How to Stop States from Borrowing Too Much Money

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📂 Public Policy 🏷️ Research

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  1. I'd like to welcome Vinton Buccola do knowledge at work man he is a professor of legal studies and business ethics
  2. here and he's written an interesting paper about excessive state debt and a new approach to this problem there's a
  3. worry a concern that some state debt around the world I guess could end up in default creating lots of problems for
  4. investors and capital markets and Vince I'd like to leave it to you to explain what this paper is about and what some
  5. of the findings were sure thanks Steven so this paper or this position brief is based on a paper published in the Duke
  6. Law Journal it takes up the problem of state over borrowing and I mean here states of the United States Illinois
  7. California and so on and the paper really has to conclusions for policymakers one of them is negative or
  8. sort of pessimistic and one of them is maybe more optimistic so I'll just take this one at a time i'll stop the the
  9. pessimistic findings so in the aftermath of the financial crisis a number of policymakers politicians and scholars
  10. saw in the leverage or over-leveraged of a number of american states like Illinois New Jersey California some of
  11. the same moral hazard or too big to fail thinking that was part of the cause any
  12. way of the financial crisis in Wall Street the idea is that the institution note can over borrow knowing that if
  13. things get bad enough there's a federal back stop there and therefore lenders are more willing to extend and
  14. overextend credit so these thinkers in most prominent was probably my colleague and friend at the law school here at
  15. Penn David Skeel proposed a bankruptcy mechanism a new law that would allow states in addition to cities and towns
  16. which can already file for bankruptcy this would allow states to file and they thought this might relieve turn off the
  17. spigot by allowing there to be a mechanism that would give creditors a haircut the idea would be to forestall a
  18. federal bailout so the negative conclusion of my paper is that the bankruptcy mechanism won't
  19. work to reduce state borrowing and the basic problem is an old very old legal doctrine called sovereign immunity this
  20. doctrine dates at least into the 19th century and the idea is that because the American states are thought of as
  21. sovereigns they can reject any claims on to pay debts they can simply walk away from them so in other words they don't
  22. need a bankruptcy mechanism and the way this works is that if someone Sue's a state for a debt say on a bond the state
  23. can decline to be sued so there's no remedy and the upshot is that states can already walk away from deaths if they
  24. want to they don't need bankruptcy mechanism and they won't opt in to one unless they're given sweeteners let me
  25. ask you what are what were the main conclusions of your research as you looked into this but also as a preface
  26. to that is there a history of states defaulting has it happened in what have been the results yeah so the earliest
  27. state defaults were in the 19th century a wave of financial panics caused state defaults in the 1840s 1870s after the
  28. Civil War the most recent state default was Arkansas is during the Depression I think it was 1933 but I might be wrong
  29. on the exact date so yeah there is you know I think people tend to think that the states are risk-free and they're not
  30. they haven't historically been and and the the law is solid in the sense that there's no legal repercussions there are
  31. obviously reputational consequences to default but but not legal so what were your main takeaways from your research
  32. sure I think there they really are twofold one is that a kind of any kind of ex post mechanism a kind of illegal
  33. mechanism that tries to work on borrowing after the fact after things have done bad is not going to work and
  34. the second takeaway relates to an idea I develop in the paper called tax credit borrowing which is a way to get around
  35. the this problem of sovereign immunity that I'm that I mentioned and the tax credit borrowing may have
  36. um more hope or more promise than a bankruptcy mechanism and what is that exactly sure so the idea of tax credit
  37. borrowing is that you that a state borrows just like it or not I would think of a bond the prompt the state
  38. problems is to pay a coupon annually however periodically they want but instead of promising an outlay of cash
  39. the state promises a tax credit some credit that can be applied against a tax bill owed to the state and the idea this
  40. really is just to circumvent that sovereign immunity doctrine I was mentioning under the settled law
  41. sovereign immunity only applies to a state as a defendant in court it does not apply to a state as a plaintiff in
  42. court so the logic of tax credit borrowing is that the owner of the bond say or the obligation can assert the
  43. right to decrease taxes and if the state doesn't like that or wants to default will say the state must sue rather than
  44. be sued and by toggling the plaintiff defendant distinction as sort of trivial as that sounds maybe to a non-lawyer you
  45. get a radically different result that's interesting so a company obviously would
  46. have to have substantial business interest in that state in a substantial tax obligation in order for that to to
  47. make sense is that often who's investing is in it sort of big investors with institutions in New York and so forth um
  48. you know it with municipal and state that there actually are a lot of individuals or owners so the way I
  49. really foresee Tax Credit barn working is that the tax credit would coupon say would just be sort of an option on for
  50. the holder so in the ordinary run of business the taxpayer that I'm sorry the holder of the obligation just gets paid
  51. as an ordinary bond but the taxpayer or the holders one would have an option to use it as an offset against a tax bill
  52. so it would only come into play if a state was let's say teetering financially and wanting to default in
  53. this way so is the other thing I'm wondering is would that would that be a sweetener for states to be able to to to
  54. get a lower interest rates or is that federal back app already providing something
  55. equivalent yeah so I the short answer is I think it would allow states to borrow
  56. more cheaply it's a way of creating a lower risk state instrument there are 22 observations that one is we're not sure
  57. how much of over barling really is attributable to moral hazard that's too big to fail idea i think actually tax
  58. credit borrowing would help researchers like myself get a better purchase on how
  59. much of over borrowing is really caused by that sort of moral hazard and how much is due to other political failures
  60. you know and then the last thing I'd add about the text credit borrowing is not not just about allowing states to borrow
  61. at cheaper interest rates there are a lot of constituents what you might say creditors of states who are not
  62. bondholders I'm thinking employees with retirement plans and so on who could really use a little safety I would
  63. probably be willing to give up a little juice for for our consider for for the safety of a return down the line I think
  64. their tax credit borrowing is you know I introduce it in this paper as a mechanism to reduce the over borrowing
  65. incentive at the state level but I think it has other potential uses so states could see this as a way to lower their
  66. financial costs I'm if they if they so chose I think that's right yeah sorry interesting as you looked into this
  67. where their conclusions or findings that surprised you yeah 11 rise is an historical I thought that I was coming
  68. up with this mechanism out of sort of scratch but as I conducted research I found out that the state of Virginia I
  69. guess the Commonwealth of Virginia actually used tax credit borrowing in the aftermath of the Civil War in the
  70. 1870s so some lawyers in Richmond were smart enough to figure this out and in fact Virginia tried to repudiate these
  71. tax credits and they were upheld in the courts so that was a big surprise we have some precedent yeah that's right
  72. what are some of the other practical implications for this that maybe have them covered just yet so I think for
  73. for investors and for employees at the state level it's important to know this is not this is not unique or new from my
  74. work but it's important to know that states can walk away from their obligations a lot of general obligation
  75. bonds and according to some constitutions state pension obligations are said to be backed by the state's
  76. Full Faith and Credit it's a common language and a lot of people assume that means it's impossible for the state to
  77. default you should know it's not impossible and states have done it before they will probably do it again
  78. okay so that would be one of the misperceptions that the public may have about these kinds of things that because
  79. it hasn't happened since the 30s that that it's unlikely to happen and it does it does seem like an unlikely thing and
  80. yet if you can provide a guarantee against it and at the same time incentivize States to perhaps lower
  81. their borrowing closet that that's an interesting thing and how much might Lauren cause be lowered is it a quarter
  82. percent an eight percent anyway to any way to judge that you know I'm not sure and I'm probably would not be the best
  83. at figuring this out I think the case is that the better the financial situation
  84. of a given state the less this tax credit borrowing mechanism matters so if there's a prudent highly solvent state
  85. it's not going to change borrowing costs at all but then again I'm we're not so concerned about that states motive on so
  86. it's more an issue as a state is under increasingly dire financial situation this the tax credit bar will have a
  87. bigger impact I don't know how to quantify that any states around right now that are in that position Illinois
  88. okay Illinois Illinois is not doing is not doing well its Supreme Court has in the past couple of years issued rulings
  89. that make it look difficult to restructure pension obligations there which are a major driver of costs and
  90. the city of Chicago is in financial trouble as well if you're trying to understand the fiscal picture at state
  91. and municipal levels you often in some ways need to look at together because states can offload some
  92. of their own obligations to the to their own municipalities or if municipalities
  93. are doing badly the state can back them up if both of state and its major municipalities major cities are
  94. simultaneously on the rocks financially that's a bad picture all right what what
  95. else about this whole idea would be interesting to know that we haven't talked about or have we covered it ah
  96. we've covered this research okay I'm what what I'm doing now is watching watching what's happening in Puerto Rico
  97. it's not a state but in and so the sovereign immunity doctrine i mentioned doesn't apply there but it'll be
  98. interesting to see what happens there there's some question whether puerto ricans going to be a warm-up for
  99. illinois we'll have to see and presumably they could offer some sort of a coupon that was in effect a tax break
  100. for let's say certain investors that that had enough business there that they be able to offset the tax obligation i
  101. think that's right okay well thanks for coming in thank for an interesting stuff
  102. you [Music]

Brief Summary

Vinton Buccola discusses state debt, bankruptcy mechanisms, and introduces tax credit borrowing as a potential solution to over-borrowing issues.

Key points

  • The Problem of State Debt. Vinton Buccola discusses excessive state debt and its implications for investors and markets.
  • Bankruptcy Mechanism Ineffectiveness. Buccola explains why a proposed bankruptcy mechanism won't help reduce state borrowing.
  • Tax Credit Borrowing Explained. A new approach to circumvent sovereign immunity and reduce state borrowing costs.
  • Historical Context of State Defaults. A look at the history of state defaults and their implications for the future.
  • Misconceptions About State Defaults. Buccola addresses public misconceptions regarding the risk of state defaults.

Tension

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