:56:11
um, yeah, if I'm back helping run a team
00:56:13
again someday, I definitely want to be
00:56:15
do it from from, you know, an ownership
00:56:17
position to sort of maximize the impact.
00:56:19
And, um, yeah, who know? Like I I was
00:56:23
lucky enough to work at Major League
00:56:24
Baseball and help with the rule change
00:56:25
project. I I you started to allude to
00:56:27
earlier how you think it's a better
00:56:29
world when baseball truly is the
00:56:31
national pastime. I completely sign off
00:56:34
on that. I agree. So, anything I can
00:56:36
ever do to help baseball in any capacity
00:56:38
and help help restore it to its place at
00:56:40
top the pecking order, I think we're all
00:56:42
we're all better off. And you you know,
00:56:44
you asked earlier about what can we do.
00:56:47
I mean, baseball has some incredible
00:56:49
advantages relative to the other sports.
00:56:51
I we have twice the content uh in a
00:56:53
world where live content is king in the
00:56:57
media and entertaining landscape these
00:56:59
days. So, um, you know, Rob and and the
00:57:02
powers at BM baseball are really
00:57:03
starting to be strategic and creative
00:57:06
and how we can, um, use that going
00:57:09
forward in next collective bargaining
00:57:10
agreement, next set of media deals to
00:57:12
sort of like maximize uh, engagement and
00:57:16
and and lift the the impact of the
00:57:18
sport. We um, we take place every day.
00:57:21
It's sort of, you know, the news cycle
00:57:22
is so short now. We don't, you know,
00:57:24
unlike football and hockey, we don't
00:57:25
wear helmets on our players. like our
00:57:27
players should be the biggest stars in
00:57:30
all sports because they're very
00:57:31
accessible. They're out there every
00:57:33
single day. We play twice the amount of
00:57:34
games. Baseball has unbelievable
00:57:37
narrative arcs, you know, watching a
00:57:38
starting pitcher out there perform or
00:57:40
play within the course of the season.
00:57:42
So, you know, we lean into that. You you
00:57:44
expand um the fan base, you know, you
00:57:47
attract casual fans who might be in it
00:57:49
more for human interest than for all the
00:57:52
inside baseball stuff. And um you know,
00:57:55
it's sort of unlimited potential. And as
00:57:56
it is, look, we draw more fans than any
00:57:59
other sport by by by a 3x multiple. The
00:58:03
second most attended sport in in in this
00:58:07
country is minor league baseball. There
00:58:09
more people go to minor league games
00:58:11
than go to the NFL or NBA or NHL. And
00:58:14
>> it's also a family game. You if you go
00:58:15
to a baseball game, you see families
00:58:16
there. You don't see that.
00:58:17
>> Absolutely. Absolutely. And it's just
00:58:19
it's a good the the pace now of the game
00:58:21
is back restored as you said earlier to
00:58:24
this naturalism. you can talk to people,
00:58:26
you can enjoy it without being
00:58:27
completely locked in. Um, and it's uh,
00:58:31
you know, it's a good antidote for
00:58:34
what's happening in the rest of the
00:58:35
country with our addiction to screens
00:58:38
and this constant demand from different
00:58:41
sources for our attention and the
00:58:44
polarization that you find sort of like
00:58:46
everywhere. Baseball's a great unifier.
00:58:48
So, I just think we have so many natural
00:58:50
advantages as as the best game there is
00:58:52
that over time as we adjust to new
00:58:55
societal norms and lean into the
00:58:57
advantages we have. We're going to be in
00:58:59
good shape.
00:59:00
>> Well, Theo Audi and I would like to
00:59:02
thank you for joining us here on Wharton
00:59:04
Bunnyball and the Wharton Podcast
00:59:05
Network. Uh we've been talking to Theo
00:59:07
Epstein, a man who I'm going to make a
00:59:09
statement now. I assume when he's either
00:59:11
in Boston or Chicago or possibly many
00:59:13
other cities will never spend a money on
00:59:15
a beer for the rest of his life.
00:59:17
Well, I like what you said though. Do
00:59:20
people recognize me in Boston?
00:59:21
>> No. So, one one quick anecdote about
00:59:23
that. So, we said everyone came up to me
00:59:25
after we won in '04 and said, "You'll
00:59:27
never buy a beer in Boston again." So,
00:59:29
we had kind of a disastrous spring
00:59:32
training in 2005 where our whole
00:59:34
rotation got hurt and Kurt Schilling was
00:59:38
down. He was going to start opening day.
00:59:40
Next thing, you know, we had to throw
00:59:42
David Wells out there. Opening day,
00:59:44
Sunday night baseball, Yankee Stadium.
00:59:46
He gets bombed. Matt Clement, our big
00:59:48
free agent signing, like didn't get out
00:59:50
of the fourth inning in game two. And by
00:59:53
the time by the time we got home uh to
00:59:56
to start our first home stand of the
00:59:58
year, trust me, we Tito and I were
01:00:00
joking around. We were paying full
01:00:01
freight for
01:00:03
dinner and everything else. The
01:00:04
honeymoon period is short in the in the
01:00:06
good baseball market.
01:00:07
>> By the way, remember you're sitting here
01:00:08
talking to two fans whose team has won
01:00:10
one championship in 26 years. So if you
01:00:12
had told us that in 2000, we would have
01:00:15
said that's not possible. I keep talking
01:00:17
about the I you call the dice roll or
01:00:19
whatever the playoffs. If you would told
01:00:21
Audi and I that the end of the 2000
01:00:24
season, the Yankees would have one
01:00:26
championship in 26 seasons, we would
01:00:28
have said, "How is that possible? It's
01:00:31
not possible."
01:00:31
>> And they're the winningest team in
01:00:33
baseball over that 26 years.
01:00:35
>> Yeah.
01:00:36
>> In terms of regular season.
01:00:37
>> Well, there we go. But a but um Theo,
01:00:39
we'd like to thank you for joining us on
01:00:41
Wharton Moneyball. On behalf of myself,
01:00:43
this is Eric Bradlo. On behalf of my
01:00:44
co-host today, Audi Winer, this has been
01:00:47
one hour of Wharton Moneyball. Uh some
01:00:49
combination of myself, Audi, Cade
01:00:51
Massie, and Shane Jensen are here every
01:00:53
week talking sports and statistics. For
01:00:55
our producer, uh Dion Simkins, for our
01:00:59
big the big boss man, Marissa Rena, we'd
01:01:01
like to thank you. And thank you again
01:01:02
for Theo Epstein for this week on
01:01:05
Wharton Moneyball.
