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private equity in general is totally owed. I think the history of this is important. There was a long-standing
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belief that the best way to generate the best risk adjusted return was to have what's called a 60/40 allocation. 60% to
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bonds and 40% to equities. Over many years, especially when we artificially suppressed rates at zero, a lot of
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people started to move their allocations away from 60/40 and they started to make
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more and more investments further out on the risk curve. The biggest beneficiaries of that were venture
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capital, private equity, and hedge funds. The thing with private equity is that because rates were zero, they had
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an infinite amount of borrowing capacity, had very little downside to them, and so they were able to
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manufacture returns much faster than venture capital and hedge funds could. So, as a result, you had an initial
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group of people that were defining the asset class, making a ton of money, and then you had all these fast followers
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that said, "Well, if they're doing it, I can do it, too." But then always what happens is then you have this flood of
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just lagards that just flood the zone. And it's these lagards that make it very difficult to generate returns because
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they start overpaying for assets. They start mismanaging and undermanaging the assets that they do own. That created a
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lot of competition. And so that's why you see this hockey stick graph, Jason. And when you see that kind of graph, it
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doesn't matter what asset class it is, the returns go to zero. And so we've seen this in venture capital, we've seen
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this in hedge funds, and we're now going to see this in private equity.