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Welcome. Welcome everyone to this week's edition of Wharton Moneyball. My favorite time of the week where two of
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my favorite subjects, sports and data science collide. This is Eric Bradlo, professor of marketing statistics and
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data science here at the Wharton School. I'm joined today by my longtime friend,
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collaborator, co-author, and co-host, professor of statistics and data science, Audi Winer. some combination of
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the two of us, Kade Massie and Shane Jensen are here every week on the Wharton podcast network version of
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Wharton Moneyball. Well, Audi, you and I have been at this for almost 12 years together. Been friends for 30 years.
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Today's a very special week. Um, I always say one of the greatest things we get to do here on Wharton Moneyball is
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we get to talk to people that are living statistics and data science and its application to sports in the real world.
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I would say today is no exception. But today really, you and I were talking about this off the air. I would think
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you and I would both consider this a pinnacle of everything we've been trying
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to achieve with Wharton Moneyball is uh interviewing our guest today, Theo Epstein. Um, for those of you that don't
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know, I don't know how you could not possibly know who this is, but what the
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hell? I'm going to read a bio anyway. And by the way, Theo, just so you know,
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this was generated by a large language model to show you the whole world knows this. We'll see how accurate it is.
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>> Yeah, we worry about that. >> Yeah, we'll see. Exactly. Theo Epstein
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is one of the most influential baseball executives of the modern era. Best known
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for helping end two of the sport's longest championship droughts. After rising quickly through the Boston Red
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Sox front office, he became MLB's youngest general manager and hate build helped build the roster that won the
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2004 World Series for the Red Sox, the franchise's first title in 86 years. and
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later another championship in 2007. He then took over baseball operations for the Chicago Cubs and helped the
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organization to a historic 2016 World Series victory ending a 108-year title drought. Widely respected for blending
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scouting, player development, and analytics. Epstein has also been a prominent voice on the future of the
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game, including pace of play and competitive balance. So, Theo, please, on behalf of Audi and myself and all of
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our listeners, welcome to Wharton Moneyball. Thanks for having me. I appreciate uh I'm not sure I'm the
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pinnacle of anything, but I I appreciate that kind intro. >> Now, I should warn you, by the way, you
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know, I don't know if you've ever listened to our show. Um you broke our
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hearts cuz just so you Oh, listen. >> Yeah, he's going to get it out there
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right early. >> I might as well let you know there's no two more diehard Yankee fans than Eric
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Bradlow and Audi Winer. But withstanding that, we do have respect for everything
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that went on in 2004, 2007, 2016, and beyond. >> Yeah. I'm I'm breaking my rule of being
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outnumbered by Yankee fans. >> Yeah, I'll roll with it. >> Well, Audi, let me turn things over to
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you, please. >> Sure. Okay. So, um there's a I thought it was a pretty accurate bio. Um, but in
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the in the process of doing a little bit of research, I remember that when you first started at the Red Sox, um, Billy
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Bean was in hot pursuit by the Red Sox and he and he obviously turned them down to stay at at the Oakland A's and he and
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at least the the story is is that he actually recommended they just hire you. Um, so you can confirm or deny that
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that's up to you, but I wanted to ask you specifically, how influenced were you by what Bean was doing at Oakland
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A's? And just to be more specific, um, how what we would call saber, meaning
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sports analytics oriented or baseball analytics, were the Red Sox back in back in the day when you first took over
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because it's a different time now than it was then. >> Yeah. Well, first off, it's it's true
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that Billy recommended me, but not before I recommended him. So, I was I was actually running the search process
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uh for the GM. I was the assistant GM. I'd been there a year. um my boss, the
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interim general manager, Mike Port, had been let go at the end of the or removed
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from that role at the end of the O2 season. So, we had a search process that I led and uh Billy was the top guy, the
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guy that we all wanted and it was sort of a long very public pursuit and he ended up accepting the job, got a record
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contract and then, you know, the Moneyball the movie sort of has it a little bit right and and there's more to
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it. But >> he uh he called me 24 hours after taking the job and asked if I was sitting down
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and and and then after I sat down, he told me that he had decided he couldn't
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take the job. And so I had to go back with my tail between my legs to um John Henry and Tom Warner and Larry Lucino
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and told them we had to start the process over again. They met and yeah, a day or two later they they called me and
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said, "Well, we just want you to do it. that's what Billy said we should do and
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we've gotten to know you over the last year and we think you're the right
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person for the job. So, um, as to how influenced I was by Billy and what Oakland was doing, I'm definitely
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absolutely took note of it. I mean, they were doing remarkable things on a small
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budget. I think it's probably accurate to say both Billy and I and Billy's
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um mentor Sandy Alderson were all sort of influenced by Bill James and by men and by you know the school of sabertric
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thought that had always existed sort of outside uh the walls at MLB up to that point. You know, I grew up in the 80s
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watching baseball, playing baseball, but then also reading Bill James baseball abstracts. And I know Sandy, he he's
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talked about this that when he got the job, he saw it as an opportunity to apply a lot of Bill's concepts. And
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frankly, a lot of that dates back to like George Weiss and the and the Yankees. you know, he had his own
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>> personal statistician and he made a lot of decisions based on >> um you know, the hidden value of numbers
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in baseball. Branch Ricky the same the same way and a lot of so a lot of it dates way back. But Bill Bill's
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masterful mind um sort of just made it crystal clear that there's this whole
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other world, other way to evaluate players, other way to understand the game. Sandy, I think understood that,
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weaponized it. Billy took it to another level. And then and then when I took over the Red Sox, um it was at a time,
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it was before Moneyball had come out, there were only a handful of teams really using statistical analysis in a
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meaningful way uh to make decisions. And so that made it uh that left a lot of lowhanging fruit. And then my personal
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philosophy having come up with the Padres's under Kevin Towers, I had I had the benefit of, you know, my my cubicle
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was literally situated between the scouting director, uh, Brad Sloan, and the statistical director, Eddie Epste,
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no relation. And those two had completely opposite views of the world. Brad Sloan
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>> didn't want to know a player stats. He just wanted wanted us to evaluate them
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by watching them play. He thought it would it would uh bias his opinion or scouts opinion if he knew what the
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player's performance was. And Eddie was the opposite. He didn't want to see him
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play. He just wanted to to take a sophisticated look at the players track record, run it through his models, and
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make a projection. So those two guys had opposed views of the world. But I I ended up soaking up a lot from both of
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them and and sort of came to the conclusion that the right answer is not just looking through the traditional
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scouting lens and not just looking through the the uh object objective analysis lens but whenever possible
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using both to try to get to the clearest picture of the player. And so watching what Billy was doing successfully in
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Oakland and taking over in Boston, knowing that we had a lot more resources than they did, and I I had uh this
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personal approach trying to blend uh analytics and scouting, I just saw it as sort of a great opportunity to learn
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from a lot of great people and and go off and try to apply it the best we could with a new approach.
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>> Just to say just to jump in here and then I know Audi's going to continue on
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with some other questions. Couple things. One is um I I'm a strong believer like you are Theo. Apparently
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we you know in statistics we might call that an ensemble estimator. We get two we get a scouting approach. We get a
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more analytics approach. Any I mean every theorem of statistics says you get optimal solutions when you blend both.
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Neither is 100% correct and you do better. The second thing you'll be proud of this. Last week our guest was Josh
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Rawitz uh the president of the National Baseball Hall of Fame. Um we of course recommended you for the Hall of Fame. We
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hope that you know seriously we hope it happens someday. And the other person we
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talked about was Bill James and we said but unfortunately for Bill there isn't
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like the same path there is for you as an executive. And we just told Josh we did this on the air we just said
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something has to be fixed like how Theo Epstein's not in the Hall of Fame and
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how Bill James is not in the Hall of Fame. Like to us there is no Hall of Fame. And he gave a very good answer. He
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said, "Well, I don't know if there'll be a day where a plaque of Bill James will
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be in the Hall of Fame, but Bill James is in the Hall of Fame. It's the Hall of
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Fame and Museum. You can't talk about the history of baseball without talking
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about Bill James." And I thought that was a very thoughtful answer, but we wanted I just want to know on the
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record, we want you both in the Hall of Fame. >> Appreciate the the support there. But
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yeah, Bill Bill's had a had a transformational impact on the game and on a lot of others who went on to make
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their own impact as well. So my that actually leads me to my second question because Bill James um obviously his his
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role is incredible but as you pointed out a lot of these ideas particularly the ones that most people will talk
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about the the the value of the OBP the home run and the the poverty of the batting average as a metric um shifts
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and things like this. These were known for a long time. And in fact, when I teach um students at all levels, I
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emphasize that Moneyball the book and the movie especially is actually a it's
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people think it's a baseball book. It sort of is. Um people often think it's a
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statistics book. It sort of is that, but it's really a management book. It's
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really about getting an organization that didn't value certain things to change and become and value them. And we
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know like in and we always ask the question, how did it take basketball so long to figure out that three is bigger
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than two? It's just how do you miss that? Um and and the answer is actually complicated. And and so I guess my
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question for you is >> how did you transition a team from doing things historically into what I mean
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everybody does now to varying degrees understands completely that that you have to use the numbers the way they are
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done now. How did that transition actually how did how did that take place? Um, well, we had the benefit of
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having an owner and John Henry who really set the tone for that. I mean, he the >> my first meeting with John after I um
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got the job, you know, he said, "Oh, we need to arm you, you know, with some
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some experienced adviserss because you're young and it'll help you. It'll
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also make it look better." and and so Bill Lejoy who was um you know a great
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general manager we we brought in uh put the 84 Tigers together um and then John suggested Bill James and I said great so
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let's call him never forget sitting in John Henry's office we just cold called
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Bill James and uh Bill Bill's answer he goes well he goes I have I have a a rule
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I I try to live by which is never say no to if a billionaire wants to meet with you never say no so he agreed to fly to
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Austin and we ended up hiring him as an adviser. But um so we had we had great alignment throughout the organization
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because John set the tone. He had made his fortune um in the in the markets using models and algorithms and um
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understanding trends and trend following in the markets. And so he was he was a Bill James reader. he was um very driven
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by data and and so um I guess I guess the way I approached it initially was was um you know to to to make make it
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clear that we were going to take some risks that um you know the Red Sox had at the time what 84 years or or so of of
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of of not having success and we were going to try things a different way that we weren't afraid to be wrong. Um, but
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that but that just because we were going to build an infrastructure that allowed
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us to work successfully with data didn't mean that we didn't place tremendous
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value on scouting. It didn't mean that we didn't place tremendous value on
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player development and that there that there was room for everything. We tried to um be transparent and open with the
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organization that you'll remember back then at the time there was a lot of animosity really for you know from the
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old guard to the new guard scouts computers were going to come and take their jobs and
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>> um so we just tried to um >> cross-pollinate as best we could share
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information. And we'd send our analysts out on the road with the scouts to get
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them to understand how hard their job was and to understand what they bring to the table and share ideas. We'd bring
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our scouts into the draft room and and and in preparation for the draft and show them the models that that we were
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going to use. And we had some some early wins um that uh helped create some some
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momentum behind some of the ideas we were using. And you tried to just create a culture of thoroughess using all the
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information possible, creativity, trying to innovate, you know, that there were sort of no bad
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ideas. And you know, when you're when you're trying to find a competitive
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advantage, um, in baseball, you do a lot of R&D, probably 99 projects can lead nowhere. And the
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hundth one might help you getting a little bit of insight, something actionable, help you position the
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fielder a little bit better, help you evaluate a player in the draft a little bit better. and just tried to foster
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that culture of there are no bad ideas and that it was, you know, but but good ideas would be rewarded and brought down
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to the clubhouse or or or or you know, show up on the GM's desk. So, it was,
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you know, sort of a culture change uh project as as as much as anything else. >> I'm loving this format, Audi, where you
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ask questions, Theo answers. Now, I get to chirp in here. So, let me just chirp in. Yeah. Um, one is Theo, you said
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something that makes me think of today, which is, you know, you people were worried back then that computers were
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going to take their jobs. Wow. If we just replace that with the word AI, we're in we're in 2026. And so that's
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one thing. Uh, the second is our listeners on Morton Moneyball knows this. I started the data science team at
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the Philadelphia Eagles, our home football team. Jeffrey Lur has a PhD in sociology. He's a quant guy. He
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contacted me and it starts from the top. when you know it was him and Howie Roseman that I reported to. how he's a
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very quantoriented guy that would you know I hate to say it but you know the rest of the organization fell in line
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when the owner says we will be data oriented and we'll use it as a you didn't use these exact words but it's
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what you bent it's a decision support tool by no it's no one's looking to
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automate draft decisions to Eric Bradlo's statistical model but it's another input into the decisionm so I I
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really everything you said really resonated a lot with me >> and there was it was a time when there
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was so much lowhanging fruit that we would have been negligent in in not >> and not not picking them up. I give you
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an example. You know, I'd been in the draft room um with the Padres's in the
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in the mid 90s and late 90s and there were there were no stats in the room whatsoever. And I remember one year we
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had these extra picks and I was up high and I was the night before the draft I was in a panic because I could tell from
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the way we were setting up our board and the way we were talking about certain players that we were going to end up
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with a handful of players who who had subpar performance at small colleges and we were going to draft them just based
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on some scouting looks and expect them to go out and you know perform their way through the minor leagues and perform in
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the big league against better competition. And so like in a panic, I remember calling the night before the
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draft, calling sports information directors at the respective colleges and and and asking them to fax me their team
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stat sheet. So I'd at least have, you know, the ability to stand up on a soap
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box and say, "Why are we about to draft a kid from Texas Pan-American with a
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five and a half erra, you know, at the bottom of the first round?" And >> and and we did and he didn't get that
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aball. But so when I got to the Red Sox, literally the first project we did, we sent a team of interns to NCA
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headquarters um and had them look through file cabinets and photocopied 30 years worth of college baseball stats
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just trying to answer the simple question um what do great big leaguers look like when they're in college? And
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so just, you know, simple process, building a database, run some regression analyses, came up with a very simple
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set of formulas. one was ISS iso ISO power over strikeouts, ISOP over K. And it just basically showed that if if you
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if you slug, it doesn't have to be homers, but if you have isolated power, if you slug in in college ball and and
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you make a lot of contact and don't strike out, you tend to project really well. So, we took that into the draft in
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2004. And Dustin Pedroya was, you know, not a not a prototypical high pick because he didn't hit for a
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ton of power. Although he hit a a lot of doubles and some triples, he only had a
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handful of homers, but he never struck out. And so he did extremely well in the ISOP over K. We moved him up to the
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point where he became our first pick. And uh you know, you know, good scouting reports, great makeup, but
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also you know, we moved him where we needed to because he lit up this metric that we had just devised. And then you
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know, obviously the rest is history. Rookie of the year. Yeah, we know all about it. Yeah, we don't want to.
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>> So, it's just but it's just an example of, you know, there was so much low
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hanging fruit. You could you go from one year this you're with an organization
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you're not using any stats in the draft and they're not allowed to a couple
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years later now you have some formulas where you think you can identify what good big leaguers look like in college.
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You can weaponize that. And we had we ended up being the best drafting team of the decade.
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mainly through great scouts and great process but also because we were one of the first teams to to really incorporate
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that kind of data and that kind of innovation into the draft room. So I think it's fair uh to say that I want to
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I want to scroll us in time to today to 2026 teams all over are using these these are now fan graphs it's every you
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get all this information so so I don't even want to entertain that but let's
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ask a question I'll start with an example uh some of the one of the most recent papers I wrote in baseball
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surprisingly I write more papers now um baseball's still my favorite sport in
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football and other things because there's so much widespread interest and in some level more to do but I did write
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a paper on on something which every time you watch a baseball game and it's late
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in the game. The announcers keep yapping away about what they call a third time through the order effect. So if you
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actually see how it's implemented in the game, the way they implement it is what
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we would call statistically based on what uh the idea of a discontinuity. So that the pitcher once he turn the line
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lineup turns over, you're now dealing with batters who have seen the pitcher
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twice and they have now an advantage. That's a discontinuity. So and therefore
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you should react accordingly. the pitcher is going to be hit, more likely to be hit. So, what I did was look at
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the data. I did this with my my former PhD student Ryan Bril, and we discovered that while it's very obvious that the
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pitcher starts to break down in the third time through the order, it's not because of a discontinuity. It's because
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of a combination of getting exhausted and that the everyone's watching the pitcher. So, at some level, it is batter
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learning. They are watching the pitcher, but it's not a discontinuity. And the
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reason why that's distinction is because there's no real reason to pull the
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pitcher just because they're heading into the third time through the order if
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they're having a good game and that it's not a it's not a discontinuity. So I
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take that as something that that is it is a widespread practice that I believe as an academic status is wrong. So my
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question to you is uh what are the analytics that are either using being used too much uh and maybe ineffectively
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and and is there another analytics thing uh or an avenue an area of baseball where analytics isn't being applied
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enough? So where is it over the top and where is it um not being underused and this is in today's game? Do you have
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anything you could >> Yeah. Where is it being used too much? Um >> so I I I my example was the third time
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there trying to do it too much with the relievers and not looking almost in the oldfashioned way. How is that pitcher
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doing on that day? >> Well, I think it's a process, right, where we're like when when you can first
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quantify something, it becomes over relied upon. So, right, you know, team I think people have always known, yeah,
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you have to be careful with pitchers as they get later in games. Then it was, oh
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wow, look what happens third time through the order. Oh, we can quantify it. Here's a third time through the
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order penalty. Let's make sure we don't fall victim to that. And then, um, you
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know, overreact and start pulling pitchers too early. I think then there's more sophisticated thought. Oh, let's
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separate fatigue from the exposure element. Um, we can and and then you have to take into account, you know,
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what the alternative is just because you may not be as effective the third time of the order, you have to then look at,
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you know, well, what's what are my probabilities of getting outs, you know, with with the alternatives. And so I
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think most teams by this point have now gotten to a point where they'll have
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their manager prepared with a card that shows sort of the appropriate third time
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through the order penalty, but then also what the what the matchup is for a fresh
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each available reliever facing for the first time. I mean, he can make a comparison so that you're, you know, if
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you look at the information in context and better understand it visa the alternatives, you're you're more likely
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to make a decision than just overreacting to some sort of newly discovered phenomenon. I I feel like a
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lot of baseball um new new data streams or new insights fall into that pattern. like when you
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know we first started to be able to quantify defense um there were a lot of overreactions and sort of like
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misattribution of of skill in certain ways we didn't have we had some data but
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it wasn't perfect data and we wasn't taking all the factors into consideration. Um so back to your
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original question which is um where is it being underutilized where is it being under um uh where is it being
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underutilized? sort of being overutilized. Um I don't know. I think um I mean think about that. I think I think
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you know personally I think there's sort of too much data being used in in-game
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decision making right where >> you where like the manager Yeah. He needs some basic information which he probably
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>> understands because managers prepare really well for games to begin with. But
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there is something to the flow of a game to understanding your personnel to being
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in the dugout. Um to feel is a real thing just because it's not like quantifiable and driven by numbers.
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Managers have a pretty good understanding of of of of how to run a game. I think you lose a little bit of
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that when there's too heavy a hand, too much information being forced upon on on
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the manager. I wouldn't want a manager who's underprepared, who doesn't
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understand their percentages. And but at the same time, I wouldn't want to put a
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manager in a position where he doesn't have the ability to take in all the factors, including those that are harder
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to quantify and and and make decisions where there's probably not enough data
00:24:00
in the game and where there's a race to properly incorporate data is like injury
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prevention, right? We're just um that's I think the next big breakthrough. It
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it's already started in player development using obviously data and tech to improve player development and
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to sort of engineer training for certain outcomes that are that are really important to
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>> let's hope AI and motion data also helps with that video analysis now that can be
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done at large scale with motion data as well. >> Absolutely. And all and what all all
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that will do is is um you know increase the data set and give you enough information where then now
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>> your analyst or AI or a combination thereof um can can go about analyzing a
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big enough data set where >> we will hopefully find some leading indicators of injury that we can sort of
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uh develop and and and and uh around and and put players in a better position to
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stay healthy. It's a billion dollar question. It's it's also an arms race
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because right >> you know they they get very advanced training methods which is giving you
00:25:03
more ability to train harder and longer but now you get more injury and you get methods to prevent that and so it's
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almost like it's still I don't think the injury rates have >> really have they gone up they've gone
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down and they where are they they constant I mean >> yeah they're they're really constant and
00:25:18
what's amazing and Bill James used to make this point too um and this gets to
00:25:22
your point about third time through the order and fatigue but you know the the >> the pit pitch limits
00:25:27
and pitch counts and innings limits. You know, we've we've changed pitcher usage
00:25:32
so dramatically over the year. It really started like with remember when Billy Martin had the four aces in Oakland
00:25:39
>> and they were on the cover of Sports Illustrated and everyone thought, "Oh,
00:25:42
they have this dominant pitching staff that's young. They're going to be
00:25:46
together forever." And then all four of those guys got hurt and and blew out in
00:25:50
the course of a year. And what happened? Billy Martin lost his job >> because that in and Bill's theory is
00:25:56
that all because if you look at the data that's when the most dramatic change in
00:26:01
pitch pitcher usage occurred where we started going from you know 275 innings to you know 250 225 200 now you know 180
00:26:11
170 pitchers used to throw you know upwards of 200 pitches a game and then there was a huge drop off obviously now
00:26:18
we're like below 100 but >> that was that was sort of this inflection point in Bill's series that
00:26:23
the the ma managers notice that if you blow out your very talented, very valuable pitchers, you're more likely to
00:26:29
lose your job. So, usage dramatic a bit. Look, look how far we are from where pitchers were a couple generations ago
00:26:36
throwing so much less. It's such less lowered volume and injury rates are exactly the same. And
00:26:43
>> the main reason for that is because obviously when you throw less, you throw
00:26:46
with more max. >> Yeah. This the entire modern game. We've had lots of biomechanics people on our
00:26:52
show that have talked to us about what really matters in their view, love your view on this, is not so much the number
00:26:59
of pitches, but how much how many max effort pitches? >> Yeah, exactly. And so people ask all the
00:27:04
time um you know, well, a how do you um how do you keep pitchers healthier? And then B is also sort of how do you how do
00:27:16
you rein pitching in a little bit so that the strikeout rate gets back under control, balls are in play a little bit
00:27:22
more, pitchers can go deeper in games, restore the value of the starting pitcher. And I think, you know, it's
00:27:28
it's obviously not a new concept, but this idea of if if you could get to a point where you have real limits on the
00:27:36
number of pitchers on a pitching staff, you know, when when I was growing up, there were 10 pitchers on a staff, then
00:27:40
it went to 11 and 12 and 13 and 14 and 15. We've obviously ran it back in with
00:27:45
the 13 pitcher limit. But if you could ever gradually work it down, so say, "Hey, we're going to we're going to move
00:27:51
that limit to 12 pitchers two years from now. So train your pitchers accordingly." And then if we don't get
00:27:57
the strikeout rate um under control, but you know, if we don't hit a certain
00:28:01
metric, two years after that, we're going to 11 pitchers. And if we don't
00:28:04
get the strikeout rate, you know, under 22% or by then we're going to go to 10
00:28:10
pitchers. You would just have to draft and develop pitchers differently and bring back the art of pitching. you
00:28:16
know, the and the number of pit the percentage of pitches thrown at max effort would go down because that, you
00:28:22
know, the job of the starting pitcher used to be go as deep in the game as you possibly can, if not pitch the whole
00:28:28
thing. And so pitchers would modulate their effort. They'd come out throwing
00:28:31
90 miles an hour and if they really needed it in a big spot, they'd reach back and throw a max effort fast and get
00:28:37
more. But now the the whole job description has changed because of optimization. and we understand how hard
00:28:44
it is to hit a, you know, maximum stuff, throw them with max effort. And so now the job description of the pitcher is
00:28:51
get me as many outs as you can, but miss as many bass as you can along the way. And don't worry if you have to come out
00:28:57
after four and two/3 because I've got, you know, eight guys and you are throwing 99. One of my Theo, just so you
00:29:04
know, one of Audi and my favorite moments on our show was when we interviewed John Smoltz and we asked
00:29:10
him, you know, you know, who wouldn't even make the major leagues? And he said, "Oh, there's no way Greg Maddox
00:29:15
would make the major leagues today with the stuff he had." Like, who would have
00:29:18
seen that a guy, you know, who can barely throw 90 that hits all his spots would win whatever 300?
00:29:24
>> That's actually not true. That's actually not true because when Greg
00:29:27
Maddox was drafted out of high school and then his his early years in the minor leagues, he was actually throwing
00:29:31
he threw quite hard. He was throwing five miles an hour. But what Maddox >> learned is that he he could be just as
00:29:39
effective, toning it back, hitting his spots and using movement and changing speeds to be effective. I think if Greg
00:29:45
Maddox were drafted today, they would said, "Hey, you throw 95. >> Now throw 98.
00:29:50
>> Let's put let's put you on a velocity program to make sure you throw 98." and
00:29:54
he would have thrown a fraction of the the amount of innings and probably never would have developed.
00:29:58
>> So that actually leads me to my next kind of question and topic is you were
00:30:01
really influential in changing a bunch of the rules that that were really I think it had a tremendously positive
00:30:08
impact on MLB the pitch clock uh the bases the the the pickoff uh limitation and the size of the bases. Um I guess I
00:30:16
want to confirm that that that this was you were studying this with the MLB. Um and I love the changes. Um, I want you
00:30:22
to comment that, but but um but particularly the the um the time between pitches, what has that done to the
00:30:29
pitcher? Does that force them to not throw as hard because they don't have a
00:30:33
35 minute, 45 seconds to a minute to catch their breath and rare back another 100 mph fast or is it just making their
00:30:40
time through the game shorter? What is what is the impact of that? And and how do you reflect on on that change in
00:30:45
particular? You proud of it? I mean, I love it. >> Yeah, know it's true. I had been on the
00:30:49
when I was serving as general manager, I had been on the competition committee for, you know, over a decade and um so I
00:30:56
had given those issues a lot of thought and frankly it was kind of frustrating because we just couldn't we couldn't get
00:31:01
much done on the competition committees and so when I was getting reaching the end of my time with the Cubs, I reached
00:31:07
out to Commissioner Manfred and and asked if I could have a role at Major League Baseball just help helping out
00:31:13
with um the rule change projects. and he was great and and brought me in. So with
00:31:19
Morgan Sword and his staff of at baseball operations at Central Baseball, I was allowed to be one of the leaders
00:31:25
of um uh those projects and it was a lot of fun. There were a lot of different components to it. There was a sort of
00:31:31
like research component. We we relied on a lot of club analysts and a lot of very
00:31:36
smart people try to model all the changes. There was a a sort of scientific method experimentation
00:31:42
process where we we were able to we had this great petri dish of the Myer Leagues where we could experiment a
00:31:48
little bit, make sure we >> um uh sort of planned and and and determined any unintended consequences
00:31:55
and sort of understood what worked about the proposed changes, what didn't in in
00:31:59
in not just in theory but in practice. and we were able to test over the course of 8,000 minor league games to so that
00:32:07
by the time we were ready to implement at the major league level, we were really confident, we understood that the
00:32:13
rules worked, what the outcome would be, and that they were fair to players. And
00:32:17
then there was a sort of like political campaign element of the rule change process too where we were trying to win
00:32:24
hearts and minds and um you know sort of plate traditionalists as well as as as as sort of younger fans and get the
00:32:33
players and the managers and the media on on board. And then the execution element where you know you had to make
00:32:40
sure the adjustment period was as as small as possible and that that went pretty well. I think by
00:32:45
>> pretty much by like the end of April that first year, people just didn't
00:32:48
notice the pitch timer and all they all they noticed was this really crisp, beautiful pace uh to the game and that
00:32:55
they were getting home at a at a more reasonable hour. But as far as the pitch timer's impact on on pitchers, I mean
00:33:00
the pitch pitch timer um was going to have a lot of effects um ultimately I think like on on pitchers
00:33:09
on hitters um on on on the pace of play on fans and ultimately they were like all going to be really positive right
00:33:16
with with with pitchers. One of the secondary impacts on pitchers was going to be um that this trend of pitchers
00:33:26
taking a lot of extra time between pitches in order to be able to recover and throw max effort was going to be
00:33:33
mitigated a little bit. So, I think pitchers figured out and and and and a lot of people at the clubs figured out
00:33:40
that, you know, to to throw more pitches at max effort, you could you could accomplish that by pacing yourself. And
00:33:48
conversely, if you have to work at a more rapid pace, you have to modulate a little bit. Now, the strikeout rate
00:33:54
didn't go down directly because of that because it's a it's a multiffactorial
00:33:58
issue and a complicated um equation. Um, but I think it helps a little bit. And then obviously you have to balance that
00:34:06
with the concern that um, recovery is a good thing and that if you ask pitchers to do too much, you could potentially
00:34:13
run the risk of hurting them. But I think the data has backed up that what we saw in the minor leagues, I think
00:34:18
what's held true in the in the major leagues is that the pitch timer is not a
00:34:21
contributing factor to the increased injury rate. It's simply um the desire to throw max effort um as as as
00:34:31
frequently as possible that's really leading to these injuries. >> I think they probably have to pull it
00:34:35
back just because they just don't have the the uh the the energy. But I'm I'm
00:34:39
surprised that the strikeout rate didn't go down. Um and that probably was in It
00:34:44
didn't go up though, did it either? >> Yeah, it went it stabilized a it
00:34:47
stabilized a a little bit >> because we don't have the counterfactual. I would imagine it would
00:34:51
have gone it would have gone up a little bit and probably kept it from rising and
00:34:54
just sort of stopped stopped that trend. >> Again, I think it's just going to be um
00:34:59
there are sort of other interventions that ultimately will be necessary to lower the strikeout rate and we tested
00:35:06
all kinds of things even we even tested mound distance where >> in one of the independent leagues.
00:35:12
>> Yeah, we heard that that ran this joint venture. we moved it back from 60 ft 6
00:35:16
in by >> I think it was a foot and um again it's sort of like a dynamic environment. So
00:35:24
that alone doesn't lower the strikeout rate because then you breaking balls actually break a little bit more from
00:35:29
that distance and it >> there's a huge adjustment period for hitters to to who have trained their
00:35:34
whole lives seeing pitches at 60 feet six inches. How long is do they have to be exposed to this new input before they
00:35:41
can adjust as well? So, I still think there's something there uh to toy with,
00:35:45
but you know, lot lot of different things you can a lot of different levers you can pull to try to get the strikeout
00:35:50
rate um back under control. I think ultimately the most important thing is we have to ask a little bit more from
00:35:57
our pitchers in terms of volume whether through it it's its pitcher roster limits or through like mandating the
00:36:05
length of starts be certain innings unless you know you have to go you lose your DH if you know or you can't come
00:36:12
out of the game unless you've gone five innings or give up five runs or um unless there's an injury concern. Um,
00:36:19
but just change the job job description for more volume. So that so that pitch pitching is not about power and missing
00:36:28
bats exclusively. It's also an art where you're where you need to be efficient.
00:36:33
So that you know there's a reason to throw under certain game situations throw a one-1 sinker down the middle.
00:36:40
Know that >> there's only aso as the famous quote I think it was Sandy Kofax said right? I
00:36:44
became a good pitcher when I stopped trying to guy make guys miss the ball. Yeah. And and under the current
00:36:50
environment, teams are asking pitchers, hey, if you want to be a good pitcher, miss as many bats as you can, right?
00:36:56
>> And because that's an optimization under the current system. So, putting in
00:37:00
constraints that change the equation, change the incentives, soon you'll start rewarding pitchers
00:37:06
that can go deep in games and that throw volume even at reduced strikeout rates.
00:37:12
But under the current system, teams would be crazy to pay for anything other than bat missing. That's the that's the
00:37:16
one way to know you're you're going to get guys out. >> So, I want to ask about the the I guess
00:37:21
the fan experience, which is one of the things that the pitch clock really helped. It moved the game along. Now,
00:37:27
I'm a traditionalist and my view is you brought it back to where it was. >> Yeah, exactly.
00:37:31
>> The game pace was back to where it was and why it would be very against
00:37:34
changing the distance because one of the beauty things, beautiful things about baseball is you can say, "Yeah, Sandy
00:37:38
Kovac was playing the same game as they're playing today." And they really
00:37:42
are. Um, so I'll add two things. because I actually went to a Phillies game um
00:37:46
this past season and there weren't any strikeouts and there was a lots of lots
00:37:50
of ground balls, lots of terrific fielding and one of the things that's great about a game in person is you
00:37:54
really feel what a spectacular fielding play. You don't catch that on TV that's
00:38:00
missing but you really feel that in person. There was there were stolen bases. So I I'll just an anecdote. You
00:38:07
know back in the day stealing bases was considered something you needed to do. And one of the things the analyst showed
00:38:12
that if you're not doing that on average twothirds of the time, although there's
00:38:16
some variance in that depending on context, you're not getting any value out of that. And
00:38:22
>> even so Babe Ruth used to steal tons of bases when he was young and he was
00:38:26
actually somewhat quick, but he was not successful at it very much half the time. He was actually costing his team a
00:38:31
lot of value. We know that now. But from a fan experience, all those balls in play, all that action makes the game fun
00:38:37
to watch. Yeah. >> And so the the new rules about stolen bases have have made the game more
00:38:43
exciting. I think you you would concur. Um so my question is two things. Um >> how do we get the I mean as you know and
00:38:51
and Eric and you were all roughly the same age. You're a little younger than
00:38:55
we are but not too much. Um baseball was once the the national game. Um and football has overtaken and I I think
00:39:02
that's largely to do with the TV the beauty and elegance it has on television. Um, but what we have is what
00:39:08
we I say we we uh baseball has the advantage of having a great experience in the ballpark and 162 games and I
00:39:16
think all of us I don't know I know Eric and I we got to be baseball fans from
00:39:20
our childhood from the experience of going to games and maybe you did in something similar are playing. How do we
00:39:25
get baseball to bring back fans and be attracted to it? How do we make the fan experience better? Is that something
00:39:30
that's that you're thinking about? I know that some people are trying to get
00:39:34
engagement that really um connects with fans through computers, through their phones, through through like
00:39:39
forecasting. Um but the how do we how do you think about the fan experience? And
00:39:43
you can think about stolen bases an example and maybe jumping on from that. >> Yeah. Um so the entire rule change
00:39:50
project that led to the pitch timer bigger bases and and um the shift changes was was um intended to give fans
00:40:01
more of what they like and less of what they don't like. And the reason I I I
00:40:05
love that project is you I'd worked 29 years for for teams where you're really
00:40:10
only focused on winning, right? So, I'm a huge baseball fan, but you have to
00:40:15
almost stop thinking like a fan in order to be a GM and your your currency is wins. And so, you're you're trying to
00:40:22
optimize your player selection, your player deployment, your player development just simply to win. So, um,
00:40:30
you know, for instance, if if you know that, uh, the stolen base attempt is only a good play if you're going to be
00:40:36
successful 70% of the time, then you ask your your base runners not to go unless
00:40:42
unless, you know, everything adds up, all the math adds up that they're going
00:40:45
to be successful more than 70% of the time, even though it's a very entertaining game. So, we started that
00:40:50
project with with a ton of fan outreach, trying to determine what is it that fans
00:40:54
really like about baseball? What is it that they don't like? We're trying to
00:40:58
create the most joyful, most entertaining version of baseball. Figuring that if you do that, that's the
00:41:04
single best thing you can do to to bring fans back. Turns out, you're right, fans
00:41:09
like action. They like the ball and play. They like athleticism on display. Their favorite uh three events at a
00:41:16
baseball game are triples, doubles, and stolen bases. Their least favorite events are anything that has to do with
00:41:23
uh inaction or inactivity. So, they don't like uh pitching changes. Um they don't like intentional walks. They don't
00:41:31
they don't like things where there's dead any dead time whatsoever. So, we
00:41:35
knew we wanted to try to incorporate some rules that would change the math on stolen bases to make it a little bit
00:41:41
better percentage play so that there'd be more attempts and more stolen bases
00:41:45
and more athleticism on display on the bases. So, you know, you mentioned being a traditionalist as well and you could
00:41:51
you never want to change 60' 6 in. Well, the same is sort of true of the base
00:41:55
paths. You know, they're they've been set out um 90 ft um >> in shorter now.
00:42:02
>> Well, no, but it's not it's See, this is what's interesting. I'll tell you this
00:42:06
anecdote. Um it's not 90 ft between bases. It's a 90 90 foot square at which
00:42:12
the bases are set out with first base is is uh on one end of that square. Second
00:42:18
base is the midpoint of the base. >> Uhhuh. on on the 90 degree uh corner.
00:42:23
Second base, third base is within there. So, it's actually le it's always been
00:42:26
less than 90 feet between bases, >> right? >> So, we were sitting around, we said,
00:42:30
well, one way we can encourage soul and base activity is to shorten the distance
00:42:34
between bases, but we could never get away with that because everyone thinks it's 90 ft between bases. It was
00:42:39
actually an analyst at the Cubs, Chris Jones, who we were having a meeting about this and he just he he came up he
00:42:46
just said bigger bases. I said, "What do you mean bigger bases?" He said, "Well,
00:42:50
that's that's that's another way to shorten the distance between bases
00:42:53
without having to change the geometry of the game." So, fast forward a year
00:42:57
later, >> I'm leading this project at MLB and I'm on a Zoom with all 30 major league
00:43:02
managers. >> And I asked them, okay, uh, how wide is home plate? And they all knew 17 inches.
00:43:08
And I said, well, how what's the distance between home plate and the pitchers mount? They all knew 60 feet 6
00:43:13
in. And I said, well, let me ask you this. What are the dimensions of a major league base? No idea.
00:43:20
>> Guess how many of the 30 you knew. >> None. >> Correct. >> Beautiful.
00:43:27
>> No one knew that it was >> I don't know. And I'm a numbers fan.
00:43:29
>> Yeah. So, it was 15 in by 15 in, right? 15 in squared. >> And so, I said, "Well, look, if you guys
00:43:36
don't even know how big a base is, then I don't want I don't want to hear that
00:43:40
we're ruining the game by going by adding 3 in on the base." And so when
00:43:44
you add three, you make the base uh 18 in by 18 in, which is what we did. Now all of a sudden, the distance between
00:43:51
first base and second base is shorter by 4 1/2 in because you gain 3 ft at first
00:43:56
base and you gain an inch and a half at second base. So 4 and 12 in is like the length of your finger. So all those all
00:44:02
those bang bang plays where you're just out at second base by less now all of a
00:44:08
sudden you're safe. So the stolen base became a better percentage play by shortening the distance between bases
00:44:16
doing it in a way that didn't offend the traditionalist because you weren't
00:44:19
messing with 90 ft. You were just messing with the size of the base which not even the major league managers knew
00:44:24
about. And it ended up being a very successful rule change because the math worked. We tested it in the minor
00:44:29
leagues. There were once you shorten the distance, more stolen base attempts, higher percent higher success rate. And
00:44:36
that's exactly what happened in the minor le in the major leagues. And so, you know, we were we we had gotten down
00:44:40
to a point where guys were leading the big leagues in stolen bases with like 40 bags. And we just realized it's a better
00:44:47
game when guys can steal 70 80 bags. And so now there's a lot more guys running,
00:44:53
a lot more guys getting, you know, 30 bags and it's a better pickups, right?
00:44:58
How much how would you distribute the increase to the pickoff limitation versus the
00:45:03
>> Yeah, I think you that was definitely part of it. You know, as part of the
00:45:07
pitch timer rule, you had to put in the the the pickoff throw limitation. It's
00:45:11
really a disengagement. It's really a limit on how many times you can disengage from the rubber as a pitcher.
00:45:17
um the the the data shows that um it's it's not that's not as significant as as
00:45:24
as you would you would think, but certainly helps and certainly moves the needle the right direction. Everyone
00:45:30
everyone was saying, "Oh, once you get to, you know, once you've disengaged
00:45:34
once, you only have one left or once you've disengaged twice and you have to
00:45:37
put the runner out or else it's an automatic 90. It's going to be an automatic bag." And that that fear did
00:45:43
not play out. If you look if you look behind the data, it hasn't ruined the game. You don't hear too many people
00:45:47
talk about it. Now it's just another another part of the batter the pitcher runner dynamic.
00:45:54
>> So go ahead. Go ahead. >> Yeah. Let me let me ask you a few last questions for us here.
00:45:59
>> Um first >> without giving out any secret sauce about what you're specifically working
00:46:03
on now, which I'll ask you in a second. Um, how do all of us, how do all the
00:46:07
teams, whether it's our Yankees, your Red Sox, whether formerly the Cubs, how
00:46:12
do we compete with the Dodgers today? Like, if you know, one way to think about it is we need to go in an entirely
00:46:20
different direction. Like, they're good on these dimensions and so we can't
00:46:23
compete. We can't be better than them on the dimensions in which they're really
00:46:27
strong. Another option would be, you know, we have to invest in, I don't know, purely, you know, we're going to
00:46:34
be the best defensive team and so we'll try to create as many outs that way. How
00:46:38
do you think about competing with a team that's now the two-time champion and,
00:46:43
you know, team spender? >> Yeah, they're they're they've gotten
00:46:47
better. They're the biggest spender. like how how do teams even think about compet like for example you know you've
00:46:54
been a general manager long enough you know you remember when our Yankees were the three-time repeat champions and were
00:46:59
an out or two away from fourtime repeat champions in 2001 h how did you think about it then and how do you think about
00:47:05
it now >> yeah look I think obviously the Dodgers have tremendous resources and have done a
00:47:11
remarkable job of of using them and growing them and creating this cycle where um they've had so success that
00:47:19
their revenues have grown. They're up over like a billion dollars in revenue,
00:47:22
I think, now, and it's just this perpetuating cycles. They've done a phenomenal job. But look, it's it's it's
00:47:29
baseball. So, the you know, Billy famously said the playoffs are a crapshoot, and I don't I don't fully
00:47:35
agree that it's not a crapshoot, but there's there's no team that's actually
00:47:39
um you know, can get anywhere close to a 50% chance of winning the World Series there. So, the Dodgers still are still
00:47:46
underdogs. compared to the field. And so the answer is is you you try to build a
00:47:53
team that has sustained success and gets into the playoffs as often as possible and then lean into the ingredients that
00:48:00
make for a successful October baseball team and chance plays a huge part in what happens in October. The Dodgers
00:48:08
themselves were an inch away from not being champions last year and then they became. But um there are certain
00:48:13
elements of of the game and elements of the roster that that take on added emphasis in October. So our goal when I
00:48:22
was with the Red Sox was always, you know, build a team that wins, you know, a foolproof team to win 95 games a year.
00:48:30
You know, anything that could get in the way of us winning 95 games a year, uh we
00:48:34
needed to attack and create redundancies and depth because you couldn't look up
00:48:38
and say injuries are excuse or this is an excuse. So win 95 and get in and then make sure your roster is is built for
00:48:46
for October as well. And that worked then with the Cubs different landscape. Now there's wild card teams lowers the
00:48:52
bar a little bit. 93. >> You don't need 95 to be 95 anymore. But you know now that
00:48:58
bar has never been lower. You know say you could either be a fan or a critic of the modern uh playoff structure but the
00:49:05
reality is the bar has never been lower to get into the postseason. And so, um, if I were with a team and said, "How am
00:49:12
I going to compete with the Dodgers?" I would start with build a team that's get
00:49:15
into the playoffs every single year and then lean into the elements that make a team successful in October. Be prepared
00:49:22
and and attack it that way. >> So, maybe two more questions. I lied. Um, >> oh, I got to do a follow-up though to
00:49:27
just jump in. Go ahead. You go ahead. >> What is that? So, we love to argue about
00:49:30
what that actual element is. Some people have said it's starting pitching. Others
00:49:34
said it would be middle relief pitching. Others said, "Is it contact? Is it
00:49:37
homers?" If you had to pick one thing that's that that that that ingredient
00:49:42
for October that's different from the 90 95 games in the in in the in the regular
00:49:46
season, what would it be? >> Well, one of my roles now is with Fenway Sports Group, which owns the Red Sox,
00:49:51
and I'm right so I'm an adviser there. So, I'm not going to share >> You're not going to talk about a an
00:49:57
element that's that's kind of obvious and has been publicly discussed. So,
00:50:01
it's not showing anything, but you know, >> uh you're, you know, having like an ace
00:50:06
reliever or two or three just absolute shutdown relievers has added import in in October because they're pitching
00:50:14
>> a much greater percentage of the innings and and and where the the sort of most
00:50:20
important innings where the game turns in October. So, you know, so takes that's why we traded for Raldis Chapman.
00:50:25
One of the reasons we traded for old as Japan with the Cubs is we we were not, you know, doing that to maximize our
00:50:32
chances of winning the division and we were pretty sure we were going in the division. Our calculation was literally
00:50:37
based on World Series odds, >> right? >> And a pitcher like that can change your
00:50:41
World Series odds. I think I think adding him changed our World Series odds from something like um World Series
00:50:48
championship odds from something like, you know, 18% to 22%. I would guess three to 5% which is
00:50:56
>> right. And so you got back with one player. It's it's that and and you know
00:51:01
what we don't win game five of the World Series at Wrigley Field without him. He
00:51:06
comes in and >> one out in the seventh and that gets eight huge outs in a one-run game. So
00:51:12
that one that one turned out well. But um so so ace reliever and then you know it's obvious like you need a really you
00:51:20
need you need good fourth fifth starters sixth seventh eighth starters to get through a season and win enough games to
00:51:26
get in the postseason but your fourth and fifth starters probably don't see the light of day you know in in the
00:51:31
postseason and your your ace pitches you know out of the 1400 innings these days
00:51:38
he might be lucky to pitch 200 in the regular season. So, one oneth, you know, 13 14% whatever that is. Um,
00:51:47
but in the postseason, you know, especially if if he can start games 1, four, and seven, he's pitching a much
00:51:54
higher percentage. So, like your your top two or three starters, your top one or two relievers, obviously those are
00:52:01
more important positions in the postseason even than in the regular season. >> Can you just maybe just last question,
00:52:07
you mentioned about the work you're doing now with the Fenway Sports Group. What is your actual role and title
00:52:12
today? And um you know, are we going to see you back in a general manager? Are you interested in a full-time general
00:52:19
manager role again? Or you know, I don't know if the baseball Josh Raw told the
00:52:24
story where you know, the baseball hall of fame called him and he took over the job. Is there some dream job you'd like
00:52:30
to have? Like you know, I don't know when Rob Manfred called you tomorrow and
00:52:33
said, "Theo Epstein, you know, the owners of you know, we need you to take over Major League Baseball." I mean, no.
00:52:39
No. Oh, I mean it's not imp you're laughing but I mean none of us would no
00:52:43
there's no baseball fan that would would have a problem with that at all. So what
00:52:47
are you doing now for the Penway Sports Group and what do you see your to me you
00:52:50
look like an extremely young man. What do you forecast for the next 30 years of your career in baseball?
00:52:56
>> Um well I appreciate that compliment. I am 52 so it's all age is age is all
00:53:01
relative but um yeah I have two part-time jobs now and and also have the benefit you know after those 29 years in
00:53:09
front offices of of spending more time with my kids I have two boys 18 and 11 so making up for lost time with them but
00:53:15
with Femway Sports Group I guess technically my title is senior adviser and part owner um so I kind of advise
00:53:23
all the different uh uh organizations and companies that we have across the portfolio. So different role with each
00:53:30
organization. So with the Red Sox, I get to play that Bill the Joy role for for Craig Brezlo where I had the benefit of
00:53:37
Bill's wisdom, someone who had done the job and done it successfully. Now I get
00:53:41
to be there for Craig whenever he has questions, help him see around corners, help him with his development in in that
00:53:47
role. And then um we also own the Pittsburgh Penguins, uh Liverpool Football Club and the Premier League. We
00:53:54
have a a NASCAR team, Rous Femway, uh, Racing. We're, uh, I, you know, I can't
00:54:00
drive stick, so I'm not sure I'm I'm I'm a great help there, but we're also the,
00:54:05
uh, lead investor in this consortium, um, that that is invested in the PGA Tour. So, I'm actually doing a lot of
00:54:11
work. I'm on this uh competition this uh future competition committee at the PGA
00:54:17
Tour where we're putting in a lot of thought under the leadership of um Brian
00:54:21
Rolap who's the new CEO of the PGA Tour and Tiger Woods who's chairing the
00:54:25
committee trying to reimagine the competitive and commercial model uh for the for the tour.
00:54:30
>> Oh, you got to be eating that up. That's got to be right up your You must be
00:54:33
loving that. >> No, it's real. It's really interesting stuff. And my oldest is a big golfer, so
00:54:37
I've got the golf bug myself the last couple years. So, it's good work. And
00:54:41
then I'm also an operating partner for Artos Partners. >> Oh, >> Artos Partners was the first mover in in
00:54:48
in the space of institutional capital coming into the sports world. So they're
00:54:53
sports only private equity company started. >> We know them well here at the Wharton
00:54:57
School. We have a partnership with Artos. So >> that's right. So uh they were the first
00:55:01
mover in that space. actually got got the rules changed at Major League Baseball and subsequently
00:55:08
um NHL and NBA and now just uh the last year or two the NFL. So they have um you
00:55:14
know close to 30 investments in in in in different teams across the the four major sports here in global soccer. So,
00:55:21
it's been fun. You know, after sort of working for for owners um for 30 years,
00:55:26
I recognized what a sea change this was going to be with institutional capital coming in and creating liquidity and
00:55:32
some growth capital. And so, it's been fun to advise. I definitely do not ever
00:55:36
want to consider myself a finance guy and I and I do not. Um but getting exposure to that world and they're doing
00:55:43
some real exciting work on the phone with commissioners and sports owners every day. It's been been a lot of fun.
00:55:48
So, as far as the future, yeah, as my kids get older and can see myself jumping back in full-time, if it's with
00:55:55
a team, you know, I definitely want to I I've seen the the power of great ownership in sports, like what you can
00:56:01
do to make an impact in your city. Um, how you can um align the team around certain values on and off the field. So,
00:56:11
um, yeah, if I'm back helping run a team again someday, I definitely want to be
00:56:15
do it from from, you know, an ownership position to sort of maximize the impact.
00:56:19
And, um, yeah, who know? Like I I was lucky enough to work at Major League Baseball and help with the rule change
00:56:25
project. I I you started to allude to earlier how you think it's a better world when baseball truly is the
00:56:31
national pastime. I completely sign off on that. I agree. So, anything I can ever do to help baseball in any capacity
00:56:38
and help help restore it to its place at top the pecking order, I think we're all
00:56:42
we're all better off. And you you know, you asked earlier about what can we do.
00:56:47
I mean, baseball has some incredible advantages relative to the other sports. I we have twice the content uh in a
00:56:53
world where live content is king in the media and entertaining landscape these days. So, um, you know, Rob and and the
00:57:02
powers at BM baseball are really starting to be strategic and creative and how we can, um, use that going
00:57:09
forward in next collective bargaining agreement, next set of media deals to sort of like maximize uh, engagement and
00:57:16
and and lift the the impact of the sport. We um, we take place every day. It's sort of, you know, the news cycle
00:57:22
is so short now. We don't, you know, unlike football and hockey, we don't
00:57:25
wear helmets on our players. like our players should be the biggest stars in all sports because they're very
00:57:31
accessible. They're out there every single day. We play twice the amount of games. Baseball has unbelievable
00:57:37
narrative arcs, you know, watching a starting pitcher out there perform or play within the course of the season.
00:57:42
So, you know, we lean into that. You you expand um the fan base, you know, you attract casual fans who might be in it
00:57:49
more for human interest than for all the inside baseball stuff. And um you know,
00:57:55
it's sort of unlimited potential. And as it is, look, we draw more fans than any
00:57:59
other sport by by by a 3x multiple. The second most attended sport in in in this
00:58:07
country is minor league baseball. There more people go to minor league games than go to the NFL or NBA or NHL. And
00:58:14
>> it's also a family game. You if you go to a baseball game, you see families
00:58:16
there. You don't see that. >> Absolutely. Absolutely. And it's just
00:58:19
it's a good the the pace now of the game is back restored as you said earlier to
00:58:24
this naturalism. you can talk to people, you can enjoy it without being completely locked in. Um, and it's uh,
00:58:31
you know, it's a good antidote for what's happening in the rest of the country with our addiction to screens
00:58:38
and this constant demand from different sources for our attention and the polarization that you find sort of like
00:58:46
everywhere. Baseball's a great unifier. So, I just think we have so many natural
00:58:50
advantages as as the best game there is that over time as we adjust to new societal norms and lean into the
00:58:57
advantages we have. We're going to be in good shape. >> Well, Theo Audi and I would like to
00:59:02
thank you for joining us here on Wharton Bunnyball and the Wharton Podcast Network. Uh we've been talking to Theo
00:59:07
Epstein, a man who I'm going to make a statement now. I assume when he's either
00:59:11
in Boston or Chicago or possibly many other cities will never spend a money on a beer for the rest of his life.
00:59:17
Well, I like what you said though. Do people recognize me in Boston? >> No. So, one one quick anecdote about
00:59:23
that. So, we said everyone came up to me after we won in '04 and said, "You'll
00:59:27
never buy a beer in Boston again." So, we had kind of a disastrous spring training in 2005 where our whole
00:59:34
rotation got hurt and Kurt Schilling was down. He was going to start opening day.
00:59:40
Next thing, you know, we had to throw David Wells out there. Opening day, Sunday night baseball, Yankee Stadium.
00:59:46
He gets bombed. Matt Clement, our big free agent signing, like didn't get out
00:59:50
of the fourth inning in game two. And by the time by the time we got home uh to to start our first home stand of the
00:59:58
year, trust me, we Tito and I were joking around. We were paying full freight for
01:00:03
dinner and everything else. The honeymoon period is short in the in the good baseball market.
01:00:07
>> By the way, remember you're sitting here talking to two fans whose team has won
01:00:10
one championship in 26 years. So if you had told us that in 2000, we would have said that's not possible. I keep talking
01:00:17
about the I you call the dice roll or whatever the playoffs. If you would told Audi and I that the end of the 2000
01:00:24
season, the Yankees would have one championship in 26 seasons, we would have said, "How is that possible? It's
01:00:31
not possible." >> And they're the winningest team in baseball over that 26 years.
01:00:35
>> Yeah. >> In terms of regular season. >> Well, there we go. But a but um Theo,
01:00:39
we'd like to thank you for joining us on Wharton Moneyball. On behalf of myself,
01:00:43
this is Eric Bradlo. On behalf of my co-host today, Audi Winer, this has been one hour of Wharton Moneyball. Uh some
01:00:49
combination of myself, Audi, Cade Massie, and Shane Jensen are here every week talking sports and statistics. For
01:00:55
our producer, uh Dion Simkins, for our big the big boss man, Marissa Rena, we'd
01:01:01
like to thank you. And thank you again for Theo Epstein for this week on Wharton Moneyball.