What Does the 2023 Banking Crisis Mean for the Future of Banking?

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Episode Description

Episode 1 of 4 in our "Future of Finance" series, hosted by Wharton School finance professor Itay Goldstein

In March 2023, the U.S. banking system went into crisis following the collapse of multiple small to mid-level banks, notably culminating in the failure of Silicon Valley Bank. Goldstein discusses what catalyzed this banking crisis, why regulators couldn’t prevent it, and what parameters are required to protect smaller banks in the future. He is joined by Hyun Song Shin, Economic Adviser and Head of Research with Bank for International Settlements, and Loretta Mester, former president and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, to fully understand the future landscape of the banking industry.

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Brief Summary

Experts discuss the March 2023 banking failures and their implications for future banking regulations and monetary policy.

Key points

  • The March 2023 Banking Crisis. A series of bank failures in the US and Europe raised concerns about financial stability.
  • Lessons from Silicon Valley Bank. Poor risk management and weak supervision led to the downfall of SVB.
  • Monetary Policy Dilemmas. The Fed's interest rate hikes continued despite banking stresses, raising questions about future policy.
  • Future of Banking System. Experts discuss the evolution of the banking system amidst technological changes and challenges.

Transcript

Itay Goldstein: Welcome. Today we are going to talk about the Future of Banking. I am Itay Goldstein, Professor of Finance here at Wharton, and the Chair of the Finance Department. And I am very honored to have two distinguished guests to help us dive into this conversation, into this important topic. I have Hyun Song Shin, who is an economic advisor and the Head of Research in the Bank for International Settlements. Hello, Hyun. Hello, Itay. Good to join you. Great to see you. And Loretta Mester, who just stepped down from being the President and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. Hello, Loretta. Hi. Great to be with you, Itay. So in March of 2023, we had an unusual string of events in the

global banking arena. Failures of institutions here in the United States— Silicon Valley Bank, Signature Bank of New York and First Republic Bank. And of course, the turmoil in Credit Suisse over in Europe. This was the biggest episode altogether since the global financial crisis of 2008, and it had a ripple effect on financial markets worldwide, financial institutions and the global economy, with quick intervention from regulators in Europe and in the United States. Looking now at the future of banking, I think we are looking into a new era with some new lessons that have been learned and some new policies that will be in place. And I'm here with Hyun and Loretta to dive into these topics and learn some more and

talk about what we can expect going forward. So let me get started by thinking about what happened in March of 2023. What were the causes of these events? Is there any common unifying theme? Is there any connection to the policies that were in place in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis? So Hyun, why don't you get started? Yeah. Itay, I think those are very good questions, and I think we can certainly learn lessons from what happened in the spring of 2023. In some ways, you know, there are some classical lessons, you know, from the events, both in the US and also in Europe. But in a very important— in a very important respect, the backing stress last spring was very unlike what

we saw during the GFC. I mean, as you well know, the GFC was a major systemic banking crisis when many, many very leveraged institutions were under stress on the funding side. And the theme was very much on the— on the wholesale funding. You know, of these large banks. And you may recall all the discussions about shadow banking and all the special purpose vehicles and so on. But in the— in the stress in the US, it was much more to do with the classical theme of— of depository rights that actually you have really contributed a lot on. I think it's important to bear in mind the macro backdrop. You know, we had this burst of inflation in 2021, and so central banks raised rates in '22 and what that meant was that some of the securities holdings of

banks, you know, lost value in a mark-to-market sense. But you know, many of these securities were held on a— on a— on a UTMA maturity basis, which meant that the losses needn't be recognized, you know, as they as they lose value. But in this case, in the case of SVB, for example, there was a— already a very large increase in deposits, which were then, you know, put into these securities. But when you have a run, you do need to sell the assets, and that's when the— you know— losses would be realized. So I think that was a very particular feature of the macro environment at that time. But it wasn't a systemic crisis, and those— you know in the same way that the 2008 global financial crisis was. The story with Credit Suisse

was actually somewhat different still, because, you know, this was a major, globally systemic banking institution. It wasn't a retail institution in the same way that some of the smaller banks were in the US. But what it saw was, you know, after a series of mishaps in its— you know, in its— in its business, the stresses that were happening at that time meant that its wholesale creditors were actually, you know, similarly withdrawing, you know, their funding. And so it was a slightly different episode, but it shares the same kinds of commonalities in the sense that it was a liability- side driven event that interacted with the asset site. I think that would be one way of putting it.

Thank you. And Loretta, some reflections from you. Yeah. Yeah. I mean, fundamentally, I think there were two key factors for SVB, Silicon Valley. And they were just doing very poor interest rate risk management. The Bank had, as Hyun said, you know— the bank had tripled in size in a very short period of time in terms of its assets. And it was funding those securities with a very high proportion of uninsured deposits. Over 90% of their funding, short term funding, was uninsured deposits. So they were very vulnerable. And they weren't really managing that risk. In fact, they kind of leaned into that risk because they— they moved securities into the held-to-maturity buckets on their balance sheet, so they

wouldn't have to mark them to market. And then they were also vulnerable in another way, in the sense that they had a very concentrated depositor base. So a majority of their deposits came from firms that were in tech and venture capital. And of course, when venture capitals got under— you know, started— their activities started declining as interest rates increased— they found themselves in trouble. And they really weren't managing that risk at all. But the second factor— and you know, we know banks are basically, you know, set up to sort of lend long and borrow short. And so they're— they are subject to interest rate risk, and it's up to them to manage the risk. But we also have bank supervision. And supervisors are

supposed to, you know, make sure that banks are managing their risk in a safe and sound manner so that they can continue to lend and, you know, serve their important roles that they do for their customers. And in this case, bank supervision also was very weak. The supervisors didn't— and the Fed was responsible for much of this. The Fed— we didn't really understand the vulnerabilities of SVB, and especially as the institution grew in size. And once the vulnerabilities were fully appreciated, then the supervisors didn't act quickly enough and forcefully enough to get SVB management to fix the problems they were having. So I would say it would be a combination of both poor interest rate management, risk

management on parts of SVB— and of course, they're the the chief ones who were supposed to manage that risk. And then also combined with weak bank supervision that, you know, really wasn't done with speed and agility in a changing interest rate environment. So Hyun was right. When interest rates began rising, and they rose aggressively, it really revealed the vulnerabilities in that bank. And then what happened was, of course, once depositors sort of woke up and said, "Oh, we're— we have some concerns here." And they were alerted to this fact because SVB tried to do a capital raise and had to sell assets to do so, so they had to take those losses. Then depositors started to run, and that— while it wasn't a systemic

event at the moment, it did cause runs at other banks, like First Republic and Signature Bank. And there was concern that it would become a systemic event. And many large regional banks suffered in terms of depositors running. And, you know, this may be indicative of, we have not solved "too big to fail." The deposits ran into very large banks because the depositors believe that those banks would not be allowed to fail. So we have not solved that problem. Coming out of the— the, you know, financial crisis, there were a lot of reforms done. Dodd-Frank, you know, part of that was to try to address the "too big to fail" problem. And I think this episode shows that that has not been adequately addressed. So— so I agree with

Hyun. There's— there are lessons here, certainly, that the regulators and the Federal Reserve are taking to heart in terms of how we do supervision and also regulatory changes. But here, I'd put more of the burden on the supervisory part of it, not the regulations themselves. So let me follow up on this. You both mentioned the connection to monetary policy. And Loretta, you said that there are lessons now going forward for supervision and regulation. But another question is, what are the lessons going forward for the way that the Fed is conducting monetary policy? To the extent that you can say something about that? Well, remember, this all happened in early March, and

there was an FOMC meeting on March 22 of that year. To— March, 22, 2023. And at that meeting, the Fed persevered and— in its interest rate increase. So it did another increase of 25 basis points. So we didn't allow the stresses in the banking system, per se, to deter from what needed to be done from a monetary policy point of view, given where inflation was. Because inflation at the time was running above 5% and it was clearly well above the goal of 2% and unemployment was very low at the time. So of course, the obvious thing to do with your monetary policy is to tighten interest rates again. And we did not let those stresses— however, you know, there was certainly a lot of focus on whether those stresses would become wider

spread. And there was concern, if you recall, when SVB failed, the Fed also set— had to set up an emergency lending facility, the bank term funding program, and that allowed banks to— that were having liquidity issues— to put these securities that they were holding on their balance sheet at face value, they could actually put them at the Fed at fair value and borrow against them so they wouldn't have to sell them. That program, combined with what the Treasury and FDIC did for some of the banks, which basically said, we're going to make sure that all deposits are insured, that kind of quelled the stresses. So, you know, the FMC felt, you know, that there was risk out there of continuing on its campaign of raising interest

rates, but it was the right thing to do from a monetary policy point of view. And then we'd have to very, very— be attuned to those risks, because if they did— you know, you need to have a healthy banking system for two reasons. One, you want monetary policy, whatever action you take on the policy front, to actually transmit through the broader economy. When the financial markets aren't working, when they're disruptive, monetary policy won't transmit. But also, we wanted the banks to remain healthy and not pull back on all the credit extension, because they were actually support— helping to support the economy as well. So there was a lot of discussion about— and, you know, we've got to continue monitoring

this. But we were able to persevere and and put another interest rate increase in. And that's thanks to— really likes to use, you know, regulation, supervision, macro credential, to the extent we have it in the US. Tools to focus on financial stability. And then have its monetary policy tools, interest rate increases or asset purchases and balance sheet policies, really focused on the macro policy goals of full employment and price stability. And so we were able to do that, but there was a lot of attention paid to, we are taking some risk here. And you'd have to sort of make an evaluation of whether you thought we could continue on that. And we were looking at that. I think the broader question, Itay, and maybe this is

one that you were alluding to, was— you know, we— we were raising interest rates very quickly. You know, unprecedented quickness in how we were having to raise interest rates. We had to do that, given where inflation was. But no one felt that, you know, we, we— that— we would have preferred not to have to do that. Let's put it that way. But monetary policy was so out of position for where it needed to be, given what was going on in the macro economy, that we we had to do that. So I think one of the lessons is, is don't let your monetary policy get out of position. Always maintain it being in a good position, which means always being attuned to the risk. Upside risk, downside risk, inflation risk, unemployment

risk, so that you aren't in a position where you feel you have to really move quickly and at large increases or decreases, which can be hard for financial markets and institutions to handle. Yeah, that's a that's a very important lesson. So Hyun, turning back to you, you sit in the Bank for International Settlements, and you think a lot about international coordination of financial regulation and supervision, what happens with cross border transactions and international banks. And you know, to some extent what happened in March of 2023, a lot of it was concentrated in the US, but then we saw how the panic and sentiment kind of spread over and affected Credit Suisse in Switzerland. Even though the fundamentals there,

the situation there, was very different. So what do you think are the lessons going forward for coordination at the international level? Well, Itay, I think, of course, you know, regulation is— is going to be a— you know, very important, you know, building block in— in any kind of financial stability framework. But let me just underline one thing that Loretta said, which I think is very, very important, which is that— as well as the regulation, which is clearly, you know, very important. And that is something that is discussed at the International forums like the— like the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision. Supervision itself is going to be really the key, actually. And I think what

the events of last year showed was how important it is to get the basics of supervision right. So the way— the way you should think about the difference between regulation and supervision is, you know, regulation are the hard rules. You know, the ratios, particular numbers, capital and liquidity and so on. But the supervision really has to do with, you know, the business model. How coherent is it? How good is the risk management? And as Loretta explained very well, you know, it was those business model issues, the risk management issues, which really came to the fore. And so before we even go to regulation, I think we have to emphasize how important supervision is. And that's really done at the

national level. So it's the national supervisors who are, you know, in the driving seat. Now, with the regulation, what— what will be important for the international, you know, forums like the Basel Committee, would be when competition also becomes part of the— part of the discussion. So one of the— you know, if you— if you go back to the very first Basel Capital Accord, back in 1988, you know that that accord came about because of this— because of the consensus, I think, among all the supervisors, that there needed to be a way to make sure that the internationally active banks who compete in various, you know, markets globally, are competing on a level playing field. So, you know, no one jurisdiction is—

you know, that is deviating very much from others, in that, you know, one— in that that jurisdiction, its bank somehow has an advantage, you know, competitively. And so it's a way to prevent this race to the bottom, or potential race to the bottom, where, if the competition is unfair, then some banks may be at a greater advantage relative to other banks. And so that's really the role of the international coordination. And this is what the Basel Committee is— you know, has been a very, very important piece in this— in this international discussion. But it's very important to emphasize that the— you know, it is the national supervisors who are in the driving seat. And whatever is discussed in the Basel Committee

doesn't have the same kind of legal force as, you know, something like an international treaty. I mean, it's very much a discussion shop. And whatever is discussed is then implemented by the national— you know, by the national authorities. So I think— so to that extent, the lessons that I think we learned in March of last year, they're being actively discussed in ways— through various, if you like, strengthening at the national level of the national regulation. So liquidity, clearly, is a very important part of this. And, you know, this is still, you know, very much in process at the moment. But I think it's— I would say that the— that the role of international discussions has to be sort of, you know, put in

this broader context. So there is a fairly limited role there in terms of coming up with specific recommendations. But it's very much a part of the consensus building among the national supervisors. - Okay. And a different aspect of government intervention, government involvement, I would say, is deposit insurance. For many years, this was a very important part of addressing financial fragility and preventing crisis. We saw that deposit insurance was updated in the US in 2008 following the beginning of the global financial crisis. Since then, it hasn't been updated. But then in March of 2023, after the run on SVB and the beginning of runs in other banks, there was this shift to kind of implying that everyone will be guaranteed,

whether they are insured or not. And now there are discussions. Maybe the policy should be updated. Maybe there shouldn't be a limit. Maybe there should be some distinction on what is the limit on different kinds of deposit, different kind of accounts. So where do you think this is going, deposit insurance? And I think either one of you could take this question. Well, Itay, you're right. There are a lot of proposals out there. I mean, whenever I— whenever I think about these things, I always think about you, you want to sort of have market discipline working with bank supervision and bank regulatory rules, including deposit insurance. So I'm not sure the first place I would go would necessarily be to just

have a blanket increase in the cap on deposit insurance, which is at 250,000 per depositor at this point. But there are things that are probably worth considering. I mean, and one thing is, is well— that's smaller now than when it was set in 2008. Because, of course, the economy has gotten bigger. So there are people who think that, well, you could just adjust— you should adjust that just on that ground. But I also think you want to think a little more thoughtfully about, one, what would be the trade off there? Because someone has to pay for that higher level of a deposit insurance. Right now, the banks pay fees. But if they're paying that, and they're covering that, then of course, they wouldn't be

able to lend as much. So you have to think about whether that's the right approach. I think one thing that became clear in this SVB situation was that, you know, a lot of their customers and firms, and even of other regional banks, were really concerned that they wouldn't be able to pay their customers, you know, pay their workers. You know, payroll. They were doing payroll services. And so there is an idea that you could distinguish business accounts, transactions accounts, from other kinds of deposits and have a special account and special, you know, deposit insurance for those, because those are really important for the functioning of the economy. But the whole idea of these is to try to make sure that depositors don't feel that

they're in a situation that they have to run to be the first to take their money out of the bank. The other approach, aside from deposit insurance, which I think for the US in particular, is— and there's work going on— is, you know, we have a discount window. And the discount window is the Federal Reserve, as a central bank, lends to healthy firms when they have temporary liquidity problems, as long as it's backed with, you know, good collateral. In the case of— of this, of the stresses in March, you know, it became very clear that the regional banks— not the ones that were on the way to failure, but the ones that were finding that it was hard to fund in the— in the environment that we were in with the stress— were very reluctant to come to the

discount window. They didn't— they didn't really feel that they could, without stigmatizing themselves. And I— in other countries, their lending is not as stigmatized. At some countries, it's not at all, compared to the US. So there's work going on at the Federal Reserve to try to make the discount window much more attractive in terms of making sure that banks know and are well positioned to be able to use the discount window. So for example, you know, the legal documents that— agreements that have to be in place— there's a big campaign to make sure that firms, the banks and institutions that are eligible to borrow at the discount window, have those already in place. That they have collateral

already evaluated, so that they can borrow much more quickly than was the case during the stresses of March 2023. So— and that has been very worthwhile. I think, the number of institutions now— I think that if you think— if you think about banks, as well as credit unions, who are eligible to borrow, it's probably around 8000 institutions. And I think it's well over 5000 that have those legal documents in place now. So there's been work to try to do that. But ultimately, it's still a bit stigmatized. Even if— even if banks are able to borrow, will they borrow? And so there's work going on to try to maybe give a carrot as well as a stick. So for example, include discount window contingent funding as part of the liquidity

plans that banks have to submit as part of their showing that they're doing safe and sound liquidity management. Or, you know, making sure that borrowing from the discount window doesn't count against the bank in terms of their supervisory treatment. So there's work going on to try to destigmatize the discount window and make it part of the plan for contingent funding that— that institutions have. And I think that's very promising, and that may be as promising as any kind of reform of the deposit insurance. Hyun, did you want to add to that? Yeah. Let— let me add, Itay, that, you know, as— as Loretta laid out very well, I think we have to think about the deposit insurance discussion within the broader context of liquidity

risk for the bank, and how you would manage that liquidity risk. So you know, simply focusing on deposits would not address, for example, some of the issues that banks faced during the GFC. You know, when the problem was the wholesale funding market. And the run, if you like, on some of those banks were happening because some of the wholesale creditors were shrinking their exposure, you know, for their own risk management reasons. And so it's— you know, it's more prudent behavior. It's more prudent lending on the parts of the— of the party that's shrinking that funding, but it looks like a run, if you're, you know, on the receiving end. So it has to be— so the discussion about— about about deposit insurance should

be placed in this broader context of funding risk, you know, for the— for the bank. And as Loretta laid out very well, the— a crucial part of that is the role of a central bank as the lender of last resort. And what it would take for the collateral framework, or the— you know, the criteria and the rule book for the emergency, you know, funding from the central bank to be done without— you know, without the kind of, you know, the— the stigma issues that Loretta mentioned. Okay, so we're coming very close to the end here. I want to finish by thinking about the future of the banking system, and maybe give each one of you a minute to reflect on, are we going towards a different kind of financial system, a different

kind of banking system? You know, one thing that we see is more consolidation. As Loretta mentioned before, there was a run from the small banks to the large banks. So maybe we will have fewer and fewer smaller banks going forward. Something else, of course that comes to mind is the digitization and the fact that digital deposits are much easier to withdraw, and maybe the liquidity that banks have is no longer adequate to deal with that. So where are we going in terms of the future of the banking system? I know this is very broad, but this is a concluding question. And please, each one of you just take a minute or so to reflect on that. Yeah, Itay, maybe I can just kick off with a very, you know, quick point

about the distinctive, you know, nature of banks. I mean, banks are distinctive in that deposits are the main means of payment. So, you know, we— we execute payments by, you know, debiting the account of the sender and crediting the account of the receiver, and it settles through the central bank's balance sheet. So in that respect, you know, banks are not only, you know, bringing in funding and lending, they're also essential for the— for the monetary system to work. And what we've been doing, actually, at the BIS, is to— to use some of the technological innovations. In particular, we have a project called Agora, which is about revamping correspondent banking by using tokenization.

And tokenization is this idea that you can have claims in transfer on a programmable platform. And so you can really build in contingencies and— and other features. And— and I think if we look to the future, my sense is that we will be speaking more and more about the role of banks as the pillars of the monetary system, you know, as well as intermediaries that lend. Loretta? Yeah. I— I don't disagree with that. I mean, but I'd also point out that everyone— you know, we— we have these problems every— periodically. They come up in the industry, and there's always people who say it's the end of the industry, and everything's going to become

non-bank. Well, the banking industry's been around forever. And I think it will change, and I think the regulatory supervisory structure will have to change, in order to make sure that we have financial stability, which is crucial for a healthy economy. And, you know, the distribution of the size of banks is likely to change, because, you know, technological changes, and— you know, some of my own research shows that the— you know, an efficient size of a bank is much larger now than it used to be. But it mean that community banks won't stay, and still do what they do best, which is lend to their local community. So I think

it will change over time. What I'm hoping is in the US, we get a little bit of a simpler structure. Because it's very different from in a lot of other countries. But I think the role, the important role that banks have— and as Hyun points out, they're— they're becoming more and more important in terms of the payment system. And of course, the Fed launched its instant payment system, you know, over a year ago, and it it's being built up now, in terms of more and more firms becoming customers of FedNow. I think that's sort of where things are going,

and technology can be very helpful to more efficient, more safe, more sound banking. But it also shows, in the speed of the runs that occur, it also can lead to more challenges. So I think we are in a very exciting time of change. But fundamentally, if you think back to the stresses of March 2023, it wasn't a big esoteric thing that went on. It was just basic poor risk management, and weak supervision. And I think those are things that we all have to take to heart, whichever side you're on. If you're a bank, banker, or a regulator-slash-supervisor,

in that we can do the basics better than we showed that we were doing in March 2023. Okay. A lot to think about. Thank you very much, Loretta and Hyun, for a very stimulating discussion. And thank you for everyone who was listening. Thank you, Itay. Thank you very much. - Thank you.

Tension

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